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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form. An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Contact Group Insists on B-H as 'One State' *[Belgrade Radio]* 1
Contact Group's Plan Detailed *[AFP]* 1
Muslims 'Will Not Completely Reject' Plan *[TANJUG]* 2
Silajdzic 'Not Totally Pessimistic' *[AFP]* 2
Karadzic on Plan as 'American Diktat' *[AFP]* 2

ALBANIA

Implications of Zhulali's U.S. Visit Viewed *[ALEANCA 28 Jun]* 3
U.S. Balkan Policy Seen as 'Pro-Greek' *[BALLI I KOMBIT 30 Jun]* 3
Biography of Army Chief of Staff Published *[USHTRIA DHE KOHA 2 Jul]* 4
Prefectures Created; Eight Prefects Named *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 18 May]* 4
Difficulties in Rail Transport Industry Viewed *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 19 May]* 4
Socialist Party Statute Published *[ZERI I POPULLIT 15 May]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

President Havel Returns From U.S. *[Prague Radio]* 14
Iraqi Foreign Minister Comments on Visit *[Prague TV]* 14
Economic Agreement Signed *[Baghdad INA]* 14
New Border Crossing Opens With Austria *[LIDOVE NOVINY 4 Jul]* 15
290,000 Slovaks Possess Czech Citizenship *[RUDE PRAVO 2 Jul]* 15
RDP Group Wants To Conduct Trade in Arms *[LIDOVE NOVINY 2 Jul]* 15
Minister Presents 1993 Environment Report *[LIDOVE NOVINY 1 Jul]* 16

SLOVAKIA

Meciar Discusses Politics, Elections, Media *[SMENA 17 Jun]* 17
SDL's Weiss on Possible Coalition With HZDS *[SME 4 Jul]* 20
HZDS, SDL 'Fight' for Economic Control *[SME 4 Jul]* 21
DS Official Justifies Asking Hagyari To Quit *[SME 4 Jul]* 21
Hagyari Ready To Resign *[SME 4 Jul]* 22
KSU Leaders Issue Statement Against Chairman *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 30 Jun]* 22
Klepac Responds to Criticism *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 1 Jul]* 22
SNS Offers Places to KSU Dissidents *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 2 Jul]* 22
SKOI Presents Election Candidates *[SME 2 Jul]* 23
HZPCS Registers, Expects To Win Election *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 2 Jul]* 23
Parliament Approves Bills on Social Allowances *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 4 Jul]* 23
Reactors at Nuclear Plant To Shut Down in 2000 *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 2 Jul]* 24
Pakistanis Complete UNPROFOR Training *[PRAVDA 1 Jul]* 24

POLAND

Officials, Papers Preview Clinton Visit 25
Visit Previewed *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 6 Jul]* 25
Security Measures Discussed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6 Jul]* 25
Olechowski Voices Hopes *[Warsaw Radio]* 26
Policy Shifts Examined *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 6 Jul]* 26

Daily Speculates About 'Baggage' *[TRYBUNA 6 Jul]* 28
Clinton's Position on Abortion Criticized *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 5 Jul]* 29
Sejm Postpones Concordat Issue *[Warsaw Radio]* 30
Olechowski Protests Decision *[Warsaw Radio]* 30
NBP President on Inflation, Redenomination *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 5 Jul]* 30

ROMANIA

Iliescu's 'Attacks' on Opposition Assessed *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 30 Jul]* 33
Iliescu Views Impeachment, Domestic Issues *[Bucharest Radio]* 33
Answers Questions From Media *[Bucharest Radio]* 36

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Ganic Promises To Consider Latest Proposal *[London TV]* 41
Silajdzic Denies Iran Supplying Arms *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 5 Jul]* 41
UN Officers Fear Increase in Sniper Activity *[AFP]* 42
Fighting in Northern Posavina Corridor *[AFP]* 43
General Delic Views Cooperation With HVO *[DELO 31 Jun]* 43
Police Beat Up Muslims, Croats in Banja Luka *[AFP]* 47
Serbs Prevent Flights by UN Helicopters *[AFP]* 47

CROATIA

Valentic, FYROM Counterpart Hold Talks *[HINA]* 48
Russian UN Troops Block Osijek Workers *[HINA]* 48
Djukic: 'Reintegration' Solution for Serbs *[VJESNIK 1 Jul]* 48
Data on New Army Promotions, Generals *[GLOBUS 3 Jun]* 49

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Gligorov Discusses Regional Relations *[VECERNJI LIST 29 Jun]* 54
Albanian Deputies To Boycott Assembly *[TANJUG]* 57
PDP Comments on Boycott *[MILS-NEWS 5 Jul]* 57
Census Commission Announces Preliminary Results *[MILS-NEWS 6 Jul]* 58
Albanians To Request Extended Deadline *[MILS-NEWS 6 Jul]* 58
Skopje Police Interrogate Albanian TV Team *[Tirana TV]* 58
Air Force Receives Russian-Made Helicopters *[TANJUG]* 59
Defense Ministry: Straza Peak 'Demilitarized' *[MILS-NEWS 5 Jul]* 59

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Army Statement on Moving Units Near FYROM *[TANJUG]* 60
Article Views Border Problems With FYROM *[VOJSKA 30 Jun]* 60
Simic Outlines Government Stance to UK Envoy *[TANJUG]* 61

Montenegro

Croatian Envoy Arrives in Podgorica for Talks *[HINA]* 61

Contact Group Insists on B-H as 'One State'

AU0507184994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Report by Dragan Milosavljevic from Geneva]

[Text] The five ministers of the Contact Group ended their session in Geneva this afternoon with a joint statement in which they demanded that the warring sides accept the peace ultimatum or suffer [words indistinct] sanctions or the introduction of new sanctions. As the chairman, [Russian Foreign Minister] Andrey Kozyrev, said on behalf of the five, the Contact Group's experts will present the solution—that is, the entire package with maps and constitutional solutions—to the warring sides tomorrow.

The five ministers have decided on Bosnia as one state within its internationally recognized borders, where solutions of delineation will be offered to [word indistinct] that will acknowledge the interests of all sides and represent guarantees for future peace, Kozyrev stated. The Russian minister said right at the beginning that the five—the United States, Russia, and the EU representatives—agreed on all the details in their joint platform ABOut the implementation of the peace plan, which is entirely a product of joint efforts.

(?They had) to take this action and decide on these measures because the Bosnian conflict poses a danger that could trigger a war of international dimensions, Kozyrev said. We firmly support even that part of the plan that will allow refugees to return to their abandoned homes, he said. We are willing to embark on the implementation immediately if the Bosnian sides reply positively to the proposed maps and other solutions. If the Serbs accept the lines drawn on the maps, we will in return start the process of gradually lifting the sanctions, Kozyrev said.

In the meantime a delegation from the Srpska republic, led by president Radovan Karadzic, has arrived in Geneva. In an interview for Yugoslav reporters, Karadzic said: [words indistinct] the maps will be accepted with difficulty or not at all. However, we will make some necessary [word indistinct] in the interest of peace, naturally, provided that strategically important territories are not in question, Karadzic said.

In the course of the afternoon session, while the conference of the five ministers was under way, the so-called Islamic Conference started in the Palace of Nations, chaired by Alija Izetbegovic. Izetbegovic in his address called for the solidarity of the Islamic world with the Bosnians and said: We will not reject the plan directly and relentlessly. We expect your further political support. We have imported a certain quantity of arms regardless of the arms embargo because we consider this to be our moral right. However, we need more means and more arms on the 1,500-km front, where we have been fighting the Serbs.

Contact Group's Plan Detailed

AU0507193794 Paris AFP in English 1911 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Excerpts] Geneva, July 5 (AFP)—Foreign ministers from Europe, Russia and the United States endorsed a carrot-or-stick peace plan for Bosnia Tuesday that threatens punishment for the Serbs and the Croat-Moslem federation if they reject it. [passage omitted]

The contact group plan reverts to previous schemes to "preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single union within its internationally recognised borders," said an official statement released by the ministers. This has long been a key demand of the Sarajevo authorities but could make the plan unacceptable to the Serbs who dream of creating a Greater Serbia. The newly formed Croat-Moslem Federation would be linked to the Bosnian Serb entity by "constitutional arrangements" to be agreed between the two sides.

To prod the Serbs to accept the plan, based on a near-even partition of land, the contact group threatened to exempt the Moslem-led government from a UN arms embargo if the Serbs balk. [passage omitted]

Ministers also hinted at a withdrawal of UN troops from Bosnia if the arms embargo was lifted, and warned UN Security Council resolutions on safe havens would be "rigorously enforced," raising the prospect of airstrikes against Serb forces. The necessary planning was underway, they added.

This veiled threat was underlined at a press conference by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, whose countries both have large contingents in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Previous air raids by North Alantic Treaty Organisation warplanes on Serb positions caused rifts between Russia, traditionally a Serb ally, and the West.

But as a sweetener for the Serbs, the ministers agreed that "sanctions (against the rump Yugoslavia) will be suspended, geared to their pullback to the lines indicated on the map." [passage omitted]

Hurd said ministers had agreed the incentives to signing up to the contact group blueprint, which he said offered "sticks and carrots." "The choice is not between half peace and total peace," he said. "It is between the kind of peace we have suggested and a relapse into complete war and going back to the savagery of snipers and artillery (barrages)." [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has rejected the outlines of the proposal as "humiliating," saying it destroyed all chances of survival for the Serbs.

Muslims 'Will Not Completely Reject' Plan

LD0507184794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1827 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Geneva, July 5 (TANJUG)—The Moslems will not completely reject the peace plan for Bosnia because they have "stabilized the lines of the front," Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic said on Tuesday. At a closed-door meeting with ambassadors of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (IOC) in Geneva, Izetbegovic said it would not be wise to reject all the conditions set in the "Bosnian package", according to sources close to the OIC. Izetbegovic said the tactic of drawing out political talks should continue to be applied instead.

According to the same sources, Izetbegovic said the delegation of the Moslem-Croat federation would not engage in any talks on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The U.S., Russian, British, French and German foreign ministers agreed on a "peace package" for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Geneva on Tuesday. The plan is to be presented to the Bosnian Serbs, Moslems and Croats on Wednesday.

Izetbegovic told the OIC ambassadors the Moslems were unable "to liberate their territories," although they had imported large quantities of weapons, to which he said they were entitled despite the embargo, and although they had produced some weapons themselves. The Bosnian Moslem leader urged the Islamic countries to provide even greater aid to the Moslems, since he said "our front is 1,500 kilometers long."

The embargo on arms deliveries to the territory of the former Yugoslavia was introduced by the U.N. Security Council on September 25, 1991. Despite the embargo, Islamic countries have been aiding the Bosnian Moslems with war materiel and mujahedin.

Izetbegovic said the Moslems would be offered a four-week extension of the current ceasefire, and they would accept the offer if it proved to be in line with the current political initiatives. However, the ceasefire, which will expire on July 10, is being violated by the Bosnian Moslems who are trying to capture as much territory as possible before a final political solution is reached.

The U.S. Administration has no doubts that the Moslem government in Sarajevo will accept the plan for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, abthough it falls short of the Moslem ambitions. The U.S. seems to have suggested to the Moslem government in Sarajevo to leave it to the Serbs to reject the plan.

U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher said in a statement made during his flight to Geneva on Monday that, if the Serbs failed to accept the peace plan, a series of measures would gradually be taken, ending with the exemption of the Moslems from the U.N. arms embargo.

Silajdzic 'Not Totally Pessimistic'

AU0607105594 Paris AFP in English 0952 GMT 6 Jul 94

[Text] Geneva, July 6 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic on Wednesday said there were "serious deficiencies" with an international peace plan presented to the warring parties, but did not reject it out of hand. Speaking after being presented with details of the blueprint by officials from the contact group on Bosnia, Silajdzic said the Bosnian side wanted further details on implementation of the plan and sanctions against the Serbs if they reject the deal.

"I am not totally pessimistic," he said in response to questions by reporters outside his Geneva hotel after about two hours of talks with officials from the contact group at the Russian Mission here. "The solution, especially in eastern Bosnia, has serious deficiencies, and some genocide areas, like Prijedor, are going to be controlled by those who perpetrated those crimes."

He said a decision on acceptance of the plan by the newly-formed Croat-Moslem Federation would be made in Sarajevo, possibly by the Moslem-dominated parliament.

The contact group, comprising Russia, the United States and major European powers, endorsed here Tuesday a "carrot-or-stick" peace plan providing for a 51/49 percent split of Bosnia between the federation and a Bosnian Serb entity, but retains Bosnia as a unitary state within its current borders. The foreign ministers warned of a sliding scale of international reprisals against the warring parties if they rejected the deal.

Karadzic on Plan as 'American Diktat'

AU0607110094 Paris AFP in English 1039 GMT 6 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, July 6 (AFP)—The peace plan put forward by an international contact group "resembles an American diktat," Bosnian Serb Radovan Karadzic told Pale radio from Geneva Wednesday. "Unfortunately, it looks like the other four members (of the contact group—the European powers, Russia and the United Nations) have not contributed anything of their own views to the peace package," he said.

Karadzic did not say whether his side would reject the plan, but he dismissed a threat contained in the plan for the gradual lifting of the arms embargo against the Moslems should the Serbs reject the plan. "This is not a serious threat because the embargo does not exist," he said. "The Moslems are getting weapons," he added.

Karadzic spoke as Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said in Geneva there were "serious deficiencies" with an international peace plan presented to the warring parties, but did not reject it out of hand. Speaking after being presented with details of the blueprint by officials from the contact group on Bosnia, Silajdzic said the Bosnian side wanted further details on implementation of the plan and sanctions against the Serbs if they reject the deal.

Implications of Zhulali's U.S. Visit Viewed

AU0407072394 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 28 Jun 94 p 3

[Commentary by Blendi Fevziu: "Zhulali—One of West's Favorite Interlocutors"]

[Text] Back home from a second visit in less than a year to the United States, Defense Minister Zhulali did not conceal his enthusiasm about his meetings held there. Moreover, Radio-Television broadcast some of his recorded meetings, but he failed to mention a detail which is not unimportant: Zhulali is the only Albanian official received with protocol in the United States. A year ago, he was received in Washington with military honors, the national anthems being played, and other honors conferred on him. This undoubtedly pertained to a minister invited by the Pentagon, but such ceremonies had never been conducted for any other Albanian dignitaries, including President Berisha.

The goals of U.S. policy toward Albania, consisting mainly in military cooperation and interests, were frequently reiterated by the press at the time and reinforced in the declarations made by several foreign diplomats. Furthermore, the U.S. Balkan policy, steered along strategic interests for more than 50 years, had to redress something within this new orientation.

Albania, situated in a key geographical and political position, and given the large number of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], could not possibly be left out of U.S. attention. In the meantime, however, Minister Zhulali's second visit in less than a year had a somewhat different form from the first one. Zhulali was invited for a visit to the United States by the South Carolina National Guard, but in less than 48 hours he was flown to Washington, where he met U.S. high dignitaries, among them Defense Secretary William Perry in person. Almost all Albanian ministers have traveled to the Unied States, invited by various bodies, associations, or societies, but none of them could meet their opposite number in Washington. Foreign Minister Serreqi himself, in several visits to the United States, has not succeeded in meeting at least once Mr. Christopher, and even Prime Minister Meksi could not escape from this protocol regulation.

Placed in a different Balkan configuration, and arranged in a hurry, Zhulali's visit seems to have been more incited by the Pentagon rather than organized by the National Guard of South Carolina, where perhaps nobody knows that a Ministry of Defense exists in Albania or that its office-holder is called Safet Zhulali. Unable, of course, to arrange in less than a year a second official visit for the Albanian minister, the Pentagon made use of a marginal pretext. This visit, which happened to coincide with the announcement in the Greek press about President Clinton's letter to President Berisha, seems to have clarified once again the Albanian position regarding the Balkan policy, and the U.S. guarantee to Albania as well, provided Albania permanently abided by this position.

The United States, which has guaranteed Macedonian independence by sending in its peace-keeping force there, seems to be determined to carry its mission right to the end. The Clinton-Papandreou talks and Zhulali's visit to the States have buffered the blows of Macedonia's two neighbors and their claims upon this country, which is on the eve of conducting its population census, and threatened more than ever by internal conflicts. The Albanian Army, which in case of emergency will have Zhulali as its commander, has already been advised to show restraint, and guaranteed in turn that the conflict would not spread southwards to smear the Kosovo Albanians with blood. Otherwise, in case of trouble, the United States, according to Clinton, will entrench itself and point guns against the Serbs.

Speaking of the U.S. moral and material help to Albania, Zhulali did not anyhow mention in his news conference whether our relations with Greece were discussed in his talks. However, these relations must have had an important place in these talks, as Greece is a member of NATO, and Papandreou has discussed them in his direct meeting with Clinton.

Zhulali's meetings and visits once again prove the existence of a U.S. military interest in Albania—the first country to have abandoned the Warsaw Treaty—and it remains for the defense minister to play an important role on the political front, too.

U.S. Balkan Policy Seen as 'Pro-Greek'

AU0307200394 Tirana BALLI I KOMBIT in Albanian 30 Jun 94 p 2

[K.M.-signed commentary: Why Did Omonia's Representative Go to the U.S.A.?]

[Text] The other day a group of Omonia [Greek minority political organization in Albania] representatives left for the United States for talks with high U.S. Government officials. These meetings, sponsored by the Greek Government, have sparked interest because of the fact that they were organized just after the keen interest shown by President Clinton, who, in a letter sent to President Berisha, expressed his concern regarding Greek-Albanian relations. It appears that the U.S. President's interest in Greek-Albanian relations is not something of a routine nature. It is expressed and confirmed within the framework of a pro-Greek diplomatic spirit, which in most probability, has been implanted in the new U.S. President's mind, and upon which his possible consultations with advisers of Greek descent have perhaps had their impact also.

The fact that Omonia's representatives are going to meet high U.S. Government officials, who previously were not interested in getting acquainted with official documents

regarding this issue, make us suspect that U.S. diplomacy is using the minority card in the Balkans, to hold the newly-created Balkan states tightly in its diplomatic grip. We are within our rights to assume that in today's Balkan context, the United States is more interested in minorities, as an "apple of discord," rather than in the Balkan states themselves. This fact, for the time being, remains an enigma for the diplomatic analysts.

Biography of Army Chief of Staff Published

AU0507143894 Tirana USHTRIA DHE KOHA in Albanian 2 Jul 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Major General Sheme Kosova—Albanian Army Chief of General Staff]

[Text] Born on 24 March 1949 im Lumas, a district of Berat, in 1971 he became an army officer, specialised in all arms. From 1971 to 1977, he was the commander of various army units, and chief of brigade from 1977 to 1979. In 1981, he graduated from the Military Defense Academy, and was appointed the chief operative of a military unit, until 1984. From that year until 1991, he held the position of chief of staff in various army units. During the 1991 to 1992 period, he held the position of army division chief of staff, and in October 1992 was appointed director of the Operational and Military Preparedness Department.

He has performed all his duties with precision and military professionalism, distinguishing himself in organizational and leading skills. Strict requirements, perfect methods of work, and good communication with his dependents and superiors have served as a basis for his successful military career in fulfilling his tasks. He has been awarded various medals and orders. He is married and has two children.

Prefectures Created; Eight Prefects Named

94P20883A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 18 May 94 p 1

[Text] On the basis of Article 1 of Law No. 7608 of 22 September 1992 "On the Prefectures," the Council of Ministers has decided:

1. Twelve prefectures are established, with the following territorial areas:

—1. Shkoder Prefecture, with headquarters in Shkoder, which includes Shkoder, Malesi e Madhe, and Puke districts.

—2. Kukes Prefecture, with headquarters in Kukes, which includes Kukes, Tropoje, and Has districts.

—3. Lezhe Prefecture, with headquarters in Lezhe, which includes Lezhe, Lac, and Mirdite districts.

—4. Diber Prefecture, with headquarters in Peshkopi, which includes Diber, Bulqize, and Mat districts.

—5. Durres Prefecture, with headquarters in Durres, which includes Durres and Kruje districts.

—6. Tirana Prefecture, with headquarters in Tirana, which includes Kavaje District and Tirana Municipality.

—7. Elbasan Prefecture, with headquarters in Elbasan, which includes Elbasan, Peqin, Gramsh, and Librazhd districts.

—8. Korce Prefecture, with headquarters in Korce, which includes Pogradec, Devoll, Korce, and Kolonje districts.

—9. Berat Prefecture, with headquarters in Berat, which includes Berat, Kucove, and Skrapar districts.

—10. Fier Prefecture, with headquarters in Fier, which includes Fier, Lushnje, and Mallakaster districts.

—11. Vlore Prefecture, with headquarters in Vlore, which includes Vlore, Delvine, and Sarande districts.

—12. Gjirokaster Prefecture, with headquarters in Gjirokaster, which includes Gjirokaster, Tepelene, and Permet districts.

The Council of Ministers has appointed the following prefects:
Agron Milaj, in Berat;
Viktor Margilaj, in Durres;
Thanas Merkuri, in Elbasan;
Fatos Gjyrezi, in Gjirokaster;
Iliaz Vrioni, in Shkoder;
Pjerin Kiri, in Korce;
Esat Hasani, in Lezhe;
Artan Emiri, in Kukes.

Prefects have not yet been appointed in the Diber, Tirana, Fier, and Vlore prefectures.

Yesterday, Prime Minister Meksi, Minister [of Public Order] Musaraj, and Minister [Without Portfolio] Uka had their first working meeting with the newly appointed prefects.

Difficulties in Rail Transport Industry Viewed

94P20904A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 19 May 94 p 2

[Article by Stavri N. Risto: "Railroad Transportation Is Facing Difficulties That Can Be Surmounted"]

[Excerpts] Although railroad transport is less expensive, there is discrimination against it because of the supremacy of the automobile. Currently, only 2,000 tonness of its 8,000-tonne capacity are being utilized.

Hundreds of railroad cars, dozens of locomotives, a strong service and repair base, and more than 5,000 specialized workers in the railroad transport sector are faced with difficulties in surviving under conditions of the market economy. Competition, as a motivating force

of modern society, assumes that there will be equal rights in the economic game for partners who perform the same function. Concretely, this competition between automobile transport and rail transport should enjoy these rights and demonstrate its advantages under the conditions of a privatized economy.

Any delay, any resistance, and any foot-dragging which obstructs the rapid privatization of the economy, as our work with the railroads shows, results in the continuation of an extremely serious situation. Corrupt elements, people with no conscience, and those who are opposed to economic reform—of whom, there are many in the production enterprises, the supply and distribution bases, the transport enterprises, and the ports—are trying to damage state interests more and more.

Rail transport is one of the most productive forms of transport but, as a result of the aforementioned phenomena. It is confronted by great difficulties on a daily basis. These difficulties are most evident in freight transport. The question arises: Why are these difficulties being resolved in the area of passenger transport but not in freight transport? The most simple answer would be: A free citizen as an independent person, analyzes his own personal interests and chooses the most inexpensive type of transportation. Of course, there are also the rich who take a taxi or bus for comfort. But, why isn't such a solution implemented for freight transport?

The market economy gives every subject the right to choose the most advantageous type of transportation. So, for any economist, it is illogical to choose the more expensive over the less expensive. Concretely, the wheat marketing enterprise in Durres chose the most expensive alternative and thousands of tons of wheat and other food items were moved by automobile when they could have been moved by special railroad cars, saving the state hundreds of millions of leks. The same situation has occurred in the case of many other items such as fuels, plaster, dirt for brick factories, various ores, cement and other construction materials, chemical and nitrogen fertilizers, charcoal, and so forth, which are typical freight items and which can be transported by rail very profitably.

The problem is presented more clearly and becomes more acute when such freight is removed from rail transport by state enterprises and transported by automobile even when railroad branches extend to the technological lines in dozens of our factories and plants. Why does this happen? In a simple analysis, there are two main reasons: first, because of the incompetence of the managements of these enterprises and of the economic directorates of the ministries to which they are subordinate and second, because of widespread corruption and indifference and, in our opinion, strange audacity, they are abandoning the rail transport of goods, openly damaging state interests, and even profiting from it by taking a bribe or receiving a tip. [passage omitted]

The economic directorates to which these enterprises are subordinate should be concerned and, under no circumstances, should they allow such antieconomic activity. But are they concerned with the economic analysis of these activities? In my opinion, transport fees which they approve for the enterprises under their jurisdiction should be set for managements of enterprises which have railroad lines, at the level of the rail transport fee. This will rule out any abuse or at least the greater part of this abuse. Why isn't this being done? We think that methods inherited from the centralized economy have an influence here and that these specialists will ignore this situation until the government issues a law ordering that certain freight will be carried by rail and other freight will be carried by automobile. Such a mentality must be eliminated. The market economy has a profit law and it is very clear that rail transport is more profitable than automobile transport.

Naturally, we do not have laws like we had at the time of the centralized economy which would oblige state enterprises to move their goods by rail. But, at the same time, the state control system, by means of its levers, and the appropriate ministries are obliged to exercise their control in this area. The state lost several hundred million leks because of the failure to transport wheat and other freight by rail. Why is this allowed to happen and, what is even worse, why is this allowed for many other items? It is never too late to analyze such activities because such analyses would put an end to abuses and corruption.

There is a saying: "There is no blind man who does not want to have eyes." So, is there any economic unit which is not looking for the least expensive form of transportation for its goods? Of course, the railroads, and especially, the Ministry of Transportation, are not without fault in this matter. This situation has put the administration of rail transport in a real state of alarm. However, despite its great commitment and despite the fact that, recently, it has radically improved its work methods by creating a completely new concept of its work, none of these things will produce results if other ministries and enterprises do not respond with the same anxiety and concern. Unfortunately, everyday activity shows that we will continue to run up against the wall of the absurd opposition of many traditional state customers to transporting goods by rail. Only a serious commitment and coordination by the General Directorate for the Railroads, the Ministry of Transportation, and the other ministries will bring a halt to this uneconomical activity.

We railroad workers are not opposed to automobile transportation. We are in favor of fair competition, free competition in which each participant has an opportunity to show his superiority. This is so the effort, sweat, and sacrifices of our working collectives will receive their reward and the subsidies which must be given to the railroads will decrease day by day. So, with some commitment by all, I believe that such possibilities exist. The rapid privatization of the economy, the creation of distribution points in railroad stations such as Lac, Mjede, and Pogradec, and the coordination of rail and

automobile transport should reinvigorate rail transport and make it possible to utilize its entire capacity for transporting 8,000 tons of freight a year—four times the amount it currently transports.

Socialist Party Statute Published

AU3006143794 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 15 May 94 pp 3-4

["Statute of the Socialist Party of Albania approved at the First Socialist Party Congress in June 1992 and Improved at the Second Socialist Party National Conference in February 1994"]

[Text]

Preamble

Socialist Party of Albania (PSSH)

The PSSH is an independent and open political organization that unites on a voluntary basis citizens of the Republic of Albania. Democratic socialism is the PSSH's alternative for the development of the individual and society.

The PSSH expresses, defends, and promotes the political, economic, and social interests of broad strata from the ranks of workers, peasants, small and medium proprietors, intellectuals, school pupils, and students, and the common state and national interests of all Albanians.

The PSSH's alternative is expressed in its program. In order to realize its program, the PPSH organizes itself and operates on the basis of its internal norms as expressed in this statute. The party program and statute are open to any change that developments may bring.

The program, statute, and activities of the PSSH respect the Constitution of the Republic of Albania and the other laws of a law- governed state.

I. Party Membership

1. Admission to the Party

1.1 Any citizen of the Republic of Albania, regardless of ethnicity, race, sex, economic circumstances, social status, or religious convictions may be a member of the PSSH, provided:—he is over 18 years of age;

—he accepts the PSSH program and works to carry it out, and;

—he accepts the party statute and behaves according to its requirements

1.2 PSSH membership is voluntary.

1.3 Admission to the PSSH is on an individual basis and atpersonal request.

1.4 Decisions on admission are made by the party organization and are effective immediately. A party member is supplied with a membership document.

2. Duties and Rights of a Party Member

2.1 A PSSH member is obliged:

—to be part of a PSSH organization

—to pay membership dues regularly, and

—not to be a member of other Albanian political parties within or beyond the Republic of Albania.

2.2. A PSSH member has the right:

—to take part in meetings, through the press, and in other ways in the compilation, analysis, and implementation of the policies of the PSSH and its program and statute;

—to elect and be elected to the party's management bodies

—to nominate and to be nominated as a representative candidate of the party for the organs of legislative and executive power

—to acquaint himself, through meetings, the press, and in other ways, with the work of the organs of legislative and executive power and to assess their work;

—to be present when the party organization discusses criticisms and suggestions he has made;

—to be present at the meeting of the management body of the party that makes a decision in connection with his activity;

—to be protected by the party when he is attacked and persecuted for his political convictions;

—to take part in organizations and associations that conduct their activities in accordance with the laws of the law-governed state and do not run counter to the PSSH program.

—to appeal to the party management bodies in cases in which he does not agree with a stand taken by the party organization concerning himself, and;

—to leave the party by his own wish and without being obliged to give any explanation.

2.3 Members of the PSSH are equal before the party regardless of the offices they hold within it and their economic and social position outside it.

3. Temporary Suspension of Membership and Expulsion From the Party

3.1 If a PSSH member fails to meet his party obligations for health reasons or because of temporary employment abroad the party organization decides to temporarily suspend his membership and frees him from the relevant obligations.

If a PSSH member is employed in sectors where membership of a political party is forbidden by law, the party

organization frees him from his relevant obligations, deregisters him, and informs the district party management committee.

3.2 When a PSSH member leaves the party at his own request, the party organization deregisters him and informs the district party management committee.

3.3 Against a PSSH member who violates the decisions of party forums, breaches the social principles that stem from the party program and statute, fails to pay his membership dues, is absent from the meetings of his party organization for more than six months without reason, or fails in his work to justify his membership of the party or of its management bodies, the following measures may be taken, according to his degree of responsibility:

a) reprimand;

b) dismissal from elected party bodies;

c) deregistration from the party.

3.4 The party organization makes a decision to deregister a member on its own initiative or at the suggestion of a higher authority. Such decisions take effect upon their approval by the presidium of the district party committee.

The dismissal from office and party deregistration of a member of the district party committee or the General Management Committee are decided by the body to which the person concerned has been elected.

II. The Party's Structural Organization

4. The Party organization

4.1 The party organization:

—is the fundamental organizational unit of the PSSH.

—consists of no less than five party members;

—is created on a residential basis in villages, neighborhoods, or groups of dwellings, and can also be created on a professional basis, and;

—meets not less than once every two months.

Supporters of the PSSH may also be invited to participate in the meetings and activities of the party organization.

4.2 For the management of its day-to-day work, the party organization elects a chairman and one or two deputy chairmen. It holds a meeting to analyze its general activities and to hold elections once a year.

4.3 A party organization has the following main obligations:

—to participate in the compilation, analysis, and implementation of the policies, program, and statute of the PSSH

—to compile, analyze, and implement the policy of the PSSH on the basis of the program, statute, and the decisions of management bodies in the specific circumstances of the territory in which it is based;

—to maintain and develop ties with PSSH supporters;

—to extend the PSSH's influence in different strata of society;

—to express and defend the interests of PSSH members and supporters and any other individual or social group when it considers fit;

—to maintain ties with public organizations, associations, and other political forces in the territory in which it operates, in accordance with the program and objectives of the PSSH.

—to work to add to the party ranks.

—to respect the view of every individual within and outside its ranks, in relations with him, and;

—to take a stand regarding any of its members who breaks the laws of the state or the principles expressed in this statute and the party program.

5. Zonal Council

5.1 The party tonal council manages the operational activities of the party organizations of a neighborhood or commune.

5.2 The zonal council:

—is created in the basis of an urban neighborhood or a rural commune;

—consists of elected representatives of the party organizations of the relevant neighborhood or commune;

—is directed by a chairman elected by a meeting of the council; the chairman of a zonal council should not as a rule be a chairman of a party organization;

—maintains links between the party organizations and the district party management committee;

—continually monitors the work of the party organizations, new admissions, and other problems connected with the party's internal life;

—organizes and coordinates the work of the party in the zone regarding political, economic, and social problems of all kinds, cooperating for this purpose with the zone's groups of Socialist councillors, and;

—gives its opinion on the area's candidates for other party management bodies.

6. Local Management Bodies

6.1 The district party conference is the managing body of the party in the district.

6.2 The district party conference meets every two years. It may meet more often on the decision of the party district management committee or at the request of not less than one-third of the party members in the district.

6.3 The district party conference elects the district party management committee and its chairman. The conference decides the number of members of the district management committee. The chairman of a zonal council automatically becomes a member of the district management committee. The district conference elects delegates for the party congress and proposes from among party members within or outside the district candidates for members of the Party General Management Committee.

6.4 The district management committee directs the party organizations in the period between two conferences.

6.5 The district management committee elects the presidium of the management committee, the deputy chairman, and the secretary, by secret ballot and from among several candidates. The district management committee determines the number of presidium members.

6.6 The district management committee meets not less than every three months on the decision of the presidium of the party in the district or at the request of not less than one-third of its members. District party aktivs may also be held for problems of special importance.

6.7 The district party management committee:

—works and carries responsibility for the implementation in the district of the program, statute, and decisions of the district conference and the central management bodies of the party;

—instructs, assists, and controls the party organizations and the tonal councils in their political and propaganda work;

—can decide on the dissolution of one or more of its dependent party organizations, when they are observed to violate the statute or to act counter to the PSSH program;

—may suggest to the party organization or zonal council the replacement of their respective officers because of their extreme incompetence or for other well-argued reasons;

—creates permanent working commissions;

—distributes the party funds within the district, controls the collection of dues, and administers the accounts, economic activities, and other material resources of the party, enforces the rules for their use, and;

—reports on its work to the party organizations, the district party conference, the General Management Committee, and the Presidium of the PSSH General Management Committee.

In very special circumstances (extreme incompetence, personal demands, or resignation because of other pressing reasons), the district party management committee may release from his office the district party chairman, and replace him through elections under Article 15 of the statute.

6.8 The presidium of the district party management committee:

—works and bears responsibility for the fulfillment of tasks set by the district management committee and central management bodies;

—organizes and approves the creation of the party's organizational structure in the district;

—decides to create new party organizations;

—verifies, examines, and decides on appeals against party organization decisions submitted by party members;

—carries responsibility for the preservation and administration of the party's documentary materials under the committee's administration and connected with the party organizations;

—cooperates with other political and social forces in the district in order to promote smooth economic and social development, the enforcement of the laws of a law-governed state, the public peace, and personal safety, and;

—reports on its work to the party organizations, to the district party conference, to the district management committee, and to the Party General Management Committee and its presidium.

The presidium of the district party management committee, in the spirit of the principles of this statute and in order to organize its work as a team, decides on the allocation of tasks and responsibilities among the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and other members, who monitor the daily performance of duties. This manner of organization is defined in the internal rule book and the district management committee is informed of it.

7. Central Management Bodies

7.1 The party congress is the main management body of the PSSH.

The party congress analyzes the party's work in the period between two congresses and sets forth the main tasks for the future. The congress approves the party program and statute or makes changes to them.

7.2 A congress is held as a rule every three or four years. It can also be held more often, in special situations, on the initiative of the General Management Committee or at the request of not less than one-third of the party members.

7.3 The holding of the congress and the agenda are announced at least two months beforehand. Delegates to the congress are elected by the district party conferences. The party's General Uanagement Committee decides representation quotas.

General Management Committee members and socialist deputies, when they are not elected as delegates, participate in the congress without voting rights.

7.4 The congress elects the party's General Management Committee with between 91 and 101 members and the party chairman. The chairmen of the district management committees automatically become members of the General Management Committee (as part of the total number of members).

The General Management Committee elects its presidium with between 13 and 17 members, its first deputy chairman, its deputy chairmen, and general secretary.

7.5 The national party conference, consisting of delegates elected by expanded meetings of the district party management committees and according to the representation quotas laid down by the party's General Management Committee, has the right:

—to listen to and assess the reports of the party's General Management Committee concerning one or more areas of its activity;

—to renew up to one-third of the members of the General Management Committee elected by the party congress, and;

—to change the party's program and statute;

7.6 Between two party congresses, the General Management Committee:

—organizes all the PSSH's work and activity;

—represents the PSSH in relations with other parties and with organizations, associations, and institutions at home and abroad;

—carries responsibility for the party's economic and financial activities;

—organizes and manages the party's central institutions and its press;

—issues and approves special instructions for the organization and documentation of the party's activities;

—draws up the policy of improving the party's management structures and the skills of those elected to them;

—approves and controls the distribution of the party's material and financial assets;

—summons the party national conference over important issues of party policy in the period between two congresses;

—when it sees fit, summons the party national aktiv, and;

—creates permanent and temporary commissions of party members and supporters in order to study and solve theoretical, practical, and organizational problems.

The General Management Committee meets not less than every three months on the decision of its presidium or at the request of no less than one-third of its members.

The headquarters of the PSSH General Management Committee is in Tirana.

7.7 When there is opposition from party organizations or local management bodies, or when there is disagreement within the central management bodies, a broad debate or referendum of the entire party can be held concerning the main problems of party policy and important decisions of its high-level management bodies.

The debate or referendum is held on the inisitative of the General Management Committee or at the request of no less than one- third of the party members.

7.8 The Presidium of the General Management Committee:

—implements the decisions of the highest-level bodies (the congress, the national congress, and the General Management Committee);

—assists and inspects the party's management bodies in districts and zones in pursuit of the decisions of the central bodies (the congress, is national conference, the meeting of the General Management Committee and its decisions);

—considers objections raised by party members and organizations to the decisions or instructions of local or central management bodies;

—decides on the structure of the political and administrative apparatus of the General Management Committee, the party's other central institutions, and the district management committees;

—issues instructions in accordance with the party statute and in implementation of the decisions made at the congress, the national conference, and meetings of the General Management Committee;

—may suggest to a district management committee the replacement of a chairman or other district party leaders because of extreme incompetence or other well-argued reasons, and

—approves the creation of PPSH organizations outside the Republic of Albania, if the law of the country concerned permits such a thing, and maintains direct ties with them.

The Presidium of the General Management Committee, in the spirit of the principles of this statute, and in order

to organize its work as a team, decides on the allocation of tasks and responsibilities among the chairman, deputy chairmen, and general secretary, who monitor the daily performance of duties, and other members. This manner of organization is defined in the internal rule book and the General Management Committee is informed of it.

The Presidium of the General Management Committee meets not less than once a month.

7.9 Political and administrative apparatuses, whose work is respectively of a consultative and technical character, may be created under the General Management Committee and the district management committees, according to financial opportunity.

III. The Forum of Eurosocialist Youth of Albania (FRESSH) [Forumi i Rinise Eurosocialiste is Shqiperise]

8. The FRESSH is part of the PSSH. The program and activities of the FRESSH are in accordance with the content of the program and the activity of the PSSH as a whole.

9. The FRESSH has representatives nominated by it in all the PSSH local and central management bodies. Its representational quota in these bodies is determined by a special instruction from the party's General Management Committee.

IV. Main Principles of the Party's Operation

10 Fundamental Principles

10.1 The personality and dignity of a party member are inviolable.

10.2 Internal democracy in the party is a moral and organizational condition of the party's existence and development.

10.3 The freedom of elections and the secret ballot are individual and guaranteed.

10.4 Discipline in the party is based on the convergence of views on the alternative for the development of the individual and of society and on recognizing the benefits of coordinated action.

10.5 Party management is collegian in every part of its structure.

10.6 The party's management bodies represent and serve the will of the party's members and supporters.

10.7 The central management bodies are obliged to collect and set forth the views of the local management bodies.

11. Basic Documents

11.1 The program and statute synthesize the common thinking of the PSSH's members and supporters, in accordance with the alternative of democratic socialism.

11.2 The program and statute are the basic documents on which the PSSH organizes itself and operates.

11.3 The program and statute are open to any change that developments may bring.

11.4 The program and statute are basic documents for every member and supporter in his relations with the PSSH and its representatives.

12. Freedom of Thought in the Party

12.1 The party guarantees to all its members freedom of expression by word of mouth and in the press, and freedom of opinions, viewpoints, platforms, criticism, and self-criticism whose aim is to implement and improve the program and statute.

12.2 Those elected to the party's management bodies are obliged to collect and set forth the opinion of those electing them.

12.3 The party's management bodies are obliged to consider and respond to every proposal or complaint sent to them by a PSSH member, within one month of its arrival.

13. The Making and Implementation of Decisions

13.1 Decisions are made by consensus or a vote.

13.2 Decisions are made after a debate and a free exchange of views. A decision approved by a majority of votes is binding on all members of the body making it and also on those to whom it refers.

The minority voting against has the right to express its viewpoints at meetings or in the party press, and also to request the reconsideration of controversial problems by the common management body.

13.4 A decision of a party organization cannot be annulled by the local management bodies, except in cases in which it is considered to be against the party program and statute.

In cases of disagreement with the decision of the party organization, the local management bodies are obliged to argue the need to change it before the party organization.

13.5 A decision of a local management body is implemented by the relevant party organizations and the zonal councils. They oppose it and do not implement it when they consider it against the party program and statute.

Opposition and failure to implement it must be argued before the local management body that has made this decision. Until the issue is clarified, the implementation of the decision is suspended.

If no solution is found, both sides turn to their common management body.

13.6 A decision of a local management body cannot be annulled by the central management bodies, except in cases in which it is considered to be against the party program and statute.

In cases of disagreement with the decision of the local management body, central management bodies are obliged to argue the need to change it before the local management body.

13.7 Party organizations and local management bodies implement the decisions of central management bodies. They oppose and do not implement a decision when they consider it opposed to the party program and statute. Opposition and failure to implement a decision must be argued before the central management body that has made the decision.

14. Collegiality, Personal Initiative, and Independent Action

14.1 Party organizations and management bodies apply the principle of collegiality in their activities.

14.2 Personal initiative on behalf of the party must serve to implement collegian decisions. Responsibility for personal initiative on behalf of the party rests with the individual.

14.3 Members of all the party's organizational structures act independently on the basis of the party program and statute.

14.4 PSSH members and supporters make take initiatives to create party organizations. The presidium of the district party management committee makes the decision to create them.

15. Election of Individual Candidates

15.1 The election of individual candidates is on the basis of free will and by secret ballot.

15.2 Candidates for members of party management forums and candidates for representatives of the party in organs of legislative and executive power at all levels are selected by secret ballot from a number of candidates.

15.3 All party members, personally or in the capacity of delegate, have the right to nominate candidates or to request the withdrawal of candidatures that have been put forward.

15.4 Candidates for party management forums and candidates for representatives of the party in organs of legislative and executive power at all levels are presented with full personal details about their specific professional and party activities at the meeting that is to select them.

It is the exclusive and inviolable right of the electors to assess every candidate and to elect him or not.

Candidates are offered equal opportunities to speak out and present themselves in the relevant environment.

A candidate has the right to refuse his own candidature.

15.5 Voting for the selection of candidates for members of party management forums and candidates for representatives of the party in organs of legislative and executive power is secret and presupposes:

a) at least one more candidate than the number of places

b) material conditions assuring secrecy for individual voting

c) a special commission composed of party members who are not employees of the party apparatuses nor in managing positions superior to the majority of those taking part in the electoral meeting;

d) The preservation of ballot papers and protocols at least until the subsequent election, and;

e) repetition of the elections if any violation is observed at the time or later.

Other details about the method and manner of voting are determined by special instruction by the party's General Management Committee.

15.6 Elections are considered valid when not less than one-half of the electoral meeting takes part in them.

The candidate who receives the most votes, but not less than one- half of the number of participants in the election, is considered to be elected.

15.7 District and central party management bodies, when conditions do not permit elections, may coopt new members amounting to up to one-fifth of their initial number.

Transparency

16.1 The activity of the party's management bodies is open to its members.

The documents reflecting this activity and the decisions made are made available to party members through organizational structures of through the press and other party public information media.

16.2 Managing bodies report to the party members.

16.3 Central management bodies report to local management bodies and vice versa.

16.4 Members of party management bodies have the right to take part in the meetings of party structures subordinate to them and to use the necessary documentary materials.

V. Representatives of the Party in the People's Assembly and in Local Government

17. The PSSH develops its policies in the organs of the state through its representatives elected to these organs.

18. PSSH deputies elected to the People's Assembly constitute the Socialist parliamentary group. This group discusses beforehand the issues that are to be examined, determines its tactics, and presents and defends in the assembly the standpoint of the PSSH, in implementation of its program.

The group decides beforehand the degree of its own members' autonomy in voting in the parliamentary session, according to the importance and nature of the bill under examination.

A socialist deputy fulfills all the obligations and demands of the internal rule book of the group of Socialist deputies.

19. The representatives of the PSSH elected in communes, municipalities, and districts constitute the relevant group of Socialist councillors. The group of councillors discusses beforehand the issues that are to be examined in the relevant councils and defines its standpoint, in implementation of the party program and according to the specifics of the zone or district. The group implements the decision made by a majority of votes.

20. Reprepresentatives of the party elected as deputies to the People's Assembly and to organs of district government have the right to take part in the meetings of the General Management Committee and the district management committee respectively.

21. Party organizations and management bodies assess the work of PSSH representatives in organs of the state, when they consider this necessary.

VI. The Press and Other Public Information Media

22. The PSSH's press organs and other public information media base their activities on the principles of the party statute and program, while maintaining the autonomy that ensures freedom of information and the free expression of opinion.

VII. Nonparty Forums

23. The PSSH supports and cooperates first of all with the Forum of Socialist Women [Forums i Grave Socialists], with the trade unions, associations, and all other legal organizations that express and defend the interests of their own members according to the basic principles of democratic socialism.

VIII. Relations With Other Political and Social Organizations

24. The PSSH implements a policy of consultation, alliances, and cooperation weth other political and social forces in the Republic of Albania that strive to preserve the freedom and independence of the homeland, and work for democracy, social justice, and progress on the basis of mutual respect of views and constructive debate.

25. While respecting and not intervening in their activities, the PSSH develops fraternal ties of cooperation with other political and social parties and organizations beyond the state borders of the Republic of Albania, in the interests of solving the national question and defending the interests of Albanians wherever they may be.

26. The PSSH maintains and develops mutual ties with progressive parties and political forces in the world that work for a democratic and progressive social order.

IX. The Party's Financial and Material Assets

27. The Party's Financial and Material Resources

27.1 The financial earnings of the party and its organizations arise from membership dues, the state budget (according to the law on financing political parties), earnings from party enterprises, sociopolitical publishing activities, assistance from party members and supporters, and other earnings in accordance with the laws of the state.

The monthly membership dues are:

—10 leks for party members living in the countryside, those on social assistance, pensioners, and students

—1 percent of personal monthly earnings for wage-earning working people, and;

—50 to 100 leks for persons working in the private sector.

27.3 The use of illegal resources for financing the party's activities or on its behalf is irreconcilable with the moral and organizational principles of the PSSH. Any person guilty of such a thing is deregistered from the party and denounced to the organs of justice.

28. The Use of Financial and Material Assets and Their Control

28.1 The financial results and annual budget of the party on a national scale are examined and approved by the General Management Committee.

28.2 The economic and financial activities of the party are scheduled for examination not less than once a year at a meeting of the General Management Committee and more than one a year at a meeting of its presidium.

28.3 An economic commission operates under the General Management Committee and implements its decisions, administering the parties financial and material assets, and carrying responsibility for their proper use. The commission has the right to demand accountability for economic and financial matters and for the performance of instructions it issues to all the party's organizational structures.

The party's organizational structures are obliged to confine themselves to the economic and financial plan and

to report on economic and financial matters at intervals determined by the commission.

28.4 The financial results and annual budget of the party at district level are examined by the district management committee and the party organizations are also informed of them.

The district party management committee takes the initiative in using its budget, in carrying out its financial plan, solving administrative problems, financing publications and the press, and identifying and increasing legitimate sources of income. The district management committee uses a part of its budget for financing the activities of the party organizations and pays 20-30 percent of its earnings into the party's central funds, under the General Management Committee.

28.5 The General Management Committee and the district management committees, in order to control the use of the party's funds and other material assets, create special control commissions according to need and on the proposal of their members.

A special control commission is composed of party members who are not employees of its apparatuses and is independent of the party's economic and financial structures. The commission reports in writing on the tasks entrusted to it at the meeting of the forum that has elected it.

28.6 Any use of the party's material and financial assets for personal purposes is irreconcilable with the moral and organizational principles of the PSSH. Those guilty of abuse pay compensation to party funds in accordance with the scale of abuse, suffer disciplinary measures to the point of deregistration from the party, or are denounced to the organs of justice.

X. The Party Symbol

29. The PSSH symbol is a clenched fist holding two red roses. This symbol is used on the party seal, emblem, and banner.

President Havel Returns From U.S.

LD0507144794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Excerpts] President Vaclav Havel, who yesterday in Philadelphia received the Freedom Medal for his important role in fighting for freedom of conscience and against oppression, ignorance, and suffering, has returned to Prague. [passage omitted] He also spoke by telephone to U.S. President Bill Clinton, discussing, among other things, the need to maintain international sanctions against Iraq. On his return, Czech Radio asked President Havel for his assessment of Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad al-Sahhap's current visit to Prague.

[Begin Havel recording] I have not taken any part in the preparation of this visit, nor did I know about it. I learned about it quite by accident, and, unofficially, one day before my departure for the United States. I immediately asked Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec about the purpose of this visit. I was assured that this visit did not change the absolutely firm determination of the Czech Republic, as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, to keep the sanctions against Iraq, our insistence on keeping all of the conditions of all of the UN resolutions in this matter. This was actually the subject of President Clinton's letter, which I answered in our telephone talk, during which I implied a certain doubt about the propriety of this visit, of its purpose. However, I will be able to assess the visit when I learn its agenda. I was assured by the foreign minister that its purpose is to explain this firm Czech standpoint to the Iraqi minister. [end recording]

Iraqi Foreign Minister Comments on Visit

LD0507194294 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1730 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Iraqi Foreign Minister Kazim Sahhap held three-hour talks with Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec today. Following the meeting, the Iraqi minister answered several questions from Czech television.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] What is the main purpose of your visit to the Czech Republic?

[Shahhap, in English fading into superimposed Czech translation] One, to brief my Czech colleague on the latest development of relations between Iraq and the Security Council. Iraq has already met the conditions of Resolution 678, and it is now up to the Security Council to show understanding. [end recording]

[Studio announcer] Answering a question on why he has chosen the Czech Republic and not any other member of the Security Council, Mr. Kazim Sahhab said:

[Begin Shahhap recording] With the exception of Washington, we have already visited the capitals of all countries represented in the Security Council—that is, not only Prague but also Moscow and other cities. [end recording]

[Studio announcer] The Iraqi foreign minister said the initiative for his visit to Prague came from the Czech side. This statement contradicts the information that we have received from a reliable source at the Czech Foreign Ministry. This is why we asked Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec the same question.

[Begin recording] [Zeleniec] Of course, I had to invite the minister to come here. Nevertheless, for several months, for almost a year now, Iraq has kept showing interest in meeting us as a Security Council member.

[Unidentified reporter] Does the Czech Republic have any interest of its own in this matter?

[Zieleniec] Iraq is a country with which we share trade relations, a tradition of trading and supplying things. In general terms, Czech foreign policy is marked by openness and activity. This can also be attributed to our position as a state that relies on foreign trade, a state that is small but export-oriented. Of course, we also have claims in Iraq. I am pleased that we have succeeded in using this visit by the minster to sign a barter agreement that will adjust the way in which payments will be affected after trade develops—that is, after the sanctions have been lifted. This is important to us.

I have to say though that this, of course, was not the main objective. The main objectives of the foreign minister's visit were issues linked to implementation of sanctions and to Iraq's stance on the Security Council resolutions. I would like to point out that, within a few weeks, there will also be in our country some activity related to this area. President Mubarak and Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa will come here on a visit.

[Unidentified reporter] Does the Czech Republic want to become some kind of mediator in this matter between Iraq and the Security Council? If yes, on which side?

[Zeleniec] Well, a mediator. That is a big word. We are a member of the Security Council. As such, of course, we are not a part of the voting machinery. We have our own opinion. We have to form this opinion in a certain way, so we need to talk with the parties involved on such matters, especially if they wish us to do so. [end recording]

Economic Agreement Signed

JN0507184294 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1745 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Prague, 5 Jul (INA)—[Iraqi] Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf met in Prague today with Czech Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy.

During the meeting, they explored prospects for industrial and trade cooperation between the two countries and ways of enhancing them, particularly once the unjust embargo on Iraq is lifted.

Al-Sahhaf and Dlouhy also attended the signing ceremony of an agreement for industrial and economic cooperation between Iraq and the Czech Republic.

The foreign minister arrived in Prague yesterday evening on an official visit to the Czech Republic at the invitation of his Czech counterpart, Josef Zieleniec.

New Border Crossing Opens With Austria

AU0507181594 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by "(dan)": "A New Border Crossing in Lipno"]

[Text] Predni Vyton—The border crossing in Predni Vyton near Lipno, which until now has served foot passengers, has also been opened to motorists. It was originally supposed to have been put into operation in the fall, but the Czech side completed a 20 million-koruna approach road ahead of schedule, and the Austrians have adapted themselves to the new date.

290,000 Slovaks Possess Czech Citizenship

AU0507170394 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 2 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Marie Konigova: "Some 290,000 Slovaks Have Already Obtained Czech Citizenship"]

[Excerpt] According to the preliminary figures, 314,000 Slovak citizens had permanent residence in the Czech Republic when the federation broke up. Citizenship was granted to 70,000 of them, and 220,000 made use of the opportunity provided by the law and chose citizenship. This information was made available to RUDE PRAVO by B. Bernikova, deputy press spokeswoman of the Czech Interior Ministry.

The possibility for Slovak citizens to choose Czech citizenship under simplified conditions came to an end on 1 July. Since this date, they have had to apply for Czech state citizenship like all other foreigners—that is, they will have to prove that they have had five years of permanent residence in the Czech Republic, and, during this period, they must not have been convicted of any crime.

According to Bernikova, there should be no case in our country of a citizen having no citizenship. If a citizen of the former CSFR does not obtain Czech citizenship, he remains a citizen of the Slovak Republic. No Slovak citizen will be released by the Slovak authorities from Slovak state citizenship if his application for this procedure is not supported by a pledge from the Czech authorities that he will be granted Czech citizenship. As Bernikova said, no Czech office will give the applicant this pledge unless all the conditions for granting Czech citizenship have been satisfied. [passage omitted]

RDP Group Wants To Conduct Trade in Arms

AU0507114894 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY (KORUNA supplement) in Czech 2 Jul 94 p iv

[CTK report: "The RDP Group Consortium Wants To Expand its Activity To Include Trade in Arms"]

[Text] Prague—The RDP Group consortium intends to expand its sphere of business to include trading in arms alongside its consultancy and intermediary activities. This information was confirmed yesterday by sources close to the company.

The consortium's subsidiary, the RDP Group Marketing limited company, was originally supposed to have been the agent and trader in these commodities. The RDP Group had submitted via it an application for a license to conduct trade in arms. However, this was later withdrawn.

One of the reasons for this was the Law on Conducting Foreign Trade in Military Material that came into effect on 1 April. According to the company's representatives, the RDP Group would have had to submit the application again because the original application had not taken the new law into consideration.

So, the RDP Group intends to submit the application again, this time, however, as a shareholding company in which trade in arms will also be cited as the sphere of business. A shareholding company should have better credentials for obtaining a license than a limited company. This should also facilitate the company's negotiations with the Army on possible contracts.

The RDP Group is also reducing the range of military material with which it intends to conduct business. The "megalomaniac" list of commodities asserted earlier by the company's former director general, Jan Vlcek, also envisaged conducting business in submarines, ships, space appliances, and so on, explained the RDP Group's representatives.

The Law on Foreign Trade With Military Material came into effect on 1 April of this year. The Law on Small Business Activity and the penal code are also supplemented by this legal norm. The law regulates the conditions for conducting trade in arms and the activity of state administration bodies in this province. This activity must be in harmony with the Czech Republic's international commitments and interests. Trade in arms has not—until now—been fully regulated by the decree on the conditions for issuing official permission to import and export goods and services.

Minister Presents 1993 Environment Report

AU0607110194 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by "(ovs)": The Environmental Situation in the Czech Republic"]

[Text] Prague—There was improvement in some spheres of the environment in 1993. Conversely, in others the situation worsened or often showed stagnation, Vladislav Bizek, deputy minister of environment, said yesterday. According to the recently completed annual report on the situation in the environment in the Czech Republic in 1993, the situation improved in the sphere of energy generation, the processing industry, and transportation, mainly as a result of the phasing out of production in the period 1990-92. A slight drop in the content of sulfur dioxide and dust in the atmosphere was recorded. Conversely, nitrogen oxide emissions increased. The contamination of surface waters slightly decreased due to lower industrial pollution, smaller agricultural output, and the operation of new effluent treatment plants. The content of toxic metals in agricultural soil also dropped below the fixed limits. High-level contamination by toxic metals was found in Prague: The concentration of lead and cadmium exceeds the limit by a factor of between two and five. The principles of state policy until 1996 are: a permanently sustainable development, preliminary prevention, the principle that "the polluter has to pay," the principle of the best available technology, and the principle of a socially acceptable extent of ecological risks. By 2005, the OECD countries' standards for the elements of the environment for 1990-91 should be reached.

Meciar Discusses Politics, Elections, Media

AU0107130994 Bratislava SMENA (SMENA NA NEDELU supplement) in Slovak 17 Jun 94 p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, by Erika Vincourekova; place and date not given: "For a Week, I Will Not...."]

[Text] [Vincourekova] Economic oligarchies have begun to very strongly affect the politics in this country. I do not believe I am exaggerating if I say that the coming elections will no longer depend on the money of the parties but, rather, on economic clans.

[Meciar] Unfortunately, you are right. Roughly speaking, there are three zones in the economy. They are the black, the gray, and the white economies. Of course, these three zones latently exist in all countries, but the degree of their influence differs. Society must effectively suppress the black economy. I know of some fellow politicians who are very closely connected with certain financial circles. Perhaps, the people should know who is supported by various large firms—Petrimex, for instance—whom these firms finance, and to whom they give instructions on how to act. However, that is, I believe, up to the journalists to inform the readers.

[Vincourekova] Is it not, at least in part, because of the imprecise legislation that was also produced during your government?

[Meciar] Of course, the legislation here has not become an integral whole yet, but more than one thing is affecting the situation. First, there are loopholes in the laws in the sphere of control. This state does not have sufficiently developed control systems, and the current temporary government immediately abolished even what we tried to develop. Hence, this state at present has no control mechanisms. Second, the system of sanction bodies requires a different structure from that of the bodies operating in the penal system. It needs different legislation and uncorrupted people. The objective should be that it is more advantageous to work for the legal protection of the state interests than for the interests of "the others."

[Vinourekova] Have you considered the options of how to achieve this? I believe it to be the cardinal question of the day.

[Meciar] It is possible. It would require, however, certain amendments to the Constitution and also a certain degree of personal courage on the part of the people. What is a person worth, who can be bought for a few thousand—only those few thousand. The person willing to take thus lowers his human value. What is the difference, then, between a politician who sells his beliefs and a prostitute who sells her body? I put them on the same level.

[Vincourekova] Habitual turncoats claim that last time they changed color because of you, because, as opposed to them, you are not accepted abroad....

[Meciar] Precisely this shows how limited their perception is. Every foreign politician who respects the rules of democracy also respects the rules of choice within the country. He does not dictate to the country. If he did so, it would not be democratic. If someone makes such a claim, he should ask abroad for specific data and react to such claims. These political manipulators of ours fit themselves out with symbols of political affiliation, then, with a red carnation, declare themselves socialists—although everybody knows who they really are—all the while claiming to be acceptable abroad. The strength of a politician is not in how many people he relates to abroad but rather in how many of them he relates to at home. Acceptance abroad is a demonization of this notion for a smoke screen. Moreover, I have been abroad many times, always accepted, always with good results. After all, I believe that integrating a state in the world system, in some 50 world organizations, means acceptance in world politics.

[Vincourekova] Do you believe that our politics are influenced too much from abroad? Some apostates from the ranks of Castle advisers claim that they are, and very significantly.

[Meciar] It may be that the people you refer to are very significantly influenced from abroad, but, until the day of the departure of our government, Slovakia was a country that belonged solely to the citizens of this state. No foreign influence has dominated this country. Of course, every realistic politician must take into consideration all trends in the international political development and act accordingly, but no influence from any foreign state dominates in the Slovak territory. To say that everything is in the play of some dark powers from abroad is misleading. It is all our own foolishness, our inability to grasp the historical opportunity.

[Vincourekova] What is the difference between government tourism and a business trip?

[Meciar] What our government does is tourism in the true sense of the word but paid out of the taxpayers' money. It would be a business trip if it were properly prepared, if it had definite contacts and the results were published. However, nobody knows anything about the results. A brief interview is conducted, and that is the end of the contribution of these trips. It is more of a presentation of their own party or person. Because there is a tendency to redistribute as much of the property as can be done in the remaining three months, it is a search for influential sponsors who would contribute either to the people or to the parties before the elections. It is denigrating for this state.

[Vincourekova] Why, if all this is a public secret, has no one in this country been imprisoned for bribery, corruption, or major tax evasion?

[Meciar] It will never happen. Just watch closely. There the circle closes. No bodies exist that would be willing to deal with this.

[Vincourekova] Why?

[Meciar] We did not manage to place people there who would be able to do something about it at this stage. It is always connected with great risks. It seems that even very high places are involved. Unfortunately, there are no reporters in Slovakia specializing in investigative journalism. This genre existed only when something was to be found against me. The Percheron Groupe [reference to a failed gas pipeline privatization deal], which was leaked to the public, is something so ugly that I myself, as prime minister, had to stop. Reporters still do not want to write about it, even though the privatization of the gas industry could lead to an exceptionally serious complication of relations with Russia. After all, we have only the pipes, while the gas belongs to someone else and the trade is conducted by someone else. We are just a transit country and could cease to be one. Everybody knows this, yet they play with it like fire.

[Vincourekova] There must be a way to prevent the sale of strategically important property.

[Meciar] There is, if people on the side of the protection of state interests were sitting in parliament. However, if parliament is not willing to exercise ministerial control, to get involved in these matters and conduct an investigation, the citizen has nowhere to turn. He should then simply conclude that he does not have good representatives and that they should be replaced.

[Vincourekova] Do you believe that the majority system would help? While everybody is playing for the party colors now, they would have to play fair then, each on his own before his voters. It might even help Slovakia per se.

[Meciar] Of course, the majority system has its advantages. If a specific deputy is elected for a particular constituency and does his work there, he is more subject to control by the citizens. In the proportional representation system, the party is being elected, but, as interpreted here, the deputy is only subject to his own conscience, which is not true because the acquisition and the loss of the mandate is not regulated by the Constitution but rather by law. Only the form of the execution is regulated otherwise. Thus, it can happen, as happened to me, that I had more than 300,000 preferences in central Slovakia, but many people had joined me just for the ride, and then they betrayed me and left. I was to serve as the prime minister and provide them with the service—even personal service, including property benefits. It was not enough that they had the honor and authority to represent the people; when I did not give them any more, they left. It is, to a certain degree, depressing even for us who act as leaders. Some praise themselves that they do better than us. They do not because we will have it all cleansed, and they will have to do it after the elections.

[Vincourekova] Could this be an error in the selection of people? Are you not frequently forced to prefer the loyal to the able? I have often heard that it is necessary to leave the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia because, while everybody else grows rich, the people from the Movement are singled out not to get a thing.

[Meciar] I have heard this as well, and not only behind my back. It is precisely because a deformed view of politics has developed here, which holds politics to be a path to riches—not the work but the post. This is very dangerous because it will bring to politics many ambitious gold diggers, who do not perceive it as sacrifice and service but rather as a decision to be on the gravy train and to become rich quick. Of course, the pressure of money, the redistribution of such a lot of property, as is being divided now, is very strong, and it requires much greater personal courage. I call it fleecing resilience [oteruvzdornost]. When it comes to fleecing, you must be able to persevere and show your true face.

[Vincourekova] Nevertheless, it seems to me that even you yourself are not infallible in your selection of colleagues; rather the opposite, as many of them have reached, and others are about to reach, the level at which they would sooner get rich than serve.

[Meciar] We have to take into account that these people were accepted under certain specific conditions. Most of them were people who were not well off, and suddenly circumstances were completely different and they learned that property can also be obtained otherwise and that I was an obstacle on their road to a better life. After that, they turned against the obstacle and wasted their strength on that. The goal that brought them into politics was no longer their objective, and they only saw their immediate profit. That is the end of parliamentarianism and the beginning of corruption. It is also the beginning of black money and the end of civic courage. If a representative democracy begins to succumb to a wave of corruption, it loses its vocation and creates pseudoleaders, who become indispensable. That is how power emerges that does not allow a plurality of opinion and the quest for truth and forces the citizens to silence.

[Vincourekova] Will your slate include more people from the ranks of the loyal, or will there be more young, able, and dynamic people?

[Meciar] There have been many attacks against the former government, but you must realize that there were 16 people to deal with the legislation, state administration, building the state, and the transformation of the entire system. These 16 people have done a lot. The problem is that they did not have the mechanisms to carry out the tasks of a sovereign state. These must be complemented, and the missing institutions must be formed. They, too, require able people. We did not conduct any purges even earlier. There were ministries where, apart from the minister, there was nobody from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia—and how many discussions were carried about it in the press! Today, there are very radical purges, purely politically based, and not much is heard about them. You cannot even read that the basis of the left-right cooperation is that the Christian Democratic Movement wants the

Insurance Company, the Party of the Democratic Left wants the General Credit Bank, and Moravcik wants to control the Savings Bank, although it means a threat to these institutions in time, as they overcome the critical point in their existence.

[Vincourekova] Do you believe that these things can be retrospectively corrected after the new government takes over?

[Meciar] This government made one big mistake: By its acts, it removed any political or moral inhibitions against general purges by anyone who comes to power. It is one of the greatest errors made since 1989 because now anyone who comes to power can do the same.

[Vincourekova] Is it not denigrating that we keep reaching in the same *nomenklatura* jug for places in the sun? I believe that no new wind can blow from old behinds.

[Meciar] We have a certain qualified intellectual basis, and many of its members used to be in the [communist] party, not out of conviction but because it was a condition for a career. If we reject all of this intellectual capital, do we have another one ready? If there is such an alternative capital, we can proceed to discuss this one as the old one, but even in such an instance too great radicalism is not good. As far as the officials responsible for the mistakes of the former regime go, I do not believe that they should return to leading posts in politics. I do not consider the way of purges to be a reasonable approach. There were far too many changes in our life recently for us to judge the entire life by a single stage. If we want to change the world, we must allow people to change as well.

[Vincourekova] The problem is whether the same people are not changing far too often.

[Meciar] That is a matter of acceptability to the citizens and a matter of political conscience. A person remains in political life as long as he is accepted and not as long as he wants to stay. The matter of political conscience, then, is the ability of inner self-reflection, of asking: Do I still have something to give? Am I becoming just an attitudinarian or an exhibitionist? Some then become mannequins showing their outfits rather than their work. It is up to the citizen, however, to recognize this and give them up.

[Vincourekova] With the approaching elections, do you expect a wave of scandals on our political scene, which lost its hallmark of culture long ago?

[Meciar] Folk wisdom says that lightning will hit a tall tree. So far, only one thing is clear to all of the political entities: We are against Meciar, and it is apparent that they will not spare me in the election campaign. One has to consider one thing, however—whether hatred for me suffices as a program on which the policy of developing the state is to be built. That is sick! Can a construction program be based on pathological delusions? Can hateful people, who point out in advance that they will not respect the results of democratic elections, enter politics? Are they democrats?

[Vincourekova] It is amateurish to accuse a politician of lying. That is not just my opinion. After all, no politician can always tell people the truth. So, how is it with politics and the truth?

[Meciar] First, it must be understood that a politician not only forms policies but also receives a tremendous amount of information, and, according to this knowledge, he can pass on the information. That is the mediatory function. Of course, it is easy to accuse someone of lying, and it has often been used against me—regardless of how often my words, referred to as lies, were vindicated within a year. If the truth is unpleasant, it is often better to proclaim it a lie, but this is rather shortsighted. I prefer partners who can look each other straight in the eye and even tell unpleasant truths and continue to respect each other. What are the chances of telling the truth in politics? It is not possible. There are many things that are also linked to personal trust. If someone confides in me, even if he is a politician, he is also a person, and I should try not to betray this trust. If trusting in a person loses its sense, so does politics. I do not believe that there is any need to lie, but not everything can be told. After all, that is also the case in ordinary life.

[Vincourekova] Do you frequently feel all alone?

[Meciar] I am rarely alone, but I know the feeling of loneliness because even the people closest to you cease to trust you for a while. It is very unpleasant, and corrections, retreats, etc. ensue.

[Vincourekova] The manner of the appeal by the president for consent divided our Republic into Meciar supporters and Meciar adversaries and brought a wave of hatred and disrespect between the coalition and the opposition in parliament. The situation will probably not change after the elections, with party political preferences remaining approximately the same as they are now. There is no chance of any peace for work after the elections. Will you work again hustled by the propaganda?

[Meciar] I have received a lot, but I wanted a lot and gave a lot. I could have locked myself up and wasted my energy on guarding my post. That, however, would not be me. The citizen must decide what he will do to make the situation in parliament quite clear. First, he should not decide against participating in the elections because his vote will be statistically included among all of the others. He should not vote for small parties because his vote would be wasted in that way, and he should not vote for those who cheated him. One cannot escape the responsibility for choosing. One must choose. There are basically two possibilities—to choose according to whom I trust or according to who represents for me the lesser evil.

[Vincourekova] Do you believe that the elections could be manipulated?

[Meciar] To a certain degree, yes. It is on the basis of the new election law that real room for creating stress emerges. Moreover, this system does not correspond to the modern trends in the development of election systems, which consist of postal voting rather than polling booths. These are the trends in Europe, and it does not mean that one is prevented from thoroughly studying the ballot. If the citizen cannot make his decision in peace, let us do away with the preference systems and name lists and use the Austrian system, when only the party is elected and it subsequently decides on its candidates.

[Vincourekova] Is politics for you a narcotic, a source of love, or something else?

[Meciar] It is something else. Those who are addicted to drugs must constantly increase the dosage. The lovers of applause constantly strive for adulation. I have a certain idea of how human society and Slovakia should look, and I want to realize it.

[Vincourekova] What do you see as your personal sacrifice to politics?

[Meciar] It took away my privacy, my health, and my family.

[Vincourekova] Is it worth it?

[Meciar] Is there any other option?

SDL's Weiss on Possible Coalition With HZDS

AU0607082394 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left by Jana Pankovcinova; place and date not given: "There Is a Difference of Opinion Within the HZDS"]

[Text] [Pankovcinova] There are rumors in the lobby that the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] is keeping its options open for a possible postelectoral coalition with the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia]. According to our sources, L. Fogas recently represented the SDL in talks on a postelectoral coalition at an unofficial level with I. Mjartan, Slovak ambassador to the Czech Republic, who has close contacts with the HZDS representatives. Can you confirm or deny these rumors?

[Weiss] There have been a lot of rumors in the lobby. I will give you some shocking information: A month ago, in Prague, I talked with Mr. Mjartan myself, as the ambassador of the Slovak Republic, and we also discussed domestic political issues. I have nothing to add. I have no idea whether Mr. Fogas met with Mr. Mjartan, but I do not think it likely, purely for reasons of time, because he spent the past few days in Strasbourg. Otherwise, we have such a good habit that we inform each other in the SDL Presidium about all political talks, and I do not see any reason that Mr. Fogas should ignore this habit.

[Pankovcinova] Hence, you can deny any attempts, even unofficial, at talks with the HZDS about postelectoral cooperation? After all, you said yourself in the television program [Kroky] that, at this time, the possibility of forming a coalition with the HZDS is not acceptable to the SDL....

[Weiss] I said that the SDL will not make the same mistakes the Slovak National Party made. I believe it is the best answer one can give at this time. One could ask who the HZDS really is, whether it is its chairman [Meciar] or other people. The HZDS must settle its internal problems and its ideas regarding what will happen before the elections and what will happen after them. The voters will decide everything.

[Pankovcinova] You made a statement, and the HZDS Press Department denied it, that the HZDS will use its chairman in the elections as a trump and "discard" him later. Does that mean that the SDL is willing to talk with a certain part of the HZDS?

[Weiss] I only responded to my information—that there is a difference of opinion within the HZDS regarding the type of politics that are to be practiced. That, however, is their internal matter, which they have to settle. After they settle this, on the basis of the elections results, the SDL will be ready to talk with all of the political parties that make it to the parliament.

[Pankovcinova] Does that mean you will not refuse pos electoral cooperation with the HZDS? In other words, is the SDL willing to talk with the HZDS—but without Meciar?

[Weiss] I do not refuse political talks after the elections with anyone. The content of these talks will be decided by the voters, the program, and the political culture of whichever party. Relations between the HZDS and the SDL are not defined by interpersonal arguments but, rather, by different views on politics, its goals and the means applied, and the manner of implementation of the state political interests of the Slovak Republic. We have different social bases, political structures, and political cultures. These differences, then, cannot be solved by pats on the back or lobby talks.

[Pankovcinova] Do you believe it realistic that, after the elections, Meciar would not be the decisive official of the HZDS?

[Weiss] That is a question for the HZDS to decide. We, with the present coalition, want to use the time before the elections to convince citizens that we are a better alternative for this country than the HZDS.

[Pankovcinova] So, does the SDL conduct talks with some representatives of the HZDS?

[Weiss] We meet in the parliament with deputies of all parties, and possible developments are discussed. And, on the basis of these informal talks, I believe that the HZDS must decide on its political orientation before the elections.

HZDS, SDL 'Fight' for Economic Control

AU0507143994 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jul 94 p 4

[Commentary by Stefan Hrib: "100 Days of Peter Weiss"—reprinted from issue Number 26/1994 of the Kosice weekly DOMINO EFEKT]

[Text] Let us start with a vision and say it clearly: There is no political vision below the Tatras today. Claiming that we want to have decent people in parliament, convincing citizens that what Slovakia needs most is cooperation among political parties, and boasting that foreign countries clearly prefer Moravcik's Cabinet to Meciar's—all that appears to be necessary today, but it definitely does not constitute a relevant vision.

Moravcik's government has returned Slovakia to among the countries that do not have extremists in the government. This, however, is only the prerequisite of a vision, but not the vision itself.

From the viewpoint of the second Western criterion of the success of an East European government—departure from the communist past—Moravcik's government does not fare any better than its predecessor. First, former communists constitute the majority in it; second, the strongest government party is the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]—that is, the direct successor to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; third, the government of Jozef Moravcik is not able to enforce the only valid anticommunist law (the screening law); and fourth, and most important, the Slovak economy continues to be run by the same economic structures that managed to bring this state to the brink of bankruptcy in the past 40 years.

Moreover, after 100 days of this government, one thing is clear: It is not the government of Jozef Moravcik but of Peter Weiss. This politician has managed to push through virtually everything he has laid his hands on. He did not like the screening law; it is not being observed. He did not like the weakening of the old structures in key Slovak companies; their decisive part remains in the hands of the state. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the agreement of Weiss's SDL with the dismissal of Meciar's government was not yet the beginning of this party's transformation into a Western-type social democratic party. The historic vote by SDL deputies, in the wake of which the former prime minister had to leave the Government Office, was, rather, an expression of the conviction of this party's elite that, at long last, it was time to take the decisive levers of this state into one's own hands. From this viewpoint, it seems to be almost certain that what is happening today is not a desperate attempt by the coalition government to preserve democracy in Slovakia. A more realistic view is that of some observers—namely, that what is going on in Slovakia today is a fight between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the SDL for economic control of the country. The other coalition parties can only look on silently. At the same time, they claim with disarming calm that the stability of the state is more important to them than an open conflict with Peter Weiss's party.

The government can be evaluated from two viewpoints. If you consider the external appearances, it is clear that, during its first 100 days, Slovakia has made a considerable step forward. When we look a bit deeper, however, we will discover that the government of former communist Meciar has been replaced by a government of former communist Weiss. Broadly speaking, the guards at the top have been replaced, but the body of the state remains without changes. Once it is Ducky, then Kubecka [former ministers of economy], once it is Toth [former minister of finance], then Magvasi [current minister of economy], once it is Baco [former minister of agriculture], then Koncos [current minister of agriculture]. Only the names keep changing. Even after 100 days of the new government, the state remains in the same hands.

DS Official Justifies Asking Hagyari To Quit

AU0507170194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by "dos": "Attitude Toward the Offer of the Democratic Union Is Not the Decisive Disputed Issue"]

[Text] The reasons for the no-confidence motion in Democratic Party [DS] Chairman Pavol Hagyari were gross violation of the DS statutes, disregard for resolutions of the DS Executive Council, and serious mistakes in political work, DS Deputy Chairman Ivan Miklos told SME in an interview. In defiance of a decision by the DS Executive Council not to hold any official talks with the Democratic Union [DU], Pavol Hagyari had conducted several talks with DU representatives, according to Miklos, without even informing DS bodies about their outcome. Ivan Miklos does not think, however, that attitude toward the DU offer [for DS representatives to run on the DU slate in the elections] is the decisive disputed issue. An extraordinary session of the DS Executive Council on 1 July passed a motion of no-confidence in Pavol Hagyari and asked him to resign. At the same time, the DS Executive Council canceled a DS congress that was to be held yesterday because, according to Miklos, it was absolutely unprepared, and convened it for 16 July. As Miklos went on to say, if the congress does not recall the party chairman, almost all those who had passed the no-confidence motion will resign from their posts and from their places on the slate of candidates. Of the 14 members of the DS Executive Council, 10, including all deputy party chairmen, attended the Friday session, three excused themselves, and only Pavol Hagyari did not attend without sending an apology, according to Miklos. The resolution of the DS Executive Council was approved unanimously.

Hagyari Ready To Resign

AU0507170794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jul 94 p 1

[Interview with Democratic Party Chairman Pavol Hagyari by Ondrej Dostal; place and date not given: "Contesting the Elections Independently Is Political Suicide"]

[Text] [Dostal] The Democratic Party [DS] Executive Council on 1 July passed a motion of no confidence in you and asked you to resign. What were the reasons?

[Hagyari] Some members of the Executive Council have a different opinion on the DS's course of action in the elections. Whereas I and several other people promote a joint course of action with the Democratic Union [DU], Mr. Miklos and another part of the Executive Council are pushing for an independent candidature. I regard the independent candidature by the DS-Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [SPZ] bloc in the elections as political suicide and the best road to the demise of the party. The only possibility to ensure that votes [cast for the DS] do not get lost is to accept the DU's offer.

[Dostal] Why are you pushing for the placement of your candidates on the DU's open slate of candidates after you turned down a similar offer from the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]?

[Hagyari] The DU's offer is far more acceptable. It guarantees three places for the DS [in parliament], and another three places are possible. If the preferences [for the DS in preelection polls] go up, it will be possible for our party to have six deputies in parliament. The DS's absence in the future parliament would mean its demise.

[Dostal] What kind of a solution to the situation that has arisen do you see?

[Hagyari] Everything will be decided at the congress, which will be held on 16 July. The congress will also decide on my proposal that the DS enter the elections together with the DU. If the congress does not endorse my proposal, I will resign. I am not a political suicide and see no reason to lead this party to its demise. I will not leave the party, however. Also, I will definitely not join another party's slate of candidates and will keep working for the DS.

KSU Leaders Issue Statement Against Chairman

AU0107171494 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 30 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Statement by Members of the Christian Social Union Leadership"]

[Text] We, members of the Christian Social Union [KSU] and members of the Presidium of its Slovak Council, in an attempt to maintain the party's original national, Christian, and social orientation and to forestall the threat of its division, declare that we do not agree with the political line and orientation pursued by the party chairman, a line and orientation that deflect the party from cooperation with similarly oriented parties that are plunging the party toward division. Therefore, we are resolved to push for a change in the political line so that the party decides without delay to take part in the elections in association with some other nationally and Christian-oriented party. We are determined to recruit party functionaries, members, and supporters for this orientation toward the elections and thus preserve the KSU's integrity and capability for action.

(Signed) Dr. Bartolomej Kunc, KSU deputy chairman; Marian Kapusta, central secretary; Engineer Ignac Prno, Engineer Gabriela Hanakova, and Engineer Ivan Tirpak, members of the Presidium.

Klepac Responds to Criticism

AU0507083194 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Jul 94 p 2

[Statement by Christian Social Union Chairman Jan Klepac; place and date not given]

[Text] The Christian Social Union [KSU] Slovak Council has been initiating unremittingly in the past few months the formation of a bloc of national and Christian forces in harmony with the appeal for unity issued by Messrs. Binder and Hlinka. The negotiations with potential partners, however, were unsuccessful due to their unwillingness to form such a coalition. Therefore, we consider the statement by the five members of the KSU leadership published in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on 30 June 1994 to be deliberately misleading. The authors of the statement are complying with the well-known scenario executed in Slovakia for breaking up political parties. The first step within its framework is always casting doubts on the party chairman and weakening its leadership; the aforementioned statement is also oriented toward this. We are convinced that KSU members will see through this maneuver and will not allow the rest of the scenario, familiar from developments in the Slovak National Party, the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia, and the Slovak Green Party, to be repeated. The decisions made by the KSU Council determine the KSU's political line. Therefore, we appeal to the statement's five signatories to respect them and to concentrate their activity on preparing the KSU's election campaign.

(Signed) Jan Klepac.

SNS Offers Places to KSU Dissidents

AU0507153594 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 2 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by ARTERIA-agency: "Slovak National Party—It Decided To Offer Places to the Christian Social Union"]

[Excerpt] The Slovak National Party [SNS] has decided to make available places on its slate of candidates to the Christian Social Union [KSU] in all constituencies. This

decision comes in response to yesterday's [as published] statement by five KSU representatives who, unlike KSU Chairman Jan Klepac, want the KSU to participate in the elections in alliance with some other nationally or Christian-oriented party. As SNS First Deputy Chairwoman Eva Slavkovska told yesterday's SNS briefing, only those KSU members are unacceptable to the SNS who lead this entity "to the Castle" [seat of president]. As an expression of goodwill and an accommodating attitude on the part of the SNS, SNS First Deputy Chairwoman Slavkovska and SNS Deputy Chairman Juraj Molnar are ready to voluntarily step down from the SNS slate in favor of KSU candidates. "We expect the same gesture from the KSU, and, in this context, we fully support the statement by members of the KSU leadership published in the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on 30 June 1994," Slavkovska said.

Participants in the Slovak Popular Bloc (SLUB), which associates nationally and Christian-oriented parties and organizations, have agreed that small entities would not contest the elections independently but would support the SNS. SNS Deputy Chairman Molnar said in this context that the SNS decided to set aside places for entities associated in SLUB on its slates. "We can expect the SNS to become the mother ship that will rally around itself all national forces so that not a single national vote in the elections gets lost," Molnar stressed.

With these steps, the SNS wants to refute rumors about its split or about its candidates departing for the slates of other entities, Molnar said. [passage omitted]

SKOI Presents Election Candidates

AU0507143794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 2 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by "dos": "The Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute Presents Its Candidates"]

[Text] Bratislava—The 12 [figure as published] candidates of the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute [SKOI] on the slate of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] include former Slovak Deputy Prime Ministers A. Vavro and M. Porubjak, former Ministers J. Langos, E. Ehrenb rger, and I. Snopko, and former leading political and parliamentary representatives of the Civic Democratic Union [ODU] P. Zajac, F. Sebej, M. Sutovec, and P. Tatar. SKOI Spokesman J. Langos briefed correspondents yesterday that SKOI representatives on the KDH slate would act as independent candidates and would not assume any obligations toward the KDH. With regard to KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky's statement that there was agreement between the KDH and SKOI that "one should not appeal to Czechoslovak sentiments," SKOI member F. Sebej said that, in the opinion of SKOI, it would not be honest to go into the elections with the promise of restoring Czechoslovakia because this option could not be realized at present. However, SKOI will strive to open space between the two republics [as published] and to build Slovakia as a state that will become a desirable partner for the Czech Republic.

HZPCS Registers, Expects To Win Election

AU0507152994 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 2 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by "agt": "Movement for Prosperous Czech Lands and Slovakia Expects To Win the Elections"]

[Text] The basic thesis expounded by the Movement for Prosperous Czech Lands and Slovakia [Hnutia za prosperujuce Cesko a Slovensko, HZPCS] is that the Slovak Republic must be headed by honest political representatives for it to have the chance of becoming a prosperous country, free of civic conflicts. According to HZPCS Chairman Lubos Olejar, his movement offers to the citizens of the Slovak Republic the historic chance that this prerequisite will be met. The HZPCS, which was registered with the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic on 21 June 1994, will prepare its own slate of candidates [for the fall elections] and expects to win 10 percent of the vote. It has approached some well-known personalities (such as [comedian] Milan Markovic) and is waiting for their replies. It wants to appeal to citizens who feel deceived by developments following the CSFR's partition, and, according to Lubos Olejar, it enjoys great support among them. The Movement's aim is not the renewal of the former federation, however, but the establishment of a qualitatively new form of coexistence between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In the economic sphere, it wants to build a market economy and remove all obstacles to mutual trade between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic—that is, import surcharges, quality certificates, and also customs. This would allow Slovakia to concentrate resources on the protection of the eastern border.

Parliament Approves Bills on Social Allowances

AU0607120294 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 4 Jul 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "A Brawl About Allowances"]

[Text] Bratislava—The National Council of the Slovak Republic deputies approved on 1 July two social bills presented by Julius Brocka, minister of labor, social affairs, and family.

The government bill on child allowances and bonuses adjusts, in the intentions of social reform, the amount of the sum to be paid and defines individuals who are in greatest need of support. The condition for paying out allowances is based on the sum of the minimum sustenance level needed for nutrition and other basic personal needs of dependent children.

Parliament passed a proposal by Jozef Jakus (Party of the Democratic Left) to create two income groups for people entitled to receive allowances, which groups are defined as the minimum sustenance level multiplied by 1.5 and 2. In the first group, the average child allowance for one child will be 617 Slovak korunas [Sk] per month and, in the second, Sk405. A total of approximately Sk10.119 billion will be needed for payments for child allowances and bonuses in the next year. After a vote full of controversies,

the deputies finally approved that the law would not change the existing form of payments. The law will come in force on 1 September 1994.

The law on the increase of pensions in 1994 and the adjustment to pensions granted in 1995 takes into consideration the 10-percent increase in the costs of living and the 5-percent increase in the average wage since the most recent increase of pensions. The 7-percent increase, plus a fixed sum between Sk54 and Sk180 per month, will apply to the amount of old-age pensions, handicapped pensions, partially handicapped pensions, widow and orphan pensions, and the sum for years of employment credited until 31 December 1994.

For the pensions granted in the course of the next year, there will be an increase of 23 percent, plus monthly sums between Sk159 and Sk530. The amount of the widow pension is Sk1,100 and the maximum pension is Sk4,660. The law will come into force on 1 September 1994.

Reactors at Nuclear Plant To Shut Down in 2000

AU0607081194 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 2 Jul 94 p 7

[TA SR report: "A Condition for Credit"]

[Text] Sofia—Both reactors of the V1 unit of the Jaslovske Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant (EBO) will be shut down in 2000, when the other nuclear power plant on the territory of the Slovak Republic, in Mochovce, will be completed. Slovak Environment Minister Juraj Hrasko said this in an interview for the Austrian press agency APA during the conference of the signatories of the Danube Region States in Sofia. The shutting down of the V1 unit is a condition for the World Bank credit of 10 billion Austrian schillings for the security system of the Mochovce power plant. A similar condition was also put forward by the French concern Electricite de France (EdF).

Pakistanis Complete UNPROFOR Training

AU0507121594 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Jul 94 p 1

[TA SR report: "Pakistanis in Training"]

[Text] Lest—The training of the last 300-strong group of Pakistani UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] members ended at the military training area in Lest, Zvolen district yesterday. Since 21 May, a total of 900 Pakistani soldiers have been trained here in two-week cycles, under the guidance of German instructors. They will reinforce the UN peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia. General Marinus Wilmink, commander of NATO's Allied Ground Forces in Europe, familiarized himself with the progress of the troops' training in Lest on 16 June.

Officials, Papers Preview Clinton Visit

Visit Previewed

WS0607102294 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6 Jul 94 p 9

[Article by Jacek Kalabinski from Washington: "A Stopover on the Flight"]

[Excerpt] *The two days spent in Warsaw will be a less important part of Bill Clinton's European tour, writes Jacek Kalabinski from Washington.*

Unofficially, White House representatives say that the several hours of meetings with Boris Yeltsin in Naples will be the most important part of the President's trip. For the first time, the Russian president will be taking part in a meeting of the seven richest countries of the world (G-7) on an equal footing.

The agenda for Bill Clinton's stay in Warsaw envisions the laying of wreaths at no fewer than three monuments, but, on the other hand, a press conference that had been scheduled earlier was dropped from the agenda. Presidents Clinton and Walesa have only a few minutes to deliver short statements after their conversation, which means that only U.S. correspondents who are permanently accredited to the White House will be able to ask questions (they are much more interested in the coming invasion of Haiti than in "Partnership for Peace.")

Normalization

Polish press correspondents in Washington were earlier denied requests for interviews. Last Thursday, however, the White House started to round up reporters of the Polonia press in the United States to enable them to talk to the President the following day. A majority of their questions pertained to the fate of Colonel Kuklinski (about whom President Clinton had not heard) and to allocation of better frequencies for Polonia television in Chicago (over which the President has no control).

A high-ranking official of the U.S. Government told reporters that "the trip to Poland is important" due to the country's key position in the postcommunist world, which has been undergoing transformations, and due to the progress Poland has made. But a diplomat dealing with East and Central Europe, who wanted to remain anonymous, said quite openly that Clinton's trip to Warsaw will not be as spectacular an event as President Bush's visits in 1989 and 1992. Poland is a normal country now, and, in normal countries, in Paris or London, a visit by the U.S. President does not make an earth-shattering impression.

However, there is still a reason that at least some of President Clinton's associates would rather have the Warsaw visit already behind them. They think that Polish public opinion has been demanding too loudly Polish membership in NATO, or at least a clear definition of how "Partnership for Peace" is to lead to NATO membership.

Meanwhile, President Clinton, who reacted enthusiastically when Russia, after lengthy arguments and teasing, finally decided to join "Partnership," is not ready to go beyond general declarations that "Partnership" may be a road to NATO. The only relatively new aspect of the issue will be about an announcement to be made during Clinton's speech in the Sejm, that the first joint Polish-U.S. military exercises will take place before the end of this year. Under this situation, asking more detailed questions about NATO would be inconvenient.

A high-ranking government official says he does not think that Poland feels directly endangered militarily but that the Polish people feel endangered for both historical and geographical reasons, and for reasons having to do with the stresses of the past four years, during which enormous social changes have taken place. Precisely because of that, during his Sejm speech, President Clinton is to announce an assistance initiative, which has not been identified with precision up to now, for that part of Polish society that suffered in the course of the transfer to a market economy. U.S. diplomats refuse to reveal the initiative because it will be the only really concrete item on Clinton's agenda in Poland, and they would rather leave its announcement to the President himself. [passage omitted]

Security Measures Discussed

WS0607100494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Jul 94 pp 1, 13

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Clinton Protection Program; Will the U.S. President Be Unconventional?"]

[Text] More than 100 employees of the Personal Security Unit [BOR] and at least 500 policemen will take part in the direct protection of the visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton to Warsaw. The protection plan includes the worst-case scenario (that is, for example, a possible attempt on the President's life). Apart from the preventive and order-keeping activities of the uniformed services, there will also be plainclothes policemen and snipers, who will be less conspicuous.

"BOR is directly responsible for the security of VIP's. BOR establishes a unit that supervises the protection operation. It is headed by the BOR head or his deputy," BOR Deputy Chief Krzysztof Dymek explained to RZECZPOSPOLITA. "I can give assurances that the U.S. party has full confidence in us and has not given us any recommendations concerning protection."

The Secret Service [preceding two words in English], however, undertook separate measures to get acquainted with the area. On Tuesday, it surveyed the streets of Warsaw and places where President Clinton is scheduled to appear.

Before any visit of an important person, BOR also routinely checks celebration sites and routes. "We check

everything on the route, from road surfaces to cars that are parked nearby; we check houses and refuse dumps nearby."

Whatever we think is dangerous or suspicious is removed. At the last moment, another pyrotechnics check is made, explains Director Dymek.

The protection of the place where a VIP is going to stay lies in establishing a system of security sectors, where only people with special passes are admitted; however, before that they are scrupulously checked. Among other things, they pass through the so-called pyrotechnic gates, where it is established whether they are carrying any weapons, explosives, knives, or other dangerous implements. Of course, as for any possible snipers, we have our own marksmen.

The routes that are to be used by the protected people are checked by experienced BOR officers. If they consider such a route dangerous or uncertain, they can alter it. BOR employees travel with the VIP in a convoy, with the so-called protection formation; thus, they create a "vacuum zone" between him and the crowd. In case the convoy halts, the protection formation changes into a "ring." "It may look like we are isolating a sick man; however, the 'vacuum zone' is necessary," Director Dymek explains. "Of course, if the VIP wants to stop, talk to people, or shake hands with them, we must take his wishes into account."

"We are not afraid of innocent passers-by, who, not knowing that just at that moment the President is headed in their direction, may meet him. More dangerous may be those who know the visit's schedule and who are prepared. There cannot be any accidents, however. It would be possible only if the protection staff worked sloppily, but we are professionals," assures Director Dymek.

In particular, BOR protects the places that are generally known to host the President—for example, the Marriott Hotel, where the President is going to stay. The car in which the President will be traveling is kept secret (it will look just like other cars in the motorcade). Its place in the column of cars is not revealed, either. On Monday the Americans sent their own armored limousines to Warsaw.

"Police work in the second line; they performs tasks assigned them. Their tasks include preventive protection of celebration sites and routes, piloting special trips, maintaining the peace," says Inspector Michal Otrebski, deputy chief of the Warsaw Police Command. "I would like to take the opportunity on this occasion to appeal to the citizens to obey the orders of the policemen. If need be, we will act very firmly."

Both BOR and the police concede that the greatest risk for them are unconventional, unplanned movements by VIP's. "Then we have to improvise."

Olechowski Voices Hopes

LD0507161794 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1400 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski has said that we attach great hopes to the visit to Poland by U.S. President Bill Clinton.

[Begin recording] [Olechowski] This is life. There are always great expectations connected with the arrival of the President of the United States, a superpower and a country with the greatest possibilities. We have reason to treat the visit as an important stage in our dialogue with the United States on security issues. Also, times have changed, and we have reason to expect the adoption of a position with regard to the nature of U.S. support or aid, to put it more broadly, for the Polish economy.

Today one has to talk more about the need to consolidate economic growth, the need to change certain social institutions, which previously was not a priority but that has become one today, such as social security, etc. So, there are many matters of fundamental importance that will benefit from the visit in an obvious way. And it will not be just thanks to this meeting but thanks to all the work that has been done before, when the civil servants had to dust their files and have another look at them in order to suggest some initiatives for their presidents to make a good impression. [end recording]

[Reporter] The world will not collapse if these expectations are not met.

[Olechowski]] No, because, if he says yes, the weather will not improve all of a sudden, and, if he says no, there will naot be a hailstorm. We are aware that this dialogue will continue for some time. The objective is to make progress: a word here, half a word there. This is how doctrines are made all over the world. [end recording]

Policy Shifts Examined

WS0607111394 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Jul 94 p 25

[Article by Piotr Koscinski: "Convincing Americans"]

[Text] Over the past few months, in spite of noticeable diplomatic activities on the part of both countries and visits by their delegations on various levels, Polish-U.S. relations were developing in the background of one fundamental issue—the attitude of the United States toward Central and East Europe, including Russia.

Although it denied this, the Clinton administration at first obviously bet on Russia, putting affairs related to other countries, Poland among them, on the back burner. It seems that this tendency is undergoing profound changes. Today or tomorrow, we will find out to what extent those changes will be borne out by Clinton's visit.

Intensive Contacts

Analyzing Polish-U.S. cooperation since the election of a new Polish Government last September, it is difficult to overlook the intensity of contacts.

At the end of 1993, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski visited the United States. In Washington, he spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher; his deputy for European matters, Stephen Oxman; and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Last March, Oxman (who is in charge of political issues) and Peter Tarnoff came to Warsaw, where they met with Jerzy Kozminski, state secretary at the Polish Foreign Ministry. Their visit was also part of the preparations for the coming visit of President Clinton to Poland.

Also proving to be an important event was the arrival in our country of Strobe Talbott, who has been the U.S. deputy secretary of state since the end of 1993. He is widely considered the architect of U.S. Russian and East European policies. Talbott participated in negotiations with top government officials (he was received by President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, and Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski) and held discussions with about 30 Polish politicians and experts, who touted the Polish vision of Europe and Polish-U.S. relations. Several days later, Poland was visited by a U.S. Government delegation headed by Richard Schifter, chief of the Directorate for East European Matters at the U.S. National Security Council. In mid-April, Andrzej Olechowski paid a return visit to Washington and was received there by Vice President Al Gore and held talks at the U.S. Department of State and Congress.

Besides the diplomats, Washington and Warsaw hosted officials from Polish and U.S. ministries and departments. Polish Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk, in April, and Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, in May, both went to the United States, while U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown and FBI Director Louis Freeh paid visits to Warsaw in late June.

Who Takes Precedence?

During his visit to Warsaw, Strobe Talbott said: "At first, we were said to be pursuing 'Russia above all' policies. Now they claim that we are dropping such policies. This is not true. We have supported and still support reformatory forces, wherever they are." Strobe Talbott said this in April 1994. But it is none other than he who is considered an author of the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, intended to replace or at least postpone, Poland's admission to NATO.

After Bill Clinton took office, departments dealing with Poland at U.S. institutions shaping foreign policy were considerably streamlined or even eliminated. It would not be that bad if, according to East European diplomats and politicians, it were not for the fact that relations with Central and East European states are clearly subordinated to those with Russia. The NATO case made it particularly obvious.

Given the situation over the past several months, Polish diplomats tried to tilt Americans in favor of the Polish perception of issues vitally important to us. This applied primarily to the issue of security in Europe, the situation in Russia and other former Soviet republics, relations between Russia and Central and East European states, our participation in NATO, and Polish-U.S. military and economic cooperation and U.S. investments in Poland.

Did they succeed? No doubt, there is a shift in the handling of Russian issues by U.S. diplomats. Political observers, however, link it to the results of the recent election in that country and the impressive success of the radical nationalist Zhirinovskiy party, as well as fears that betting everything on one card only, that of President Yeltsin, might not be safe.

Greater Interest in East Europe

The activation of the Directorate for East European Matters at the National Security Council testifies to the increased interest of the United States in this region. Recently, all aspects of U.S. foreign policy regarding our region—that is, the states situated between the old Iron Curtain and the former Soviet border—have been revised, Ambassador Richard Schifter, chief of the Directorate, told RZECZPOSPOLITA. A decision has been made to concentrate all efforts to assist the development of this region. This involves three aspects: development of democracy, the economy, and security. This is why the National Security Council set up the Directorate and appointed me as its head. Also created was the interdepartmental Coordinating Commission for East European Matters, headed by Peter Tarnoff.

The question as to whether the Directorate's formation was merely a gesture was answered by the U.S. delegation with Schifter at the head. The Americans' very busy visit should also facilitate the distribution of aid for Poland.

Speaking of aid, no substantial financial assistance to either reforms or, for example, the Polish military should be expected from the United States. This issue should be seen from two perspectives: First, Washington has earmarked most of its support for former Soviet republics; second, with the deficit in the U.S. budget, it would not be reasonable to talk about any increase in help for other countries. Nevertheless, this issue was one of the key topics during U.S.-Polish talks over the past few months.

Independent Policy

Polish political commentators stress that, in relations with the United States, Poland has its own, entirely independent position. In relations with a superpower, which the United States certainly is, it is not all that easy. It seems, however, that Washington appreciates the independence of Polish policy, even if it is not always in line with its interests.

Daily Speculates About 'Baggage'

WS0607113094 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 6 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Krystyna Szelestowska: "Bill Clinton in Poland; What Is There in the President's Baggage?"

[Text] Poland and Poles will for two days host U.S. President Bill Clinton, a representative of the new, postwar generation of politicians, who did not personally experience the dramatic events and who look upon the great military conflict in Europe that took place over a half-century ago as the yellowing pages of history.

This does not change Poles' expectations from the United States and from the incumbent President. Among the most important, if not the most important, expectations are guarantees of our country's security, to link the fate of Poland to the West, and to allow us to take part in NATO as a member with equal rights.

For some time now, the announced visit of Bill Clinton to Poland and Latvia has been attracting the attention of foreign political scientists and commentators. It is generally believed that the very decision to visit Warsaw and Riga indicates that the present occupant of the White House has finally more clearly discerned the problems of Central Europe and intends to pursue a more realistic policy in this region.

The thing is that, so far in Warsaw, as well as in other capitals of the former socialist bloc, there has been a bitter conviction, not entirely unfounded, that Bill Clinton and his Department of State are completely preoccupied with Russia and, for the sake of good relations with Boris Yeltsin and maintaining the strong position of the Russian president, the White House is neglecting Central Europe, including Poland. Even if it is not neglecting it, it does not really want to recognize its fears, anxieties, or needs.

The first signal, as it were, of "awakening" was the preparation of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program and the pressure to implement it. Everyone knows, however, that the distance between participation in the PFP and entering NATO is not only far but also at least uncertain. Poland has already made the first steps in the PFP. On 5 July in Brussels, we celebrated accepting the Polish Individual Program for Peace.

This still does not mean that we were given the go-ahead and that we were shown the waiting room. As Zbigniew Brzezinski recently wrote in a commentary in THE NEW YORK TIMES, "Poles are still afraid that the policy of the United States toward Central Europe is a function of U.S. policy toward Russia." As is known, Moscow is against extending NATO to include Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic; it has often expressed this opinion.

However, now that Russia has joined the PFP, that it has tightened its contacts with NATO, even though it has not obtained either the right to veto the organization's decisions or the consent to influence its decisions, the time is coming close for us to expect another step from NATO—this time in our direction. It is not a coincidence that, in the West, increasingly more is being said and written about the need for such a step.

In the same commentary, Professor Brzezinski argues that "for the U.S. President, Warsaw is a perfect place to state that the reconciliation of Central Europe with Russia and extension of the security system are mutually strengthening and that the United States is ready to specify the dates and criteria for admitting new members to NATO."

"In Poland, Bill Clinton should simply say—YES," wrote the WALL STREET JOURNAL on 21 June, and added that this is not just to comfort the states standing in line to join NATO.

Andrzej Olechowski, head of the Polish diplomatic service, does not conceal the fact that, during talks with the U.S. President, he also hopes to hear some dates, even though he knows that our membership in NATO will not be a matter of one year. It may, however, be put into practice during Bill Clinton's term of office.

Minister Olechowski also believes, as he told TRYBUNA last week, that "because the United States was ready to go a step further in Russian affairs, perhaps it will also be ready to take a step forward in our affairs." He does not fear that our membership in NATO must entail worse relations between Moscow and Warsaw, Washington, or Brussels. Minister Olechowski is also deeply convinced that "the announcement of opening the organization to our states will remove obstacles for developing its dialogue with Moscow."

Have all of these opinions and arguments reached the White House? Will the U.S. President's baggage also include something that Poland and Poles are so eagerly awaiting?

Various leaks from Washington reaching us last week suggest that this time we may also be disappointed—not for the first time.

Even before the U.S. President got on board the plane destined for Europe, he managed to pour some cold water on us. He praised and complimented us for joining the PFP program and voiced assurances that NATO would and should be extended, as he said in an interview with Polish television. At the same time, however, he stated that the issue of setting a specific date for admission, as well as the issue of submitting conditions, cannot be resolved right now. First, joint exercises must he arranged, which would be a test of usefulness to NATO. Only then will it become possible to work out a specific schedule for admitting new members to NATO. The president also explained that the Unitd States cannot make decisions on its own; all NATO members must agree.

Of course, Poles understand perfectly that the United States is not alone and that such a decision must be made

by all. It is obvious, however, that the decision of other NATO members largely depends, and will largely depend, on the stand taken by the United States.

Bill Clinton said that he would bring concrete suggestions and proposals with him to Warsaw. As I understand it, he said this mainly in relation to economic cooperation, to concessions in trade, as well as to the establishment or activation of aid funds that were agreed upon earlier.

It would not be good, however, if the baggage of the U.S. President contained only promises, even if they were very significant. Poles are first of all waiting for decisions that can permanently incorporate Poland into the system of European security.

Will the baggage of President Clinton, who did not want to reveal what he was going to bring to Poland, include anything that we are so eagerly awaiting?

Clinton's Position on Abortion Criticized

WS0507145194 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Jul 94 p 2

[Commentary by Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, editor in chief of NAJWYZSZY CZAS, under the "Points of View" rubric: "The Face of the New World"]

[Excerpts] In the contemporary world, which gives us enough reasons to sink into chaos, one can also discern four ideas, which are at the same time an attempt to set the chaotic world in order and an expression of four different concepts of civilization. These ideas, in short, can be expressed in four slogans: The State of the Middle, the Holy War, the Third Rome, and the New World. This sequence is not at all accidental: I have listed them in chronological order, as they appeared in world history.

The State of the Middle is a different name for China. This slogan defines a civilization that aims not so much for expansion as for contemplation of itself, for experiencing one's own history intensely. This civilization is characterized by skepticism, which probably results from several thousand years of history. [passage omitted]

The Holy War is Islam, a civilization characterized by the feeling of its own religious mission, the instrument of which is war. [passage omitted]

The Third Rome, in turn, is Russia, which can feel the increasing strength in itself after the Tartars' yoke was discarded and which is beginning its expansion with the feeling of a mission. [passage omitted]

Finally, the New World—the United States. A community of pilgrims, freed from the burden of European history, which conquers the Promised Land in line with simple guidance from the Founding Fathers. The only idea that has been put into practice, about which it boasts. An extremely strong myth of success, which compels others to follow. It compels more entrepreneurial pilgrims to suggest to the world a leadership that looks very natural. This naturalness of leadership built on success, on the fulfillment of civilization, is accepted quite generally, even when the New World fills the old one with rubbish—toys removed from the home of a spoiled brat to make room for new toys. And the hope of the oppressed with various tyrannies offers to the world its leadership in order to arrange it in line with its own model and to make it happy.

To organize it in line with its own model—that means how? What face is the New World turning to us? Is it the face of Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan, who freed the earth—one from slavery and the other from communism in the name of freedom? Or is it the face of a gangster and a speculator, who treats the world as a feeding ground he wants to subordinate to himself for profit?

U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that, at the September conference in Cairo [not further specified], he would promote the legalization of abortion all over the world as a method of preventing overpopulation. Is that a tactful proposal on the part of the leader of a nation that consumes an unproportionately large portion of the world's raw material reserves? It is worth noting that all those who complain about overpopulation believe that it is others who constitute a threat. Apparently, they think that their existence is indispensable to the world—otherwise, they would start reducing their own overpopulation. However, what can be done in a situation where others think the same and are equally strongly attached to their existence?

To support his stand, President Clinton uses a very convincing argument: He says that he must keep the promises he made to "gays" and liberated women, whose votes elevated him to this high post. Well, promises should be kept; however, were these promises responsible and correct? To make a long story short, should the world start on the road of legalizing crime just to satisfy "gays?" And if—God forbid—the election campaign had been sponsored by a cosmetic company using human embryos as research material and for this reason wanted this promise to be kept, then what? Should we accept this and not voice any reservations? Is this what leading the world entails?

When one thinks about it, it is easier to understand the accusations of "imperialism" leveled at the United States by Saddam Husayn and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. I say: It is easier to understand them, even if they are unfair accusations. Unfortunately, it is President Clinton's declaration that makes them more understandable. As a result, the face of the New World, which has so far evoked trust, is beginning to acquire repellent features.

Sejm Postpones Concordat Issue

LD0107193894 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1900 GMT 1 Jul 94

[Report by Agnieszka Ejerman from the Sejm]

[Text] The Concordat issue has been postponed. Two hundred and one deputies voted in favor of the Extraordinary Commission's presenting the final report on the Concordat after the referendum on the new constitution but not later than 31 December 1995. There were 395 deputies in the House; 181 were against and 13 abstained. Thus, the Concordat will now go to the Extraordinary Commission, as the Democratic Left Alliance wanted.

President Lech Walesa, who was listening to the discussion that proceeded the vote, left the House agitated and shouted to journalists: Enough of the commies.

Olechowski Protests Decision

LD0507115594 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski published a statement today expressing reservations about the Sejm decision to postpone the ratification of the Concordat until after the new constitution is adopted. Wladyslaw Klaczynski, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] press and information office:

[Begin Klaczynski recording] The Sejm resolution on the procedure concerning the bill on the ratification of the Concordat, according to the MSZ, postpones the date of the final decision to a very distant future. Most probably it would take place in 1996. Of course, it is a good practice when the Sejm specifies its work schedule. However, the minister of foreign affairs expresses his strong reservations about setting such a distant date for the necessary analyses to be carried out, and it is particularly erroneous to make the ratification process dependent on the progress of work on the new constitution.

First, the principles of the religious law in democratic Poland should be permanent. Second, it is difficult to anticipate today how long the process of formulating and passing the new constitution will be. The government has presented its position on the compatibility of the Concordat provisions with the constitution very clearly. It also expressed the will to respect the principle of equality of citizens irrespective of their religion. Consequently, the minister of foreign affairs believes that it is his duty to express the view that the adoption by the Sejm of the Concordat resolution was carried out without sufficient justification. He will thus suggest to the Council of Ministers that it should submit a proposal for this resolution to be changed. [end recording]

Cardinal Jozef Glemp, primate of Poland, when commenting on the postponement by the Sejm of the decision on the ratification of the Concordat, said that the church wants peace but is not afraid of war. According to Primate Glemp, the Sejm decision means not just a postponement but also a rejection of the document that has been signed.

NBP President on Inflation, Redenomination

WS0607071594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with NBP President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz by Jan Bazyl Lipszyc; place and date not given: "I Am Not an Exception"]

[Excerpts] [Lipszyc] You have been promoted by the president. Do you still feel you are a person of the Belweder?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] My first talk with the president did not suggest that I was supposed to be a person of the Belweder. There was a deadlock at that time; the National Bank of Poland [NBP] had not had a president for six months, and Lech Walesa was looking for a candidate who would meet certain specified conditions, who would be relatively independent, not linked to any strong grouping, a person who would know something about the activity of the central bank.

[Lipszyc] Does the president take advantage of your advice—for example, advice concerning the budget, the signature of laws? Does he ask you for help, or do you readily offer yourself and your assistance?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] There were times when he did take advantage of my advice. It was clearly seen in the case of signing the budget law; he was not certain what to do. As for the tax on higher-than-average wage growth, he had a different opinion. However, I recommended that he sign it because I believed that it should be signed right away. Nevertheless, at that time, the decision was made earlier. Now the president had already said earlier that he would sign it and that wage control is necessary.

[Lipszyc] The configuration of political forces, which has made it possible for you to take over this post, does not exist any longer. As for the people whom it has elevated to power, there is only the president, the president of the Supreme Chamber of Control, and the NBP president. Is it not a disadvantage in your work to not have a political ally?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I do not feel this way. For example, the party that voted for me en masse at that time was the Polish Peasant Party. This does not mean, of course, that I am treating it as my political ally.

[Lipszyc] The Sejm has made attempts to limit the independence of the central bank. They have been abortive so far. It has tried, however, to order the bank in terms of what degree it should finance the deficit and the issuance of money. At the beginning of its term of office, there were even rumors that you might be recalled from this post. Attempts to put pressure on the NBP are

bound to continue. In such issues, will it not be disadvantageous to not have political backing in the Sejm?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I felt pressure in the previous Sejm as well. For example, the degree of the increase in credits for the economy was increased, so last year I had to explain why I had not implemented this. This is just the way the central bank operates. It must simply live with pressure.

[Lipszyc] Have you made any progress in the past two years on the road to NBP independence?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It can be felt. The NBP really has a stronger position already. One factor is definitely the fact that, in a centrally planned economy, the role of the central bank is smaller. Moreover, in the first period of transformations, all decisions concerning, for example, talks with the IMF, were conducted by the Finance Ministry. Now we take part in such talks.

[Lipszyc] Many rightist politicians believe that the banking system should be decommunized because it is a nest of *nomenklatura,* which grants credits only to its own people, to people of the old configuration. Is such a decommunization possible or necessary, and how would it affect the functioning of banks?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] If we take a look at poorly granted credits, we will see that they do not correspond to the political map. Now, if investments are sound, we should only be glad because they contribute to economic growth. I think it is a mistake to look at decommunization as a panacea for the economy's development and for social justice. [passage omitted]

[Lipszyc] Those who are critical of the "Strategy for Poland" claim that it is nothing but wishful thinking, that it does not say anything about the instruments with which Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko would like to accomplish his goals.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] A plan of that kind cannot contain too many details. It is good that "Strategy" was prepared. This forecast is very important because it shows a certain direction and provides a feeling of security to business circles, for example. The previous government also felt that it was necessary to prepare a plan that would cover more than 10 years in the future. It did not, however, do it because its term of office was suddenly discontinued. Now we can think whether these intentions are feasible...

[Lipszyc] Exactly. Are the fundamental macroeconomic parameters of "Strategy" in agreement with the NBP's forecasts?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It seems that some of them are very ambitious. However, the evaluation of the size of unemployment, for instance, does not at all meet social expectations. I estimate that it is a real evaluation. I believe that it may take one year longer to decrease inflation to the one-digit level. In my opinion, we will have one-digit inflation by 1998, not 1997. What is important, however, is the fact that, before that, there were no such evaluations. Poland needs a vision of economic development in the next few years.

After the first six months of the year, one can say that economic growth should be maintained; however, this depends on structural changes. The shortcoming of this document is that it does not say much about structural changes in the economy. I understand the authors: From the tactical point of view, they decided that it is better not to write too much about it.

[Lipszyc] Now, let us talk about more specific issues—what inflation impulses will be caused by redenomination.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Because of the operation of rounding to the nearest grosz—that is, to the present 100 zlotys—it will be next to none because there are almost no prices under 100 zlotys. Two kinds of bills will be in circulation long enough, so the possibility of making a profit in the operations of converting the money will also be very small. When the VAT [value-added tax] was introduced, as well as in the case of leaping devaluation, there were also opinions that inflation would increase. However, nothing like that actually happened.

[Lipszyc] You have mentioned devaluation. Exporters have been demanding it for a long time now. Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko believes, in turn, that the rate of creeping devaluation should be decreased. What will the exchange-rate policy in the next few years be like? Will we move to a floating exchange rate in the foreseeable future?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Exporters always want devaluation. From our point of view, it is not necessary right now. Foreign currency receipts are increasing. The condition of reserves is good. The trade balance in May was slightly adverse and in April slightly favorable; thus, it is balanced. There are also other sources of foreign currencies. Therefore, the exchange rate policy will be stable. If we predict smaller inflation next year, it is clear that it will be necessary to decrease the devaluation rate. It is the only change we can expect because the present system is proving itself. We are conducting research on how to make the exchange rate liquid, an exchange rate that would allow for fluctuations only within certain limits. However, it is a thing of the future.

[Lipszyc] When can we expect a further decrease in interest rates?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I am not excluding the possibility of a decrease in NBP interest rates. This will depend on the level of inflation, however.

[Lipszyc] Is its level affected by the lack of a law on wage control?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Right now it is difficult to answer your question unequivocally. As is known, lack of control over wages can generate higher inflation. Financial processes are deferred in time, so at least six months are

needed to evaluate in what way the lack of the tax on higher-than-average wage growth has affected the level of inflation.

[Lipszyc] The level of inflation also depends on the toughness of the financial policy of the central bank.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Our policy is not very tough. One of its aims will remain to not spoil what has been achieved. Now, it is I who must adjust to the "Strategy for Poland," in which the intentions concerning inflation are rather ambitious, which I like. I will certainly cooperate with the finance minister in the area of lowering inflation.

[Lipszyc] You are trying to keep away from the current political life. However, you publicly engage in religious activity. Should the president of the central bank flaunt his or her religious convictions? Should such a person be the leader of Revival in the Saint Spirit?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The bank's president, just like anyone else, has the right to express his views. I have been a member of the Revival in the Saint Spirit for 12 years now. The president of the Bundesbank is a member of the Papal Social Academy. Thus, I am no exception. [passage omitted]

Iliescu's 'Attacks' on Opposition Assessed

AU0607082294 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 30 Jul 94 p 12

[Article by Dan Andronic: "Ion Iliescu: 'I Have Treated Coposu in a Decent Manner, But He Knows Nothing Apart From Venom and Hatred'"]

[Text] According to a Bucharest daily, the visit paid by Romanian President Ion Iliescu to the Bucharest Electric Machine Factory did not unfold without any upheaval, contrary to what the official communique on the visit—edited later—affirmed.

Thus, Ion Iliescu, while waging war against those who call for his suspension from office for violating the principle of the separation of power in the state, launched merciless attacks. We report here on the complete statement made by Romania's president, as quoted by the aforementioned daily: "I dared to talks about rules of justice and they assaulted me like hyenas, accusing that I had violated the principle of the separation of power in the state. I have not violated any rule on separation! It is the duty of a head of state to draw attention to irregularities and to those who do not respect the law. I have not urged anybody to violate the law, on the contrary, I referred to those who violated it and were throwing people out of their houses without having any legal grounds for those acts."

Ion Iliescu continued the attack against the opposition, saying to the workers at the Bucharest Electric Machine Factory: "God forbid that I am thrown out by these who have been watching me and others like myself since 1990, and a person like Emil Constantinescu or Dinu Patriciu [leaders of the Democratic Convention of Romania and of Liberal Party '93, respectively] is brought to the helm of the country. Then you would see what a national tragedy means!"

Ion Iliescu explained to the workers the difficult situation of the country through the fact that "in all countries around us the left-wing forces retreated in 1990 and let the right-wing forces come to power (...). The right-wing forces have discredited themselves completely because the economic situation is difficult and nobody can work miracles in three years (...). There were some people who said: You guys were not clever! In 1990 you should have given the power to the right-wing forces. But would it have been good?! Who were the right-wing forces in our country? Could we have given power to the peasant party, the liberals, to Patriciu—these who are really determined to get rich—would it have been better?"

"When one is in a difficult situation one might make incorrect decisions and give power to those rascals who want nothing else than to defend their own interests, that is 'restitutio in integrum' meaning to have the big properties they owned before returned to them and to bring back the monarchy, that is what they want. If the people want to vote for this and want to bring in a monarch and to reinstate the big land owners, this can be done too (..). I have treated Coposu president of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] in a decent manner, but he knows nothing apart from venom and hatred" Ion Iliescu also said to the workers in the aforementioned Bucharest factory.

The tense discussions held by Ion Iliescu with the workers were reported in the presidential communique as being manifestations of solidarity with Ion Iliescu who "not only had the right, but also the duty to take a stand against the abusive eviction of certain tenants from their dwellings."

Iliescu Views Impeachment, Domestic Issues

AU0407155194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0809 GMT 4 Jul 94

[Statement by Romanian President Ion Iliescu at a news conference with domestic and foreign correspondents at Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest—live]

[Text] To begin with, I would like to clarify a few things in connection with this news conference and why it is being held now. I can tell you that, more than a month ago, I made up my mind to resume these regular meetings with the press representatives. This does not mean—as I have heard some commentators say—that I disapprove of the presidential spokesman, who will continue his weekly meetings with the press. However, I have decided to resume this practice of my contacts with the press. Therefore, I am a bit late with this news conference, but I do not have to explain why, since the previous month has been marked by quite a few confusions. Consequently, the latest developments have made me decide to hold this meeting with the press, due to the aggravation of the political climate and the wave of successive actions of late.

In the past month, we have witnessed a concerted offensive against all the institutions of the state—the government, the presidency, and even Parliament—which could only have destabilizing motives and effects. This concern was shared with me by most of the citizens I have met with recently. I scheduled this news conference for today to coincide with the conclusion of Parliament's ordinary session—before I learned of the intention to organize an extraordinary Parliament session, scheduled to begin today, in connection with the initiative of certain parliamentarians to impeach the president. In spite of all this, we decided not to postpone the news conference again since it had already been scheduled.

Regarding the impeachment initiative, I do not wish to dwell too much on it. I conveyed my response to Parliament in connection with the respective document signed by the 166 [number as heard] parliamentary representatives. That letter will be made available to you too. Out of respect for Parliament, I did not want to proceed as the authors of the respective initiative did and have the parliamentarians learn of my response from the press. However, I will say, in a few words, that I basically

consider the action of the leadership of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD], which was also joined by other parliament members, as lacking juridical basis.

As a matter of fact, they set out from an ad lib response I gave to a local councillor in Satu Mare, who complained about the decisions of certain bodies—decisions that were taken without legal justification or ran counter to the law on defending the rights of the tenants—which have led to injustice and tension. The published text of my recorded answer is quite eloquent. It was an improvised answer, of course. As a first reaction, I thought that a man might also make certain inexact and imperfect statements when he ad libs. I would like to tell you that, despite the improvised nature of my answer, I do not have to make any corrections, since I noted with satisfaction that I was basically right in everything I said. The text of my response is available to you; you can have it. It is also included in a letter I have sent to Parliament.

As you can ascertain for yourselves, there is no question of violating the Constitution and the independence of the justice bodies or of placing myself above the law. On the contrary, my entire plea was in favor of observing the Constitution and the laws. No one can place himself outside the law, as stipulated by Constitution. This applies not only to the country's president but to each individual magistrate, too. The issue was about such an instance of placing oneself outside the law and even violating a promulgated law on the protection of tenants.

Therefore, I did not only have the right but also the duty to speak my mind in this respect, by virtue of my obligations arising from Article 80 of the Constitution, which expressly stipulates that Romania's president must see to it that the Constitution is observed and that public authorities, including legal ones, function properly. To this end, the Romanian president also fulfills the task of mediating between the state powers and between the state and society.

The authors of the impeachment request ignore this very stipulation of the Constitution, and they are probably doing it not because they are not aware of it. It is curious that those who present themselves as defenders of the justice and legal bodies are the very people who, until not too long ago, were making insulting comments about these legal bodies, whom they accused of obedience to the power. As a matter of fact, the most active initiators of this action are the same people who have fostered and encouraged a steady course of continuous defamation of the president and the state's provisional structures since 1990, from the time of the National Unity Provisional Council [CPUN]. They are the same people who, as of 1992, could not disengage themselves from the climate and language of perpetual electoral competition.

I will stop here. If you have any questions, I will answer them. I do not want to make any further comments in this respect. As I said, I have forwarded my letter to Parliament. However, what I am concerned with is the need to overcome this state of friction and hatred that is being maintained deliberately and artificially out of partisan reasons.

I must say that I regret to have somehow allowed myself to be pulled into all this. In a given set of circumstances, in response to direct questions from certain workers from the Machine-Tools enterprise, I responded to the attacks and fables from certain political leaders—and not the opposition, as they say—as well as from certain publishers, who have intensified their slandering campaign of late, by accusing me of all evils of the world: from the tendency to trample on the Constitution, as some said, to discounting the independence of justice and the principle of the separation of the powers in the state—consequently the basics of the state based on the rule of the law—up to dictatorial tendencies, the encouragement of the corruption and abuses, and finally the responsibility for the stagnation, restoration, economic decline, the degradation of the quality of life, and so forth.

Of course, my response, taken out of context, was extensively exploited. I was accused of being deaf to criticism, if all the fables about me can be called criticism, including the so-called gaffes I might have made—about which all kinds of journalistic jokes are being made—let alone the direct insults and slanders leveled at me. Moreover, they are projecting a robot image of me as an aggressive and violent man who is allegedly intolerant about the opposition. Any critical remark I might make about one or more people for insolence, impertinence, kulak arrogance, defamation, and calumny is considered as criticism against the opposition as a whole.

I would like to tell you that I have frequent dialogues with many honorable people of the opposition, both from the center—senators, deputies—and the territory. I have never made global remarks about the opposition as a whole. I believe that I gave enough proof of the fact that I have not lacked either patience or openness toward the dialogue in all these years. However, what I can tell you is that, from my contacts with various categories of citizens, I realize that their perception is exactly the opposite. Most people chide me for being too tolerant and for not showing enough exactingness toward those who are called upon to defend and implement the laws, to guard public law and tranquility, and to defend the interests of the citizens.

I have noted that those most affected by the hardships of transition are displaying greater decency when they are expressing their disappointment and exasperation with the difficulties facing them. However, they are also expressing their indignation vis-a-vis the suburban language, the slanders and the insults, and the vulgar remarks printed by certain publications and they ask me why we tolerate all this. I believe that we should all strike to give better answers to these concerns and worries of the people. The strained atmosphere of a blind and unscrupulous political struggle, with a violent, aggressive, and often vulgar language, creates pandemonium

and confusion and also compromises the idea of democracy, parliamentary life, and politics in the eyes of the people in the street. It even compromises the parties and their activity.

As a matter of fact, the people are most concerned with the life's hardships and the prospects of overcoming them. What can we say in this respect? We have registered a period of continuous decline of the national economy. On the one hand, this decline was generated by the crisis of system, which has emerged in the command economy even before 1989, a crisis which has actually generated the social explosion of December 1989. The decline was aggravated by the dismantlement of the centralized structures and of the mechanisms of the planned state economy, combined with the dismantlement, on the other hand, of CEMA and the regional economic system, to which our national economy was coupled, and with the effects of the unfavorable international circumstances.

This decline has reached its peak in 1993, something which was particularly seen in the highest rate of inflation and unemployment. Nevertheless, we are now registering certain positive signs of macroeconomic normalization and recovery. In this respect, I would like to point out a few of them: the halt in the decline in industrial production, which was first achieved in 1993; the start of the agricultural production recovery, with good omens for this year; the stabilization of the national currency, under conditions of the liberalization of the exchange rate, and, for the first time in four years, the accumulation of hard currency reserves at the National Bank, which is so important for supporting the process of monetary stabilization; the decrease of the inflation rate by more than a half in the past six months, compared to the last year's average, and the trend seems to be continuing; the reduction of the trade balance deficit, although it is still extant; and the emergence of favorable prerequisites for increasing our exports.

All these elements were also noted by the experts of the IMF and the World Bank and are reflected in the positions and stands of the politicians as well as in the growing interest of foreign investors.

Of course, these first steps toward stabilization and economic recovery must be further supported by energetic steps in the real economy. I believe that there are two essential actions that should be resolutely promoted by the government, the State Property Fund, the Private Property Funds, and the banking system in the forthcoming period: first, the elimination of the financial blockage, aggravated by the prolonged inflation, which represents the main hardship in the life of most economic units. With the decrease in the inflation rate, the banks will also be able to reduce the interest rate, something that they have already begun doing of late. This will be a first element of support for the enterprises in the effort to remove the blockage and recapitalize the firms.

The second action is the promotion of mass privatization, with its two basis components: a social one, by turning the ownership certificates into shares, which will also provide an opportunity for correcting the certain abnormal situations that have arisen as a result of certain loopholes in the law, whereby 6 million citizens were deprived of their certificates, with the danger of their being eliminated from the mass privatization process. These people have sold their own certificates at low prices out of necessity; these certificates have gotten into the hands of a few upstarts who accumulated them.

I believe that this issue is being discussed by the government and the State Property Fund, something that has somewhat delayed the entire action and upset the schedule stipulated by the governmental program on launching the mass privatization process. They are searching for a solution to ensure the protection of these citizens, on the basis of the fundamental criteria and principles of privatization, by taking into account this aspect of the social compensation of the citizens, since everybody has borne the effort of industrialization and the accumulation of fixed assets by enterprises. Finally, we have the economic facet of this measure, through the sale of shares, with the units being privatized thus gaining the opportunity to eliminate their debts, on the one hand, and to accumulate circulating capital for restructuring and recovery, on the other hand.

These two major goals of this measure are the key and essence of the entire concept of launching the mass privatization process. Therefore, these two vital measures aim at bringing about microscale improvements, at the level of economic units. Of course, this is not everything. Privatization per se does not resolve everything. It will have to be accompanied by restructuring and retechnologization measures and by the modernization of the manufacturing and technological parameters of products in order to increase their competitiveness through higher parameters of productivity and quality and through lower production costs.

In this respect, I heard quite a few correct opinions on this subject, some of which even came under the form of accusations against the government in the sphere of restructuring, which is the essence of the problem. However, it is easy to express wishes and opinions. Such a restructuring process presupposes huge sources of investments. When one talks about the so-called shock therapy, one only talks in abstract terms; wishing is one thing, while being able to do it is another thing.

In practical terms, only Germany has tested the shock therapy. This meant annual expenditures of more than 150 billion German marks, as were actually registered by the German Government. After five years of such a huge financial effort, the process is not yet concluded. Who would not have liked that everything should be achieved in one year and the entire economic reform should be implemented in one year? Meaning that we change the foundation of ownership and the economic, institutional, and legislative structures and mechanisms in just

a year. In other words, everything starts afresh in one year, including the change in the people's mentalities, by making them break with the mentality that everything comes from above and everything is being solved at the center, and by ensuring and giving them financial resources, contracts, sale markets, marketing opportunities, and so forth.

However, life is harsher than all this. If such limitations in thinking, action, appreciations, and approaches had only existed in Romania, these negative phenomena would only been registered in Romania alone and this inertia would only have been seen in Romania. However, as we can see, the processes are similar in all countries—of course, with nuances specific to each individual state. The economic decline is specific to all transition countries.

Therefore, this presupposes ensuring domestic and external investment sources for the promotion of these measures, including the need to draw the foreign capital into this process. At the same time, it presupposes the proper orientation and utilization of these sources of capital. In this endeavor, I believe we should also learn to make better use of the intelligence and creative capacity of our specialists, of technological research, of inventions and innovations, and of the skill and knowledge of our workers, which are actually our main resource throughout this process of economic recovery and which, one must admit, are decisive for the contemporary economic process at this turn of century. Only thus can one ensure the gradual improvement of the employees' incomes, living conditions, and purchase power, as of the end of this year, and also back the efforts to implement a substantial program for the social protection of the population.

Therefore, here are a few key themes for constructive confrontations of ideas, including in the press. In this respect, I agree with the opinions expressed by certain publications, which demanded more clarity in connection with the forthcoming actions, particularly regarding mass privatization.

Finally, here is an issue of concern to the entire population, namely the need for offensive and concerted action at the legislative level—and in the concrete activity of the executive branch and the legal bodies—against corruption, on the one hand, and for the defense of the quiet and security of the citizens, on the other hand. I have often spoken on this subject, and I do not want to repeat here my stand on the phenomenon of corruption. I believe there is enough reason for dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of the measures to prevent and curb these antisocial phenomena.

On the other hand, I believe that Parliament should adopt more speedily the law on public servants and the regulations on the declaration of the wealth of all state dignitaries and clerks, beginning with the assets they had at the end of 1989 and what and how they accumulated since then, in these transition years. At the same time, one should establish clear incompatibilities for those fulfilling public functions.

As an aside, I would like to say that I did not overlook the ridicule with which some people have met my statement that I prefer to die poor but honest. In response, I was given examples of rich heads of state, some of whom are the richest men in their countries. I believe we do not need foreign examples in this respect. We have also had our own examples. King Carol II excelled in accumulating wealth at the expense of the Romanian people. I do not believe that our people need such a thing today.

I share our people's disquiet over the increase in the rate of crime and organized crime, in the number of burglaries and robberies, and in the actions of certain groups that jeopardize the tranquility and security of women, children, and old people and over the lack of combativeness and insufficient involvement and efficiency of the police, the penal investigation and inquiry bodies, and the legal organizations. I agree that we need to pass harsher legislation and punishments.

This expression of insecurity is what has impressed me most during my latest meetings with the population. The citizens have the feeling that nobody is defending them anymore and that they have noone to turn to in connection with their problems. In the past, a woman told me that one could go to the party organization and complain at the bureau or the trade union. Now, no one listens anymore, and this leads to a state of disquiet.

I am sure that some people will kindly pick on these statements and term them as Iliescu's longings. I have already spoken my mind about such expressions of nostalgia, which represent an element of inertia in our life. There are people who are longing for the immediate past and for the more distant past, given the negative phenomena generated by the state of affairs of our society. However, this is not the point. We must find in our democratic structures various ways and means to defend the citizen and his interests—I am referring to the managements of our economic units, the organizations of citizens and employees, the local and public administration, and the public order and justice bodies, which must consider this as their duty of honor as well as a key and elementary obligation. We must all devote our entire energy and capacity to this cause.

These were the few introductory words I had to say. I am now ready for your questions.

Answers Questions From Media

AU0507183994

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0807 GMT on 4 July carries a 129-minute live relay of a news conference by President Ion Iliescu at Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest with foreign and

domestic correspondents. Following his 22-minute introductory statement, there is a 104-minute question-and-answer session.

The first question comes from a correspondent of the UPI news agency, who asks Iliescu to confirm or deny a statement that he made during a recent working visit that the country ought not be left in the hands of good-for-nothings. Iliescu replies by pointing out that this is precisely the way in which slanderous allegations against him are being concocted, namely by "generalizing certain statements. That was a concrete discussion and I was referring to particular individuals who may be characterized as such. People who want to strike it rich, who disregard the public interest, and put their personal interests above everything else. That remark did not refer to the opposition or to any particular political color, or to political leaders or suchlike. I was referring to the fact that public affairs should be run by those who are committed to the interests of the country and our citizens. Their political color does not matter. As I said, it is all the same to me who rules the country. Today there are a number of problems in Romania. All governments, regardless of their political color, have to subordinate all other interests to the solution of those problems. The important thing is, regardless of their political options, that we should avail ourselves of competent people, good quality people, correct people, honest people, and people who observe and apply the laws and thus protect the interests of the country and the citizens."

The next question refers to a certain improvement of Romania's image abroad, asking Iliescu to comment on the source of that trend and whether he sees any connection between the country's improved image and the recent political initiatives of the opposition. Iliescu replies by pointing out that the "convulsive events" that took place in Romania allowed for "actions intended to distort reality" and that "some did it out of selfish interests, not sufficiently pondering on the negative consequences for the country," and then goes on to say:

"In Hungary they changed the ruling party. From certain information that was coming to me I followed with attention how each time they managed to meet their national interests. I was told about meetings held abroad by the diaspora, and by scientists who had left Hungary, now in the diaspora. A year ago such meetings had a certain nuance of support for the policy of the Antall government, whereas now, after the elections, they are presenting the qualities of the new government and the ruling party. The same people. Who probably also have their own political options and their sympathies, but they have always managed" to support Hungary, he says, "and that is also to Hungary's credit. As I said at the time, it was also to Kadar's credit, who shortly after the 1956 events extended a hand to those who had fled the country and told them: Who is not against us is with us. Regardless of what government was ruling Hungary, their diaspora has always been a point of support, of solidarity, backing Hungary's national interests. In our case, however, things are quite different, both at home, where we are having scandalous confrontations that disturb public order, and this is also reflected abroad."

Referring to the role of the opposition, Iliescu says: "I do not wish to make any discrimination; actually there are certain individuals belonging to the opposition, as well, who were involved in a sustained activity in that sense and who have their own merits. Formerly I was referring to those who damaged us by adopting scandalous stances. So I do not really think that we should give this issue political or partisan nuances; I consider that it is in our joint interest, and also our joint merit or lack of joint merit, whenever we manage or do not manage to promote a certain image of our country and national interests."

Asked to assess the chances of achieving a national consensus on the 50th anniversary of the 24 August 1944 turning against Nazi Germany, Iliescu says:

"I agree with what you say; I believe that had it not been for that 23 August coordinated political move, Romania's fate would have been totally different—a tragic one. Do not forget that Romania and Antonescu used to be loyal allies of Hitler until the very last minute, while the Russian clod-crusher was advancing furiously and would have destroyed everything without remorse. We would probably have lost Transylvania as well, and for good."

Iliescu then reviews his efforts over the past two years to engage in a dialogue with all political forces to achieve a consensus platform, especially those made two months earlier, "when we were facing certain international issues of major importance, namely joining the Partnership for Peace and the drawing up of our orientation and documents, the security plan, that is, the Balladur plan, and the mandate of our delegation, which was to attend those negotiations, and the two important documents that were drawn up by the Supreme Defense Council, namely the Unitary Conception of National Security and the Military Doctrine, which were to be submitted to Parliament."

Iliescu says that dialogue was almost achieved on those issues, "but then all these disruptive events occurred and prevented us from meeting." "However, I hope that this clouding of the minds will eventually be overcome, as such moments of strain and tension do exist; I hope that the situation calms down, and then we can resume our talks."

Iliescu then points out that "regarding our foreign policy, I believe that a general strategy has already developed that is jointly accepted by all political parties, and our priorities will be the consolidation of the openings we have already achieved. We will further and finalize our actions regarding our integration within European bodies. The finalization of that concrete action of our integration within NATO's Partnership for Peace, our relations with the European Union. As you have seen, the parliaments of the Twelve are ratifying one after another our association accord with that body. Nine

states have already ratified it and, following that, we will probably apply for our integration into the European Union."

On the other hand, Iliescu says, another target is "the further bettering of our good-neighborly relations with all our neighbors and the normalization of our relations with all the states that traditionally used to be our partners, and it is our common interest to maintain good relations with them." Besides this, Iliescu points out the significance of "the diversification of relations and their expansion over further areas, such as the most dynamic zone of world economy—namely Southeast Asia and Latin America, where there is a favorable climate and where our relations have been enlarged continuously, as well as northern Africa and the other African countries."

Asked about Romania's relations with China, Iliescu responded: "Of course, when one talks about China, one is referring to one-quarter of the globe's population, the most densely populated country of the world, and the country with the most sustained dynamics of economy, which is not solely in the center of attention of our country, but also that of everyone, and, above all, of that of the superpowers. You have seen what happened with the granting of the most-favored-nation status to China. Their interests in granting it prevail over other criteria of political nature. Thus, naturally, our relations with that great country are assigned an important place in our foreign policy and in the development plans for our bilateral economic relations."

Asked to comment on the prospects of Romanian-Hungarian relations and the chances of concluding a cooperation and friendship treaty, Iliescu says: "First, I would positively assess the declarations made during the electoral period by Gyula Horn; as you know, Oliviu Gherman also held a meeting with Mr. Horn, during which they agreed that joint action should be taken, a conjugated action to ameliorate the relations between our countries. I also saluted the formula they expressed to achieve reconciliation with the neighboring countries. We hope that, on that basis, we will achieve even more regarding our bilateral relations and the finalization of the basic treaty between the two countries."

He continues: "As far as various problems are concerned, we will discuss them later. However, there are certain essential issues about which I do not think there can be discussions. Their interest displayed for the Hungarians living beyond the borders of the country is understandable, the same way as our interest displayed for the Romanians living beyond Romania's borders is. As it is not just Hungary that has one-third of the Hungarians living abroad, but also one-third of the Romanians are living beyond our borders. That is not a particular situation of the Hungarians or Hungary. I have said it a number of times; there is no country in Europe that does not have dual nationals or dual citizens living beyond its borders, which does not have ethnic minorities abroad."

Iliescu goes on to note: 'I believe that the former leadership of our country made a fundamental mistake when it declared to be hostile against the Romanians who had left the country. We are duty-bound to cultivate those relations. I appreciate that Hungary has comprehended those interests and promoted a more suitable policy with respect to its own dual nationals. But this is one thing, and it is an entirely different thing to patronize the activity of organizations of the ethnic Hungarians living on the territory of other states, as such a thing has a different connotation with respect to relations among states. I mean the confidence relations, those that observe state interests and the principle of the loyalty of each citizen toward his own state.

'As far as we are concerned, while seeking to better our relations with the Romanians living abroad, we also urge all Romanians to be loyal citizens of the state, of the country the citizens of which they are. That is an intangible principle of confidence relations among states, and, so much the more, among neighboring states.

'Similarly, the principle of local autonomy is an inner affair of each country. It is not our task to dictate to the ethnic Romanians in Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, or wherever else the way in which they should protect their own interests. Similarly, the principle of territorial local autonomy is an affair between the state and its own citizens and not between neighboring states. Regarding the contents of that notion, I have expressed my views before. We wish the elimination from that concept or claim of that ethnic minority, of the elements of national segregation and of bantustanization of the ethnic communities living on the territory of our state. This may go for other states as well, but so much the more for us. If those two principles are observed, I do not think there can be litigious issues that could not be settled in our good-neighborly relations.'

"I would not even dramatize things," says Iliescu. "We have normal relations with Hungary, and our economic relations are perhaps the most developed among all our other neighbors."

Regarding the articles of the draft education bill that is currently being discussed by Parliament, Iliescu says that "we have no reason to feel ashamed compared to any other European country. I would wish very much that the ethnic minorities living in Hungary should have the same possibilities and rights to education in the mother tongue as ethnic Hungarians have in Romania. That is just one aspect. Regardless of the way in which the bill will eventually be passed, it still offers a very broad framework of rights, liberties, and possibilities to assert the ethnic and psychosocial identity of the various communities and also to learn and cultivate their own languages and cultures. There are education institutions at all levels where they teach in Hungarian. At the sole high school for Romanians in Hungary, at the Gyula high school, for instance, the sole subject taught in Romanian is the Romanian language, while, in our country, there are primary, secondary, and university

institutions where there is wide-scale tuition in their mother tongues, in Hungarian. So, comparisons are difficult to be sustained."

After answering a question referring to the fighting of corruption, to which Iliescu replies that more drastic measures should be taken to curb such phenomena, regardless of the political party the involved persons belong to, Iliescu is asked by the AFP correspondent about the scheduled visit of PRC Prime Minister Li Peng and whether the issue of the observance of human rights in that country will be raised during that visit. Iliescu replies in French with superimposed Romanian translation: "I do not think it is our business to raise that issue."

Asked to comment on Democratic Party leader Petre Roman's recent statement indicating a readiness to achieve a consensus among various political forces, even if they "do not love each other," and on currently circulating rumors about the setting up of a social-democratic convention, Iliescu says that he salutes such declarations of intention and, especially practical actions to engage in a political dialogue and to promote the platform of understanding, joint action, and convergence." Iliescu then reminds that he initiated the establishment of a political pact himself, which eventually could not be achieved. As following the 1992 elections, the opposition parties did not accept to cooperate with the ruling party, the latter had to look for other allies, "as none of the parties hold the absolute majority in Parliament."

Iliescu then points out that economic experts already engaged in fruitful debates, in a "civilized dialogue," despite the fact that they had opposing political convictions, "but such disputes concentrated on facts and ideas." Iliescu says that basically he has nothing against the idea of opposition, and "when I referred to it, perhaps formulating in an unfortunate way, I was referring to offending and slanderous declarations addressed to the president of the country, which is a sign of lacking elementary civilization, even if it comes from journalists, who lack elementary respect toward the fundamental institutions of the country. I believe that those who each day indulge in such things, only, to pour venom, to circulate lies, invented facts, and make slanderous remarks about a state institution, a fundamental office in the state, and the head of the state is a representative office, regardless of whether one likes that man, his conception, and his eyes, or one doesn't—those are personal problems whereas it is our national interest issue to sustain the state institutions. This does not mean that things may not be criticized. But critical remarks are one thing, while cheekiness, impertinence, and the circulating of lies are an entirely different thing."

Responding to another question referring to his personal relations, Iliescu replies: 'It has been rumored that I have been a colleague of Gorbachev's. Well, I was not. I first met Gorbachev in 1991. I keep repeating this because this issue crops up all the time. Yasir 'Arafat came here and we greeted each other. Well, I did not study together with Yasir 'Arafat, although he is also an engineer, but he studied in Cairo, as I later learned. It was by mere chance that, in 1956, we both attended an international students conference, where he came as the chairman of the Palestinian students union, while I represented the Romanian students at that conference organized in Prague. That is all; that was the sole moment we had contact, and we never met later on until now. What they said later—that I had been 'Arafat's chief during the time he was a student, that we both completed our studies in Moscow—are all aberrations.

"However, with Li Peng, yes. I was a colleague, even a seminar colleague, of Li Peng's. We studied hydro-energetics together. I began my studies in 1949 at the Bucharest Polytechnics. At the beginning of 1950, I continued at the Moscow Energetics Institute in the hydro-energetics section. I was even a seminar colleague of the current prime minister of China, Li Peng, who was an exceptional student. There were three foreigners in that seminar: Li Peng, a Chinese; a Czech student, a very good professional, who led the Czechoslovakian energy system over a certain time; and myself. With him, it is not a rumor; it is true. We even practiced at three hydro-energetic building sites."

After admitting that the opposition's recent no-confidence motion against the government was on certain points justified, and after admitting that the Vacaroiu government has really made mistakes, Iliescu ultimately defends the government by saying that "it has displayed more professionalism" and "achieved more than the previous ones." Iliescu then assesses that a government reshuffle could be possible if the prime minister considers it necessary, but refuses to comment on the likelihood of a government reshuffle.

Asked to comment on Romania's current international position, Iliescu says that lately "very many speak of the exceptional place and role of Romania as a region of stability, on the one hand, in an unstable region, which is affected by manifold centers of tension and conflict, and, on the other hand, owing to its geo-strategic position, at the mouth of the Danube and the Black Sea, the neighbors it has, as a contact point among Europe, the Russian- Caucasian space, and the Middle East, where it is to play and plays an active role in international politics."

Referring to international economic relations, Iliescu says that "we have never asked for anything free" and that Romania always set out from the idea that, in business relations, interests prevail. "Therefore, we should make ourselves sufficiently interesting as partners so that foreign investors will be interested in us and want to develop relations with us."

After denying that the state is still subsidizing industrial companies operating in the red, Iliescu points out the need to raise more funds by means of taxes and defends the recently passed law on agricultural taxes.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent asks Iliescu to comment on "the stabilization" of Russian-Romanian relations. Iliescu replies that "in politics, one generally has to observe the given political reality and one has to have the necessary strength to discard one's emotional charge when one approaches, in the national interest of each country, the given reality and the development of good-neighborly relations. I believe that Russia was and is a great neighbor, even if just in an indirect way," as Ukraine is interposed "by the fact that they also have access to the Black Sea, let alone the presence of the 14th Army in the Republic of Moldova."

Iliescu then continues by saying that "Russia is a great country, a great state, and a superpower. It is the country with the largest geographic extension in the world, having enormous natural resources, a special human potential, which doubtlessly plays a very important role in international politics, both regionally and on the European and world plane. All these elements concur in making us consider the need to cultivate good relations with Russia, which, I believe, lies both in our and in Russia's interest." Old problems have lost their actuality, "as now we have no common borders."

Iliescu says that "Russia has been one of our greatest economic partners and it will be again. Unfortunately, over the past years, our economic relations have diminished very much," which was caused by economic and social problems of the transition period both in Romania and Russia. Iliescu then evokes past talks between Romanian and Russian officials on the issue of economic cooperation and expresses his hope that "the normalization of political relations" will lead to the revival of economic exchanges.

Asked whether he does not think his image could be ruined by paying so many working visits to economic companies throughout the country—just as his predecessor did—Iliescu replies that "if one were to fear such comparisons, one should stay at home," after which he points out his need to stay in touch with reality. As an example, he mentions President Clinton's visit to the Boeing company following his taking over of the presidential office.

Asked to assess the chances of the opposition to have its impeachment motion passed by Parliament, Iliescu points out that the motion is a "constitutional procedure." He also adds that he has no way of knowing its outcome.

The live relay ends with Iliescu thanking the audience for having attended the news conference.

Ganic Promises To Consider Latest Proposal

LD0607110094 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Interview with Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, by Zeinab Badawi; Badawi in studio, Ganic in Geneva; from the "Channel Four Newscast"—live]

[Text] [Badawi] Mr. Ganic, do you accept that, as far as the world powers are concerned, this is the last chance for peace?

[Ganic] Well, we will seriously consider the proposal which will be submitted to us tomorrow.

[Badawi] Does that mean you are going to accept the deal or not?

[Ganic] We are going to review the proposal very carefully. We are going to involve all the bodies of our government and give it all serious considerations, and we are pleased to hear that there are some talks about mutual recognitions of the country in the regions, and that sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia was supported today, and of course we have to look on the other details, especially concerning human rights and freedom of ownerships and overall freedom for the non-Serbian population in the area controlled by Serbs.

[Badawi] Fine, but can you just clarify for us, you said you'll give the proposal serious consideration, but do you accept that this is the final offer from the major world powers?

[Ganic] Well, let me tell you, if they say this is the final, we will consider it as the final, but we will go step by step and review the proposal and, as you know, we have to work on this and we didn't say we would reject the proposal, we are going to take it and consider it seriously.

[Badawi] But aren't you just playing for time? It could be argued that your tactics are to seem to go along with the proposals and paint the Serbs as the rejectionists so that you can get the arms embargo lifted against you, which is what you wanted all along?

[Ganic] Well, let the Serbs withdraw from the territory that they are occupying and we will not talk about arms embargo. What the nations have to do now is to stop Serbian fascism. I know that the fascism is only on the territory of Bosnia right now but it will spread, it will spread at least ideologically if you do not stop this in Bosnia.

[Badawi] You say you are serious about negotiations, however it is clear that you are still keen to prosecute the war. Is it worth spilling more blood in Bosnia for you to gain a few more percentage points of land on the maps?

[Ganic] Well, let me tell you, what we insist is on the war crime tribunal to take place immediately and to take place in parallel with the peace process. We will of course consider seriously the proposals, as I said to you, but we are resisting in every cell of our society, of course we try to survive, so you have to have in mind that where our territory is occupied by the Serbs loyal to Belgrade regime, so our resistance should not be considered as a fight for more territory.

Silajdzic Denies Iran Supplying Arms

BR0507140194 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 Jul 94 p 16

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Guido Rampoldi; place and date not given: "They Want To Legitimize Extermination"]

[Text] [Rampoldi] What do you fear from Geneva, Prime Minister?

[Silajdzic] I see that part of the international community is now ready to forget all the crimes, to legalize the aggression, and to reward the massacre with a partitioning, with the idea that a Greater Serbia is a factor of stability in the Balkans. Apart from this, there is our difficulty in trusting those who have trampled international agreements, solemn principles, and ethics to the extent of concealing the existence of concentration camps organized by Serbian nationalism.

[Rampoldi] Who concealed it?

[Silajdzic] The first concentration camps were set up at the beginning of May 1992. I am sure that by the end of that month a number of Western governments knew about it (the existence of the camps was revealed only at the end of July by the Western press.) The United Nations knew too. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, knew. They knew in detail where they were located and how many there were. But nobody said anything for the simple reason that the Western governments did not want to put themselves in the embarrassing situation of having to do something to stop that abomination. That was shameful behavior.

[Rampoldi] But what specifically do you find unconvincing about the peace plan being prepared in Geneva?

[Silajdzic] We want to know what guarantees the international community is offering to ensure that this compromise does not become a mere piece of paper. We have put some specific questions to the Contact Group. Are you willing to carry out air attacks if, for instance, Serbia signs the plan but then fails to withdraw? And what will you do if the aggression resumes after a year, or after three or five years? Another conference? Another resolution that censures Belgrade? In other words, by what means do you intend to guarantee this agreement?

[Rampoldi] Have you received any answers?

[Silajdzic] No, and I have little hope of receiving any. But without guarantees we will not sign. Our main concern is this—that the border with Serbia be placed under proper international control. And that the Western nations be prepared to abandon the fiction of

"noninterference," neutrality. Europe and the international community have interfered, and in a big way, by implementing an arms embargo that has punished only us, the victims of the aggression.

[Rampoldi] Nevertheless, according to CNN you have been receiving weapons for some time, from Iran, Turkey, and Malaysia.

[Silajdzic] That information is false, designed to show that there is no point in lifting the embargo, since it does not work in any case. For instance, there was a great outcry over an alleged shipment of Iranian weapons via Zagreb, but I can guarantee that it was just humanitarian aid, not one single bullet.

[Rampoldi] How is it possible, then, that the balance of forces is much more even than two years ago?

[Silajdzic] Because we have succeeded in organizing an army and because the agreement with Croatia, though still impeded by certain obstacles, has helped us. But it must not be forgotten that Serbia's war industry has tripled its output, that Serbia still receives oil, despite the sanctions, and that because of the weakness of our armaments the Serbian nationalists needed only four tanks to enter Gorazde. Even if we did receive something from outside, under such conditions it would take us 10 years to achieve strategic parity with the aggressor.

[Rampoldi] Now you are being offered at least the theoretical possibility of receiving a substantial portion of territory in exchange for signing the Geneva plan. Do you consider the 51 percent proposed by the plan adequate?

[Silajdzic] Our demand is for 58 percent, but of course that 58 percent is negotiable. But I would rather avoid such a discussion of percentages, which smacks of horse trading. That which is nonnegotiable for us is a certain question of principle. We will never agree to the Serbian nationalists administering cities whose population they have massacred. I am thinking about Prijedor, Zvornik (both under Serbian control). Consider Zvornik: There the Serbian nationalists killed every living being, whether human or animal. And it is not just I who says so, but Jose Maria Mendeluce, who at the time was head of the high commission for refugees in Bosnia. So what is this "European civilization" that is now allowing itself to be tempted by the possibility of legitimizing extermination and recognizing the exterminators' power to govern those cities?

[Rampoldi] Do you not expect the court in The Hague to ensure that justice is done in connection with the crimes committed in Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] Well, we sent all the material we had to The Hague. We are waiting. I cannot understand why they are so slow. Maybe they are heeding the British leaders who are saying: You cannot try the victors, and Serbia has won. But Serbia has not won.

[Rampoldi] Apart from the British Government, which you consider hostile, can you count on any friendly diplomacy in Europe?

[Silajdzic] Germany is held back by a constitution that prevents it from using military forces abroad. Paris swings between London and Bonn, but from time to time it allows itself to be lured by the picture of the traditional Franco-Serbian friendship. Rome does not play a role, though we believe that its proximity to Bosnia should authorize it to perform more actively. But in general, apart from a few exceptions, European foreign policy displays the limitations of a narrow political outlook lacking in any strategic vision. And of course public pressure has also weakened. Everything is becoming relative. In any case, this is a fact. If you kill a man you go to jail; if you kill 20 you become a celebrity; if you kill 200,000 you are invited to Geneva to attend a peace conference.

[Rampoldi] But is Croatia's Prlic—who destroyed Mostar and whom Zagreb subsequently appointed defense minister of the Croatian-Bosnian Confederation—any different from Serbia's Karadzic?

[Silajdzic] As far as I know, Mostar was destroyed by the Croatian military commanders, not by the political leaders. Of course, we were not happy to accept Prlic. But at least the pact with Croatia has stopped the fighting in Herzegovina and shown that it is not an ethnic war that is being fought in Bosnia. Indeed, by achieving the armistice, the Muslims and Croats have started to coexist again.

UN Officers Fear Increase in Sniper Activity

AU0607090194 Paris AFP in English 0846 GMT 6 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, July 6 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo fears an increase in sniper activity should the current Geneva peace round fail or simply get bogged down, according to senior officers here.

Despite the current one-month ceasefire operating in Bosnia, Bosnian Serb snipers target civilians in the city at least a couple of times a day, simply to remind them they are there.

UN soldiers have tried to discourage snipers by increasing patrols and posting armoured cars in exposed locations to protect civilians. But after more than two years of war and an end to shelling, the citizens of Sarajevo no longer fear walking the streets.

Packed trams ramble down the main Sarajevo thoroughfare, long known as snipers' alley, with an occasional additional passenger or two riding the bumpers.

At least three people have been wounded in trams, but they remain just as packed.

UNPROFOR senior officers believe that sniping—in which both the Moslem and Serb sides engage—is carefully controlled by the warring parties who use it to build up tension or to make a political point when necessary.

Snipers regularly strike outside the Holiday Inn hotel, where most foreign reporters are based, in what many believe is a way of seeking additional publicity for their action.

UN soldiers have often sought to engage snipers who are now expert at getting off a single shot, often with a silenced rifle, and then vanishing from their position—sometimes the backroom in a high-rise building from where, through a simple crack in the wall they have a direct line of sight from the front room and out through an open window.

A senior UN officer said his forces had "taken out" some five snipers in Sarajevo over the past nine months, adding that the figure was a low estimate because of the difficulty in flushing them out and uncertainty as to whether they had indeed been killed.

UNPROFOR soldiers, sources also said, do not have a mandate to take on snipers. In principle, they can only fire back when themselves directly engaged.

More often than not, UNPROFOR simply reports the position of a sniper to his own side, hoping he will then be forced to abandon his discovered position.

Meanwhile, Sarajevo remains remarkably quiet on evenings when world cup football matches are broadcast live on television.

Fighting in Northern Posavina Corridor

AU0607080694 Paris AFP in English 0748 GMT 6 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, July 6 (AFP)—Fighting continued in the northern hills of Bosnia as representatives from the United States, Russia and Europe Wednesday prepared to put pressure on the warring parties in Geneva to agree to peace. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Wednesday reported overnight shelling of the strategic northern Bosnian Posavina corridor where a small tongue of land, south of the Sava river, links western and eastern Serb-held territories.

Control of the area, near the town of Brcko, is one of the key issues being discussed in Geneva.

Fighting also continued overnight on both sides of the Ozren mountain range, in the north of the country, with monitors reporting 56 artillery and mortar explosions in the Zavidovici area and 13 in the Gracanica region, UNPROFOR spokesman Commander Eric Chaperon said. Tension also remained high in the eastern Moslem-held enclave of Gorazde, with several shooting incidents reported.

Meanwhile, an UNPROFOR helicopter on a reconnaissance flight above the front line near Sarajevo was shot at on Tuesday and a bullet smashed through the aircraft, destroying a radio transmitter, Chaperon said. The helicopter returned safely to base.

General Delic Views Cooperation With HVO

AU0507200794 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 31 Jun, 1 Jul 94

[Article in two installments including interview with Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Zdravko Latal in Sarajevo on 29 June: "Reversal on the Bosnian Battlefield"]

[31 Jun p 10]

[Text] Sarajevo, 29 June—Two things happened at the end of last week that might greatly determine whether peace will finally be restored to Bosnia-Herzegovina or whether the war will continue. At the session of the Republican and Constitutional Assemblies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation, the deputies endorsed a new, that is to say, reconstructed government, and soon afterward top officials of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Gornji Vakuf agreed to open two important land corridors, namely, Metkovic-Mostar and Gornji Vakuf-Bugojno. With the inauguration of the government, which consists of 10 Muslims, six Croats, and one Serb, started the implementation of the Washington Agreement on the formation of a dual Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The meeting in Gornji Vakuf did not arouse any major interest among the media, even though it was extremely important. Namely, the meeting took place following an agreement by two armies that were fighting each other only few months ago. To what extent will these two events influence the pooling of interests, the unification of the Federation's armed forces, the opening of routes for logistic support to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in defensive and offensive activities, and the use of military factories some in the hands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and some in the HVO's, but really forming a technological unity? We asked Commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Rasim Delic to provide the answers:

[Delic] From the political point of view, the inauguration of the reconstructed Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina means the implementation of the Washington Agreement, as well as a gradual transfer of authority to the cantons and later to the communes. The Federation has thus sprung to life with this new government. From the military point of view, however, this means that practical opportunities have been created for a further strengthening of the organization and personnel and the rapproachment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO. So far we have only had isolated agreements on the disengagement of forces, the cessation of combat activities, the opening of communication routes, and the exchange of prisoners. The new government creates objective possibilities for the formation of a federal army.

[Latal] How close, that is, how far are you from the formation of a unified army?

[Delic] Actually, the implementation of this goal is still quite a distance away. I cannot tell you at this moment how far we have got. For the time being, conditions have been created for us to be able to carry out duties that are equally important for Croats and Muslims and will contribute to the formation of the unified armed forces more efficiently. Our united command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO is dealing with these tasks on a daily basis, and our main goal is to have our armed forces concentrating at the front against the common enemy—the Serbian occupying forces.

Everything that is happening between the two peoples in the political and the military sphere is now definitely an important step forward for the future life of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Speaking from the logistic point of view, we can say that not only is the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in a more favorable position but also that the people on our territory are living much better than elsewhere. As for food supplies, the situation has improved considerably as the people in those regions long depended solely on humanitarian convoys.

[Latal] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO have several arms factories in central Bosnia in their hands. Did you discuss the resumption of production there?

[Delic] As a commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, I did not take part in these talks; however, this time will definitely come, just as we will also open some roads for the transportation of raw materials. Both armies expect this.

[Latal] To what extent is more effective cooperation between your two armies also dependent on whether you investigate the responsibility and also punish all those who have violated international principles and laws and those who were involved in great crimes in both armies?

[Delic] As regards the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, I can say that we have taken all the necessary measures to prevent possible sloppiness about issued orders. We have not noted a single case of human rights violation or crimes in our army. We resolved a few individual cases that nevertheless did occur quickly and effectively and the perpetrators were court-martialled. As regards the HVO, it is perfectly clear that they must remove such men from their ranks and take the appropriate action. We know that several war crimes were committed in Ahmici, Stupni Dol, Prozor, and Kiseljak. If they will not muster the strength to sort this out, then the HVO will be held responsible for these crimes and trust will be restored at a considerably slower pace than we would like. I, personally, insist that in the future the federal army cannot recruit anyone who has sinned against the people and violated human rights. I will demand that all these cases be resolved in the only suitable place, which is in court.

[Latal] A candidate from Herzeg-Bosnia, of whom it has been said, and not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but even in some Croatian opposition circles, that he has been responsible for ethnic cleansing, the destruction of towns, and the formation of concentration camps, has been appointed deputy prime minister and defense minister, and this official will be your superior in the future. What is your comment about this choice, which did not exactly satisfy Sarajevo either?

[Delic] I myself did not participate in nominations in any form. At the parliamentary session some of the deputies voiced certain objections about the Croatian candidates. I have my opinion about it; however, nobody cares about my opinion. The present government is a government of compromises. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has confirmed as much himself. As to how far they have gone with these compromises and whether it will be possible to secure harmonious work in the government will soon be seen. Such compromises are not merely painful but also dangerous, because they can trigger a chain reaction. Anyway, it is not my place to meddle in state and political affairs.

[Latal] Permit me to concentrate now on the second group of questions. They refer to the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia- Herzegovina. The U.S. Congress has already discussed this. Would it be wise for the United States to lift the arms embargo unilaterally? What would the lifting of the arms embargo mean for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, what sort of arms, ammunition, or raw materials would your army need most, and how long would the soldiers need to train in the use of the new arms?

[Delic] The lifting of the arms embargo would under no circumstances trigger greater clashes, as some individuals, such as UN Protection Force Commander Michael Rose, claim. The clashes might intensify somewhat for a short period of time but I would like to remind all these people that it was precisely the military equilibrium in Europe and the world that helped to maintain peace. An unjust and dangerous imbalance has taken place in Bosnia- Herzegovina, which is harmful even for those who are considered to be the legal representatives of this state. With the lifting of the blockade and overcoming of this imbalance we would break the fascist chain with a few minor victories, just like during World War II. These people would immediately be willing to sit down at the negotiating table, because it is only force that matters to them and force must always be greeted with counterattacks and not negotiations. I am personally convinced that the lifting of the embargo will not materialize. Even in the case that the U.S. Congress repeated its decision in the second round of voting, President Clinton would most likely use his veto, because he always wants to consult his allies and respect Russia's opinion and we all know very well what the positions of these countries are.

[Latal] Regardless of the outcome of the vote by the U.S. Congress, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has probably already prepared a project on the types of arms needed—

defensive or offensive? You have stated recently that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is moving from the phase of defensive combat into a war of liberation, and that this also requires raw materials for the military industry, while at the same time the troops will need to be trained in the use of new arms.

[Delic] As regards the training of soldiers in the use of modern weapons, I can say that we have good soldiers, many of whom trained in the Yugoslav Peoples Army and are familiar with new types of weapons. We have organized training on several occasions during the two-year war and, therefore, this would probably not pose any great problems. In a war soldiers train in the use of various weapons very quickly. We are primarily training in the most effective possible action in real life, without entering into the study of entire technology, which is routinely done in peace time. If the arms embargo were lifted, we could manufacture sufficient quantities of arms in our factories, provided that we had the raw materials. Bosnia has enough experts capable of constructing and manufacturing the most sophisticated arms. Many would like to learn what types of arms we need. We do not hide this at all. We want arms with which we will restore the technical balance between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Serbian forces. Not now or later will we need offensive weaponry such as aircraft. We need weapons with which to be able to respond to artillery and aircraft attacks. Above all we need missile systems. Anyway, we base all our operations on the strength of our soldiers. (continued tomorrow)

[1 Jul p 5]

[Text] [Latal] The international media claim increasingly frequently that hardy anyone observes the arms embargo. Even President Alija Izetbegovic has stated publicly that some arms are nevertheless coming to Bosnia. There has been mention of "red arrows" that played an important role on some battlefields where powerful Serbian armored forces were deployed. To what extent have these arms influenced events on the battlefields and to what extent has this sparked various affairs, such as the affair with the arms containers on Maribor airport? What can you tell us about the theft of these arms on the Herzegovina roads?

[Delic] As commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army I definitely need logistical support but at the same time I do not need to think how this support will be provided to me. I do not know the routes and the channels through which the arms have been coming into Bosnia-Herzegovina (especially in 1992). I must concern myself with the application of these arms. I can say that the quantities that arrived in the country did not satisfy our needs by a long shot. In no way were these arms sufficient for the Army to respond in the way in which it was expected to respond. With these arms we were nowhere near establishing a technical equilibrium with the Serbian Army. We have mostly been receiving only infantry arms so far. All the tanks that are now in our possession we captured from the Serbs. We would need missile systems and assault helicopters now; however, they are difficult to transport secretly. There has been much talk that we have received armor-penetrating arms. I would like to stress that we have soldiers who are extremely brave and well-trained, who can destroy tanks even with the most backward of means but who can, of course, also use the most modern of arms. More tanks and armored vehicles have been destroyed on the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory than in many other similar wars. The 7th South Operative Group destroyed 86 tanks on the territory of Doboj alone. All together we have destroyed 200 tanks and armored vehicles.

The fact is that the Serbs have always replaced destroyed vehicles with new ones. The embargo in reality only applies to Bosnia. The arms embargo does not apply to Slovenia. Evidently, it does not apply to Croatia either as it is en masse purchasing Leopard tanks and even aircraft. By the same token, the embargo does not apply to Serbia and Montenegro, which, beside the arms that they inherited from the Yugoslav Peoples' Army regularly receive arms and ammunition from Russia and the Ukraine. Trust me, we know this. The Serbs have new T-72 tanks that they did not have before, they have new missile systems, assault helicopters, and more than enough ammunition. Because of our position the supervision of the observation of the arms embargo merely applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that is why I believe that the embargo is unjust. Regarding the Maribor affair, judging from what I know about this matter, I can say that it was really all about internal matters but then we had to pay the price. At the beginning of the war we urgently needed arms because those were critical moments for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is inhumane to demand of us not to seek ways of securing arms, when the world would not allow us to purchase them in a legal way.

[Latal] It has been said that you had purchased a certain quantity of arms and ammunition also from the Serbs. The media of the Serbian Republic have reported on the trials of arms smugglers.

[Delic] Our stance toward the Serbian attackers is known. The truth is that there were some such cases at lower levels. A well- known union of criminals and smugglers is formed in any war. There were even some transactions connected with the purchase of arms among our units. Some of our units needed arms and thus asked neither the price nor the origin. We have had numerous problems with smuggling along the defense lines because smugglers were often used as look-outs. Our defense lines were most frequently broken precisely where the smugglers appeared.

[Latal] The agreed cease-fire is constantly violated. How does this situation suit the different sides?

[Delic] When we signed the cease-fire we said that we will observe it to the extent to which the other side observes it. So far we have signed some 10 cease-fire agreements and it was precisely during the cease-fires that we lost the most soldiers and territory. The attackers prepared for further attacks during the cease-fire. We were actually willing to observe the last cease- fire. The fact is, however, that not all conditions for the declaration of a cease-fire had been accomplished, like, for example the withdrawal of the

Serbian forces from the 3-km zone around Gorazde center. There are 200 Serbian soldiers there who are still attacking Gorazde. The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] would not allow the residents to return to their homes, while at the same time it pays no attention to the Serbs who are settling in these villages even though they have not lived in these villages before. The cease-fire is not observed in the UN safe haven of Bihac either. Bihac is being attacked not from Bosnia-Herzegovina but from the UNPROFOR territories in Croatia that should have been under the control of the blue berets. Following an agreement between Croatia and the local Serbs the forces of the Knin Corps are attacking Bihac now. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the UNPROFOR agreed to set up control mechanisms. They were supposed to erect watchtowers between ourselves and the Serbian side. We agreed to it, we also welcomed UNPROFOR liaison officers in our commands just as the Serbs should have. This would have allowed an effective supervision. The Serbian side did not agree to it. Nobody can expect a cease-fire only to be respected on one side on the battlefield. For this reason I can say that there is no cease-fire at all. Civilians and soldiers are dying on our side every day. We will no longer tolerate that UNPROFOR be sent various messages while the people are dying only on one side.

[Latal] What is the current situation on the battlefields? What is the situation like on the territory of Velika Kladusa?

[Delic] The clashes with the paramilitary units of Fikret Abdic are not a part of the cease-fire agreements, as this is an internal Bosnia-Herzegovina matter. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is currently in the offensive. Our aim is to solve this problem with the minimum casualties. I am referring to our soldiers, but also to the misled and forcefully mobilized people on the other side. We, therefore, wish that as many of them as possible would surrender, that we could capture rather than kill as many as possible. Had this not been the case we would have acted entirely differently. Our units have already penetrated on the territory of Velika Kladusa commune and to the outskirts of the Cazin commune that used to be controlled by Abdic's forces. If no negotiations are forthcoming, we will continue our advance. In no case will we allow the emergence of a sort of autonomous state.

[Latal] Tell us something about the situation on the front lines with the Serbs?

[Delic] In the last month and a half the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has taken initiatives on all battlefields. We have accomplished considerable successes in the areas where 1st, 2d, 3d, and 7th Corps are fighting. On the territory of the 2d Corps we have been successful militarily as well as economically, because we have taken the stronghold of Vijenac. The Chetniks supervised almost the entire industrial zone of Tuzla and Lukavac from this stronghold. We have taken a quarry with workshops, without which it would be impossible to activate the chemical industry in Tuzla. The 2d Corps has taken almost in entirety some parts of Mt. Ozren and Mt. Majevica, some regions in the Sava Basin, and some positions near Velika Kladusa. The 1st Crops acted successfully on Niksicki Plateau and prepared everything necessary for the further offensive. The 3d Corps penetrated deeply toward Teslic and Doboj. All important installations are in our hands. We have also taken some strategically important installations on Ozren-Vozus front and thus thwarted a Serbian plan to establish a reserve corridor along the River Krivaja valley. The 7th and the 3d Corps accomplished most victories on Mt. Vlasic and made advances in the Bosnian Krajina. Our soldiers are advancing toward Donji Vakuf and Kupres. This represents a major reversal on the Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefields because we are dictating the tempo and the Serbs have to follow suit. For the time being this is not yet a strategic reversal, as we would have to secure other conditions for something of the kind.

[Latal] Prime Minister Dr. Haris Silajdzic in his report about government work to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly also mentioned the successes that were accomplished in combating foreign intelligence services. Namely, not only the counterintelligence service but also numerous other intelligence organizations that operate classically, militarily, and also within numerous humanitarian actions are interested in the situation in the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army. What are the findings of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army about this and what measures have you taken in this connection?

[Delic] Numerous intelligence services are active in Bosnia- Herzegovina for various reasons and with various interests. Over these two years we have created conditions in which we should be able to protect ourselves because counterintelligence activity is as dangerous as fighting. It has transpired that we have had people in our own military and state circles who worked for the benefit of others. The military security service has grown to be a successful organization in this time. Not everybody is working for the benefit of the Serbian attackers. The truth is also that we are not fooling ourselves that we have discovered all such services. There are probably many more people engaging in these activities. Precisely because of this we have made several military mistakes even though we did everything within our power to strengthen the responsibility and the organization at lower levels. It is very difficult to secure the secrecy of various conclusions and secrecy in the realization of various operations. They have maintained intelligence activity in Bosnia for decades and for this reason I am convinced that there are numerous members of the intelligence service who are now sleepers and only sporadically undertake actions, some of them are even waiting for peace in the country. These are very dangerous clashes. At the moment I could not say how successful we are in combating these services. We will only be able to assess this from a historic distance.

Police Beat Up Muslims, Croats in Banja Luka

AU0507142494 Paris AFP in English 1404 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, July 5 (AFP)—Some 45 people, seeking safe passage out of a Serb-held town in northwestern Bosnia, were beaten up by military police as they waited outside an office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, a UNHCR spokesman said here Tuesday [5 July].

The would-be evacuees, Moslems and Croats, were attacked by five truncheon-wielding men, four in military police uniforms, as they waited in line outside the local UNHCR office Monday evening in Banja Luka to be sure of registering for departure Tuesday morning, Kris Janowski said.

When the attackers left, those who had fled returned and a line reformed. The attackers then also came back, bludgeoning those they found waiting and seizing their belongings. They then lay in wait, lashing out at those who ventured to return. One woman and two men, who were badly hurt, were taken in by a field hospital run by a Danish care organisation.

The UNHCR was informed of the incident by people who reported Tuesday morning to their office, many bearing bruises and bloodied faces. The UNHCR currently helps evacuate to Croatia some 60 people a week from the Banja Luka area. The town was once home to some 28,000 Moslems, but now only about 10,000 remain, along with about 2,000 Croats. Many evacuees also apply to local "travel agencies" which, for a hefty fee, arrange passage out of Serb-held territory.

Serbs Prevent Flights by UN Helicopters

AU0507122194 Paris AFP in English 1105 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, July 5 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb forces are preventing UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) helicopters from over-flying their territory, an UNPROFOR spokesman said here Tuesday [5 July]. "For at least two or three days, they have refused all flights," said Commander Eric Chaperon. The Serbs' refusal to allow the medical evacuation on Sunday of a sick French soldier from the Bihac pocket, in the west of the country, was "unacceptable," he said.

The medical evacuation helicopter was held up for several hours as UNPROFOR unsuccessfully attempted to get permission for the overflight from Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic. The general refused permission, linking the matter to UNPROFOR's own refusal to allow his forces to helicopter transmission equipment to a strategic hill-top in southeastern Bosnia.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, acting on a UN mandate, has declared all Bosnian airspace a "no-fly zone" and last February shot down four Serb jets that flouted the ban. The non-commissioned French officer, with heart trouble, was finally helicoptered out by way of neighbouring Croatia, rather than directly across Bosnia.

The Serbs had earlier rejected repeated requests by UNPROFOR for the British commander in Gorazde, eastern Bosnia, to leave by helicopter to attend the funeral of one his soldiers shot dead by the Serbs on June 26. The British commander was eventually allowed to travel out by road. [passage omitted]

Valentic, FYROM Counterpart Hold Talks

AU0507180794 Zagreb HINA in English 1619 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Croatian and Macedonian Premiers on Relations Between Two Countries"]

[Text] Zagreb, 5 Jul—Delegations of Croatian and Macedonian governments, led by premiers Nikica Valentic and Branko Crvenkovski respectively, held talks on the relations between the two countries today in Zagreb.

The delegations agreed that in the political area no problems existed in the relations between Croatia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. The head of the Macedonian delegation, Crvenkovski, pointed out that Macedonia was directly interested in the early cessation of the war on the area of former Yugoslavia, since it might spill over to Macedonia. Premiers Valentic and Crvenkovski stressed the necessity of reconstruction and revival of economic and traffic connection between the two countries. The delegations considered an agreement that is due to be signed by Croatia and Macedonia next days. Both governments will open their diplomatic missions in Zagreb and Skopje.

Macedonian premier laid a wreath in front of the Altar of Croatian Homeland at Medvedgrad (on Mount Medvednica) on Tuesday.

Russian UN Troops Block Osijek Workers

AU0507164194 Zagreb HINA in English 1545 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Municipal Service Workers Unload Rubbish at UNPROFOR Checkpoint"]

[Text] Osijek, 5 Jul—The Osijek municipal service company unloaded four truckfuls of rubbish in front of a UNPROFOR checkpoint at Nemetin at 1330 hours Tuesday. The municipal service workers set out this morning for the local rubbish dump in Sarvas (UNPA [UN Protected Area] East), but were stopped by members of the Russian UNPROFOR battalion at the Nemetin checkpoint, which was blocked by a truck and an armored personnel carrier. According to the Osijek police, UNPROFOR returned five refuse trucks by 1100 hours, under the pretext that the rubbish would be harmful to the health of UNPROFOR members as well as local Serbs.

Coordinator for contacts with UNPROFOR in Sector East and Prefect of Osijek County Branimir Glavas appeared on the scene a little later and asked the Russian guard to call the commander of the Russian UNPROFOR battalion to come and talk to him. After talking to the Russian commander on the telephone, the Russian guard said the commander could come only at 1800 hours. Undaunted, Glavas gave the Russian commander a choice either to come before 1330 hours, or the workers would unload the rubbish in front of the checkpoint. Glavas told the Russian soldiers to convey to their superiors the message that they "were on Croatian soil, on the territory of the Croatian state and therefore had no business to fraternize with the aggressor and behave like an occupying force." Glavas said UNPROFOR's interdiction of using the rubbish dump was nothing else but "retaliation for the protests staged by refugees, who asked nothing more but to return to their homes." As the Russian commander failed to appear, the workers duly unloaded four truckfuls of rubbish at the gate.

Djukic: 'Reintegration' Solution for Serbs

AU0507180894 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jul 94 p 4

[Article by I. Knapic: "Confederation and Cantons"]

[Text] Zagreb—"How to look for and expect a political solution without considering possible concessions that could be discernible through compromise? [sentence as published] We must take concrete steps in Croat-Serb relations, and they will eventually lead to reintegration. War is not a solution reached through compromise."

Those are the words of Milan Djukic, president of the SNS [Serbian National Party], at a news conference held on Thursday [30 June]. Djukic said that the reintegration of occupied areas was possible only through solving the political question of the Serbs in Croatia—the question of defining their national entity, establishing political autonomy, and the question of rights and mechanisms to protect the Serbs in areas where they are in the minority.

SNS Vice President Veselin Pejnovic was more specific and warned about "serious signals that many see a new war as a political solution." He said it would be good to "discuss the confederate model with the Serbs in Croatia because a civic state is not properly functioning, there is no progress in negotiations, and concession as a transition period is the only reasonable solution and the international community should monitor the situation."

Asked whether **the confederate solution** implies the solving of the problem of UNPA [United Nations Protected Area] zones, Pejnovic replied: "Let us not exaggerate." He thinks the confederate model is a "solution for all 700,000 Serbs living in Croatia," giving them full political and local self-government in accordance with the West European solution."

However, he also added that, at the beginning of the war in Croatia, 500,000 Serbs lived on "the free territory of Croatia, while there are hardly more than 150,000 Serbs living there right now." Pejnovic claims that "the territorial sovereignty of Croatia can be achieved only through concessions."

Following those guidelines, the SNS will soon issue a new document proposing a possible solution with regard to the expirity of the mandate of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], which, in case it is extended, should better and more expediently "implement UN resolutions, and not only through consulting one side but through a dialogue with both sides." Djukic pointed out that the politics of the SNS is clear and that the confederate solution is "a

solution between two extremes—between the war option and waving a white flag in Knin."

Djukic emphasized that internationally recognized borders of Croatia will not be jeopardized, and asked whether confederalization is a concession. Djukic said: "We are talking about the framework of a high degree of political autonomy and when we discuss confederation, cantonization is also possible."

Djukic supports "the continuation of negotiations between the Serbs and legitimate Croatian authorities, although he repeated that "they key to the solution is in Belgrade."

[Box, p 4]

Against the Blockade of UNPROFOR

The SNS wants all refugees to return to their homes. Djukic added that this is the most difficult problem at present. The SNS does not approve of the action of refugees who "want to block UNPROFOR and the traffic because that is unproductive at a time when we are putting pressure on the world and expect negotiations to be resumed. We cannot say that this action of the refugees will contribute to peace and that Croatian authorities will be responsible for that. It is dangerous to look for solutions by putting pressure on the public."

Djukic said that, although UN resolutions guarantee the return of refugees, "the problem cannot be solved without the return of all refugees, and it is not true that there are only 250,000 refugees, but as many as 600,000 refugees are to return to their homes under equal economic and security circumstances." He emphasized that "unless Croatian authorities come to those areas, refugees will not be able to return, and that cannot be done before finding a political solution for the problem of the Serbs in Croatia."

Data on New Army Promotions, Generals

94BA0333A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 94 pp 2-4

[Article by Jasna Babic and Eduard Popovic: "Not a Single Fighter From Vukovar Among the Some 30 Croatian Generals"]

[Text] On the first day of the celebration of Statehood Day, on Sunday, 29 May, the president of the Republic of Croatia personally awarded 10 or so new general ranks and some 50 Commemorative Medals of the Homeland War.

Josip Lucic earned the high officer rank as a volunteer in the homeland war and one of the founders of the Tigers. Slobodan Praljak became a colonel commanding defense of Sunja, and Zvonimir Cervenko obtained the rank of major general back in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], from which he was expelled in the early 1970's for Croatian nationalism. Now, all three have received the highest ranks: They have become colonel generals.

The reasons for their promotion are perhaps a military secret. However, the public does know that even Praljak has in the meantime commanded the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Herzegovina; he was removed when the Old Bridge in Mostar was demolished, but he was recently appointed director of an institution of the state that still does not exist—the Croatian Cultural Information Bureau. According to statements by one of the women in his office, at the weekly DANAS they already know what the salaries of personnel in the bureau will be; they only do not know what the bureau will be doing. Praljak also attends meetings of the National Security Council.

Josip Lucic is chief inspector of the Croatian Army [HV] and one of the authentic war heroes among the highest Croatian officers.

In addition to soldiers and policemen who were actual participants in the war in 1991, President Tudjman also decorated some 20 politicians with the Commemorative Medal of the Homeland War.

They included Milan Vukovic, president of the Supreme Court, Borislav Skegro, deputy prime minister, Ivan Penic, chief of the Croatian Fund for Privatization, and Katica Ivanisevic and Nedeljko Mihanovic, the new presidents of the Zupanija Chamber and House of Representatives of the Sabor [parliament] of the Republic of Croatia, respectively.

No one of course knows anything about their involvement in the war. Katica Ivanisevic's official biography says that she spent 1991 far from the front in the position of prorector of the University of Rijeka. Nedeljko Mihanovic, a staff member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, did not take an active part in the homeland war either.

The Vukovar Warriors Far From the Presidential Palace

By contrast with the numerous citizens of Croatia whom the president of the republic has honored with commemorative medals of the first year of the war and high ranks over the last three years, Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic and Branko "Little Hawk" Borkovic, commanders at heroic Vukovar, have to this day received neither medals nor the rank of general. Nor does any surviving fighting man from Vukovar have a rank higher than brigadier. An exception is Blago Zadro, commander of Borovo Naselje. Zadro received the rank of major general posthumously. He was killed in Vukovar in October 1991.

The living defenders of Vukovar were first suspected of armed rebellion against the "democratically elected Croatian Government," they were arrested, some were beaten during the investigation, and they were brought before the court. Some of them were sent to the southern theater and to Bosnia and Herzegovina. They died. A few were quietly rehabilitated after they left the military prison, but without fanfare and far from the Presidential Palace.

And while the triumphant political ceremonies for Statehood Day were taking place on Medvedgrad, Colonel Mile Dedakovic, the first commander at Vukovar, was working his tomatoes and potatoes in Ferdinandovac, a village in

the Drava Valley. He is today an ordinary citizen living on a pension. The numerous papers and documents testifying to the fight for Vukovar in his archives also include the official ruling of the competent civilian institution that Col. Hawk is 80-percent disabled. The hero of Vukovar earned a certain percentage of that disability in the Zagreb military prison in late 1991, when four military policemen, whose identities are supposedly unknown, forced him to confess anti-Croatian activity during the three-month defense of Vukovar.

Nor did his successor in Vukovar, Brigadier Branko "Little Hawk" Borkovic, take part in the Medvedgrad ceremonies. As president of the Association of Croatian Volunteers of the Homeland War in 1991, Little Hawk spent that rainy morning laying a wreath at the Guards Cross on Mirogoj in memory of his fellow fighters who are dead.

There was only one TV camera taking pictures of the tortured faces of these men, some of them even mutilated, with the real physiognomies of Croatian fighting men. This scene was never broadcast over government television. All the main coverage given to Statehood Day was reserved on the next to the last day of May for the president of the republic and his associates, who were involved with the Medvedgrad monument and its indeterminate symbolic significance.

Forgotten Heroism

The attitude toward the volunteers of the National Guard Corps [ZNG] began to change after the fall of Vukovar. In the message which the president of the Republic of Croatia read over government television in late October 1991, the defenders of Vukovar, personified by Dedakovic, Borkovic, and their closest associates, were accused of anti-Croatian activity. All the current factions of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] were at that time fully involved in the special investigating commission for Vukovar, which was headed by Josip Manolic and Gojko Susak and which drafted a compromising report used for the indictment of an alleged attempt by a few Vukovar heroes to forcibly threaten the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia. In addition to that, Dedakovic was accused of stealing 300,000 German marks [DM] intended for the defenders of Vukovar.

In the marathon trials Col. Hawk managed to refute not only the republic and Zagreb prosecutor's offices, but also the president's message concerning a plot of the men at Vukovar against the Zagreb authorities.

The news on 24 April 1994 that in a decision of the District Court in Zagreb Dedakovic was found unconditionally innocent was hidden by huge headlines concerning the magnificent castle on Medvedgrad, the president's new uniform, and the fireworks to be held on Statehood Day.

As far as is known, neither Dedakovic nor the other defenders of Vukovar who went through the torture of prison following the fall of Vukovar ever received an apology from anyone for the unjust suspicion and trials.

The evidence that the heroism of Vukovar has been forgotten consists not only of the tasteless ceremonies on Medvedgrad, but also the first written document of any size published about the battle for eastern Slavonia.

That is, the large monograph *Vukovar, vjekovni hrvatski grad na Dunavu* (*Vukovar, Ancient Croatian City on the Danube*), was published in Koprivnica to commemorate Statehood Day in 1994. This thick, 500—page book, which weighs more than three kg, was written under the sponsorship of top political officials of the Republic of Croatia. Stipe Mesic, who at the time when this project was conceived was president of the Croatian Sabor, is referred to in the book as the chairman of the Publishing Council. Jakob Eltz, representative of the displaced persons from Vukovar in the Zupanija Chamber, wrote a preface to the monograph entitled "The Truth About Vukovar," and at a promotion in the Mimara Museum in Zagreb, Vesna Jurkic-Girardi lent the authority of culture minister to her guarantee that *Vukovar, vjekovni hrvatski grad na Dunavu* would be in every school library in Croatia as a source for teaching history.

Adjusted to Current Politics

It seems that the homeland war has been reduced to the measure of current politics in the expensive monograph as well as in the Medvedgrad monument.

The monograph is divided into two parts: The first speaks about various aspects of the millennial existence of the former fortress, while the second is devoted to its key role in the homeland war. Along with photographs of prewar and devastated Vukovar, there are also precise maps showing the deployment of the armed forces of the JNA and Serbian chetnik units, the lines of their penetration, and the lines of the Vukovar defense. There are also articles by several witnesses of the three-month agony of Vukovar: the journalist Josip Esterajher, the physician Jurje Njavro, and the military commander Branko Borkovic. But nowhere are their roles in the defense of Vukovar presented. Thus, their articles are put on a par, for example, with newspaper reports from that time written by Josip Jurcevic, former official of the IPD [expansion not given] in the Defense Ministry, one of the monograph's editors.

Although Old Hawk was in the eyes of the Croatian public the metaphor of heroic resistance from August to October 1991, and the physician Vesna Bosanac, director of the Vukovar Hospital, was the greatest heroine of wartime Croatia, the two of them are not mentioned in the book at all. Marin "Bili" Vidic, commissioner of the Croatian Government for Vukovar Opstina, is mentioned only once. Certain other main figures among Vukovar's defenders, whom the Croatian public came to know in the autumn of 1991 by their noms de guerre: Osa Madjar, Samuraj, and Arbanas have also been deleted from a book that is supposed to help new generations learn the truth about the heroic three-month resistance of Vukovar and the fight against an incomparably more powerful enemy.

History Left to Oral Tradition

Only one of them is represented as a hero with his first and last name—the late Blago Zadro, the only Vukovar fighter whom Croatia has decorated with the rank of general.

The lengthy description of fates in Vukovar also omits the story about Tudjman's unforgettable message, the arrests, the trials, and the large-scale suffering on the southern battlefield. Even the mass grave on Ovcara has been forgotten.

The publisher of the anthology about Vukovar is a private firm belonging to one Dragutin Felataro, who was once a reporter for the Podravka factory newspaper and is the author of several similar monographs. In the communist period, he edited and wrote the following: *Iz povijesti OUR-a. Povrce u Umagu* (*From the History of the OUR [Organization of Associated Labor]. Vegetables in Umag*), *Sest desetljeca Segestice Sisak* (*Six Decades of Segestica Sisak*), *Sloga—tvornica obuce Koprivnica 1945-80* (*Sloga—Koprivnica Shoe Factory 1945-80*). Even then, he was doing his prestigious projects under the sponsorship of the current political authorities.

The first edition of *Vukovar, vjekovni hrvatski grad...*, printed in 3,000 copies, has been sold out in advance in a similar way, say unofficial sources. The largest state enterprises: Croatia osiguranje [Croatia Insurance], INA [Petroleum Industry], Podravka, HPT [expansion not given], HTV [Croatian TV], and even the Slavonski Brod Zupanija, have turned up among the subscribers and sponsors of this project.

Mile Krajina, folk musician who plays the gusle, has done what government institutions and the authors of the Vukovar monograph did not do: It is only Mile who lists by name the heroes who waged war for Vukovar, which he does in the gusle player's decasyllable line.

And truly, those who died in the city which does not exist today were not phantoms, but people with first names and last names.

The fighters in Vukovar also included Julije Novak, telecommunications engineer and ham radio operator. Following the first election, he was appointed chief of the Reporting Center of Vukovar Opstina. In early September 1991, Lieutenant Colonel Mile Dedakovic, at that time commander of the city's defense, appointed him chief of communications and electronics. His team maintained the entire command system and to some extent was involved in intelligence—electronic reconnaissance, eavesdropping, and jamming. There is a well-known case when they "penetrated" the communications system of a military convoy which in September 1991 set out from Belgrade and in the course of a 12-hour communication they so upset the Serbian soldiers that the latter, when they were attacked by some 60 Guards near Tovarnik, fled in panic, believing that they were being attacked by 10,000 ustashi.

Novak today has the rank of colonel, he has not been assigned, which is a nice way of saying he is "technologically redundant."

Ivica Arbanas of Zadar is also one of the key figures in the battle for Vukovar. Beginning in 1990, he was a member of the Croatian police, then of the 1st Brigade of the ZNG. He went through training in Kumrovec under General Rosa. Before arriving in Vukovar, he was in the most difficult Croatian theaters with the 1st Guard Brigade, including Plitvice and Pakrac. Although his unit was replaced, Arbanas decided to stay in Vukovar. In mid-August, he became commander of the Vukovar ZNG, and when the 204th Brigade was established, he became commander of the 1st Regiment. In early October 1991, Borkovic took him into the command staff of the city's defense, where he remained until Vukovar's fall.

After the breach, he worked on the team responsible for forming the 124th Brigade. Only one regiment was formed, and Arbanas took over its command. Ivica Arbanas recently returned to Zadar. Even today, he is an active officer in the HV with the rank of major.

In mid-August 1991, when Tomislav Mercep, national defense secretary who had been conducting defense of the city, was withdrawn from Vukovar, Lt. Col. Mile Dedakovic was appointed commander of Vukovar, and Captain Branko Borkovic was appointed chief of staff, both of them formerly members of the JNA. Their noms de guerre were Hawk and Young Hawk. The arrival in Vukovar of the two fugitives from the JNA, men with military knowledge and experience, signified an important turning point in organizing the city's defense.

Marin "Bili" Vidic, commissioner of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for Vukovar, was responsible for civilian life under the shelling. A big job was also done by Lav Bosanac, who headed the construction crew and who organized and coordinated the work of teams to clear the rubble, collect water and food, firefighting teams, etc. A new national defense secretary was also named—Danijel Rehak, and Stipe Pole was named the Vukovar chief of police. Dr. Vesna Bosanac was director of the hospital.

Reports from Radio Vukovar were broadcast into the Croatian ether until the last day. The team "in the cellar" consisted, perhaps there is no need to say it, of Sinisa Glavasevic, Josip Esterajher, Vesna Vukovic, Alemka Mirkovic, Zvezdana Polovina, and the technician Branko Polovina.

The first chief of the Military Police was Alfred Hill. He was killed in the fighting, and Drago Adzaga (today a colonel) was appointed to his post; he held that position until he was wounded. He was then replaced by Zeljko Spiljar.

The Vukovar Commanders

By order of the Osijek Operational Zone, the 204th Brigade of the ZNG was established in Vukovar. The 1st Regiment defended the Fairgrounds. The 2d Regiment defended Mitnica, and its first commander was Ivan "Big Joe" Soljic. The 3d Regiment defended Borovo Naselje, and its first commander was one of the people of Vukovar

who deserve the most credit—Blago Zadro. The 4th Regiment, which operated in Bogdanovci, Novi Vukovar, Lusce, and Budzak, was commanded by Nikola Zlatko Toth-Feniks. There was also an artillery rocket battery, which was commanded by Zvonko Milas.

In early October 1991, Velimir Djerek, volunteer from Zagreb, became commander of the 1st Regiment. Djerek was killed in action, and his place was taken by another man from Zagreb, Ivan Poljak. He was also killed. The fourth commander of the 1st Regiment was Josip "Wasp" Tomasic. After the fall of Vukovar, he was captured in the breakthrough. He was released from Serbian concentration camps in August 1992. Today, he is active in the Croatian Navy in Pula.

The 2d Regiment of the 204th Brigade had two commanders. Ivan Soljic, whom we have already mentioned, is today listed as missing. Its second commander, Filip Karaula, who was appointed to that post immediately before Vukovar fell, surrendered to the JNA "in order to prevent reprisals against civilians." He ended up in Serbian camps. He was released in August 1992 in the big exchange that took place at Nemetino.

The 3d Regiment was commanded by the legendary Blago Zadro, whose accomplishments in organizing the city's defense are immeasurable. Zadro was killed on 16 October 1991, and Ivo Kovacic was appointed the new commander. August 1992 was also a lucky month for Kovacic—he was released from the camp. Today, he is active with the rank of major in the river fleet in Osijek.

On 10 October 1991, Nikola Zlatko Toth, commander of the 4th Regiment, went with Dedakovic to Vinkovci, where he became chief of staff. Branko Borkovic became commander of Vukovar's defense on the basis of an order from the General Staff. From mid-October to the fall of Vukovar, the fighting became more and more intense, and in that period the enemy took the most serious losses. At that time, Borkovic says, the JNA was facing a complete rout. On the night of 17-18 October 1991, Borkovic and his associates attempted a breakthrough. On the morning of 18 October, they arrived in Vinkovci.

More Frequent Suicides

Today, the 204th Brigade of Vukovar no longer exists, although no command was ever issued to dissolve it. Even though the number of ranks awarded to people from Vukovar Opstina is out of proportion to the number of fighting men (it is said that about 4,500 ranks were awarded, and there were about 1,800 fighting men), the last commander of Vukovar's defense, Brig. Branko Borkovic, says that he is the only commander of a brigade of the HV denied the right to deliver "rewards and penalties." The ranks were awarded, he says, by someone else, haphazardly, without examining the real situation, and this added to the discord among the veterans of Vukovar.

The insignia of the brigade, which was designed after the breakthrough by the fighter Antun "Samuraj" Dugan, can be seen today only on the gravestones of some of its members.

About 330 fighting men were killed in the battles for the city. Unfortunately, there is no precise figure. About 300 fighters were taken from the hospital, some of them, it is assumed, were killed on Ovcara, and some are listed as "missing."

Brig. Borkovic, who today heads the infantry in the HV, spoke recently about the problems of the Vukovar veterans. "Commemorative medals are being awarded to the men from Vukovar behind the scenes," he said. And he went on: "After occupation of Vukovar, the Serbs were awarded promotions, decorations, and rewards, while we got handcuffs. Of the defenders who survived Vukovar, almost the same number died later on battlefields all over Croatia as were killed in the fighting in Vukovar. Suicides began occurring last year for the first time among the defenders of Vukovar, but this year this is growing into a terrible phenomenon."

And while no one is thinking about the tragedy of the Vukovar veterans, the commander of the Military Police, a film director and director of the Croatian Information and Culture Bureau, and the adjutant of the president of the republic are being given the high ranks of general.

[Box, p 3]

1. Major General Djuro Decak is one of the founders of the incumbent party. At one time, a successful hosteler, he became well-known after the JNA arrested him for "disarming paramilitary units." He earned the rank of major general in the fighting to liberate western Slavonia, in which he took part as commander of the Virovitica Brigade.

2. Maj. Gen. Mate Lausic, commander of the Military Police of the HV, is a former official of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. He became well-known to the general public as security chief of Universiad in Zagreb, and he was also responsible for security during the famous soccer match between Dinamo and Cervena Zvezda in 1990.

3. Maj. Gen. Velibor Kikerec, former chairman of the Military Office of the President of the Republic, began his political career as secretary of the Sabor. As chairman of the president's Military Office, he particularly distinguished himself by designing the uniform of the president's honor guard. He was promoted to the rank of reserve major general by decree of President Tudjman.

4. Col. Gen. Slobodan Praljak began his military career and distinguished himself as commander of the defense of Sunja. After the cease-fire was signed, he was appointed chief of the Political Administration of the Croatian Defense Ministry. He suddenly left the HV and became commander of the General Staff of the HVO. Soon after the Old Bridge in Mostar was destroyed, he returned to Croatia. He is today director of the Croatian Culture and Information Bureau and holds the rank of reserve colonel general.

5. Ivica Arbanas is a former commander of the ZNG in Vukovar and one of the first commanders of the city's defense. He went through training in Kumrovec and the

first conflicts at Plitvice and Pakrac as a member of a special police unit. He held the post of commander of Vukovar's defense until the arrival of Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic. He remained in Vukovar until it fell as a member of the city's defense staff. He lives today in Zadar and is a major in the HV.

6. Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, formerly a lieutenant colonel in the JNA, took over command of defense of Vukovar in August 1991 by command of the HV General Staff. After the fall of Vukovar, he was accused of stealing DM300,000, and during the investigation in military prison he received serious physical injury. He lives today in the village of Fernandovac on the Drava and is a farmer.

7. Branko "Little Hawk" Borkovic took over defense of Vukovar after Mile Dedakovic. He remained in Vukovar until it fell. Like a majority of the heroic defenders of Vukovar, he also spent time in detention awaiting trial after he arrived in Zagreb. Today, he has the rank of brigadier and is employed in the HV General Staff. He is president of the Association of Volunteers of the Homeland War. He has never been decorated.

Gligorov Discusses Regional Relations

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[Interview with FYROM President Kiro Gligorov by Zeljko Hodonj; place and date not given: "Greece Will Not Go to War Over Serbia"]

[Text] Entering the Macedonian parliament building, we ran into newly elected judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. They were rushing to meet the president of the country. Some 15 policemen were standing on the lawn in front of the building. We spotted a column of people some 50 meters to the south. The column of about 200 women were walking on the left side of the street and some 50 policemen on the right side of the street. Where were they going?

"To the Macedonian wall of tears," a man told me and pointed at the parliament building.

"That happens very often. People who have lost their jobs go there. Strikers go there. The police stop the traffic and demonstrators approach the building. Usually, one of the vice presidents comes out and talks to them, they complain to him and that is it."

The president might have seen them from his office on the first floor of the left wing of the parliament building, if he stood up. But he probably did not. He was probably already in a meeting with constitutional judges. He parted from us warmly, in a very lively manner for a man of 77 years, and we were equally warmly welcomed when he casually and calmly got up from his desk. Without much ceremony, just as we agreed the interview would be. No protocol. We only had to listen to the president's press adviser who said: "No longer than 35 minutes." We stayed longer than that. Nobody got upset about it.

[Hodonj] Mr. President, thank you for having found the time for this interview. The public of Croatia, as well as of Europe, want to know about the events that occurred recently at the Serb-Macedonian border. Last Saturday, you received international negotiators, Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg, before they left for Belgrade. They refused to make any comments to the press about the part of the interview that must have referred to the border dispute with Serbia. Have they conveyed Skopje's message to Belgrade and have you received any reply so far?

[Gligorov] No. There was no special message from me. We talked about the situation in Macedonia in general, about the international situation, and one of the subjects we discussed was, of course, the border, i.e. border incidents that have lately occurred at the Serb-Macedonian border. I informed them that those incidents are becoming more frequent and that this was linked to current events in Macedonia. First of all, it has to do with the list and pretensions of the Democratic Party of Serbia in Macedonia, which published some figures about the number of Serbs living in Macedonia that do not correspond with reality.

[Hodonj] They even mentioned the figure of 500,000 Serbs!

[Gligorov] Yes, there is absolutely no truth in that. I have always claimed that statistics in former Yugoslavia was not a weak point in that country. It had relatively high standards regarding statistics and this was recognized abroad as well. We do not have to emphasize the fact that every person in Macedonia was free to state his or her nationality. From the first census in 1952 to the last in 1991, there were about 40,000 Serbs in Macedonia. It is a well-known fact that, after the Yugoslav National Army pulled out of Macedonia, some Serb families left too. I know that people in Serbia know that, too. That means that this campaign has some other goals and that it forms a part of general political pressure, and is also linked to the forthcoming elections in the fall. Expectations that the blockade by Greece will have disastrous consequences for Macedonia, and that Macedonia will not be able to make its economy work, proved incorrect. That makes many people nervous, not only those in Serbia.

(Mr. Gligorov laughed heartily, confirming his statement with obvious pleasure, full of pride at another victory!)

And not only those in our neighboring countries!

How To Keep the Peace

[Hodonj] The Macedonian foreign minister gave an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw by 2 July, or the Macedonian Army will "push them back." At the same time, Macedonia has informed international institutions about the border events. If they really push the Serbs back or if the Serbs do not leave the elevation known as "Straza," will that be the beginning of an armed conflict?

[Gligorov] No, I do not believe so and I see no reason for it. I think we chose the only logical path for a country that has always fought to preserve peace in order to contain the war, to keep internal stability and solve problems by negotiating and through international institutions. We first went to the CSCE Standing Committee in Vienna. They had a session and the draft resolution we made was supported. There were some objections as to the formulation of the resolution, but I hope the resolution will be fully adopted. In the meantime, our foreign minister talked to the UN secretary general about the border dispute and presented reports by the CSCE and the peace commission that is presently in Macedonia—which found out what was happening—and requested to give those reports to UN members.

[Hodonj] When Macedonia decided to invite international forces, it requested that they be deployed along the borders with Albania and Serbia. Do you now expect UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to take a more active role in the preventive protection of Macedonian state territory?

[Gligorov] For the time being, there is no need to make a significant change in the mandate of peace forces in Macedonia. They are here primarily to observe and report. We thought that was most important, for we are a small country, and an attempt at aggression could be staged in a relatively short period of time. By the time the international public is informed about what really happened, there could be irreparable damage and loss of part of the territory. We, therefore, think that preventive activity by peacekeeping forces in Macedonia, which would enable us to promptly inform all members of the international community about what happens in the country, is a necessary precautionary measure, and one that could also enable them to react to that situation. Of course, we are the ones who should be prepared for such a situation, first of all. In addition to Scandinavian forces, international forces are also composed of U.S. soldiers. A contingent of about 1,000 soldiers presents no military protection to this country, but it is a clear message that spreading the war to this region would be a danger not only for Macedonia but also for the situation in the Balkans.

Greek-Serb Coordination

[Hodonj] Coordination between Greece and Serbia presents a violation of the Bucharest agreement of 1913. Do you not think so?

[Gligorov] It is well known that the Serbs are supported by the Greek government and politics, but I do not think Greece would go so far as to serve as a pretext for some military operations near its own borders. Among other reasons, because all our neighbors would then be involved in the conflict, and Turkey would most probably be involved as well. The West is aware of that possibility and the presence of peacekeeping forces is no coincidence.

[Hodonj] If it were not for the "Turkish danger," the idea of some political circles in Athens that advocate a direct border with Serbia would take wing. The former prime minister "blurted out" that Milosevic proposed that.

[Gligorov] That would suit the Serbs. But I must emphasize that we want good-neighborly relations with all our neighboring countries and the latest events have not changed that. Regardless of the conflict with Greece, we would be happy to develop properly founded good-neighborly and friendly relations with Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Turkey. But, should the war end, we would like to develop such relations with Serbia, that is, with the "FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]." Our friendship and cooperation—whether with Bulgaria, Albania, or Turkey—is not at the expense of any of our neighbors. We are well aware of the history lesson that says that only an independent Macedonia that does not grant privileges to any of its neighbors, is possible both as a state and as a prerequisite for peace and stability in the Balkans.

[Hodonj] What is the starting point for Macedonia's willingness to continue negotiating with Greece?

[Gligorov] Our firm view is that we want to negotiate with Greece about a package that would help solve not only this or that problem, leaving others to be solved in the future and cause new misunderstandings. We want an agreement that would form a lasting basis for our friendly relations. I think that we have many mutual interests in achieving such an agreement. Our conflict with Greece does not have any real basis, at least from our point of view. Economic, trade, political, and other interests—for Greece is a member of the EU and we are also taking the European option—require lasting and wholehearted cooperation between the two countries. The conflict over the name and the symbol is the legacy of an entire history of various burdens that exist in the Balkans. If both sides concentrated on the present and the joint future—and we are willing to do that—there is no reason why we should not reach such an agreement. We proposed that the agreement between the Germans and the Poles, which solved much more difficult problems between the two nations, should form the basis for our agreement. We would like to conclude such an agreement with Greece.

[Hodonj] Does that mean that the negotiations under the auspices of Cyrus Vance will be continued in mid-July?

[Gligorov] That is what should happen, I could even say that it will definitely happen. The only problem for the time being is Cyrus Vance's health. The talks will probably be resumed as soon as he gets well.

The Albanians—a Minority or a Nation?

[Hodonj] It does not hurt to ask, at the time of the census, is there a political reality for Albanian autonomy in Macedonia, in your opinion?

[Gligorov] I think we have already solved the problem. In the past two or three years, from the commission of the Geneva Conference until the present, the problem has been widely discussed and many things have become clearer. We showed that it was possible to preserve internal stability and interethnic dialogue, joint participation in the parliament, etc. We cannot expect a sensitive problem between different nations to be solved in just two or three years, but Macedonia has shown that such problems can and must be solved in institutions: in a democratic manner, through dialogue and tolerance. And, of course, with a determination to take joint responsibility for the destiny of this country. I am convinced that this is the basis on which we can preserve internal stability and Macedonian sovereignty.

[Hodonj] In the letter from Albanian President Sali Berisha, on the occasion of the international recognition of Macedonia, he said that, in addition to developing friendly relations, he expected Macedonia to consider the constituent position of the Albanians. Was that not a demand to give the Albanians the status of a constituent nation in Macedonia?

[Gligorov] The two of us met and I do not think such a demand was ever made. Lately, President Berisha has been talking about respecting international norms with regard to minority rights. We have the same view on that. You can see that from the census. Let us make one thing clear, we demanded that the census be conducted. It was not imposed on us.

[Hodonj] Some members of the opposition claim the census was imposed.

[Gligorov] That is not true. Already at the time of Carrington's commission, there was an official demand to take a census, because all Macedonia's neighbors started speculating that there were more members of other nationalities in Macedonia than had been recognized in the past 45 years. Therefore, we should presently have at least 4 million inhabitants.

[Hodonj] Or there would be no Macedonians?

[Gligorov] At the time of the disintegration of the Eastern European socialist countries and of the collapse of those regimes, at the time of the collapse of Yugoslavia, some international institutions readily accepted the complaints of all those who appeared to be threatened. I think many were indeed threatened in this part of Europe. We did not deny anything, but we wanted to see how things really were. We were patient in trying to learn the truth and came up with a law that was accepted by the expert group and we requested international control of the census. Not only of the census but of the entire statistics and data processing.

Idea About "Big Countries"

[Hodonj] At the meeting with Bulgarian President Zhelev, you agreed not to sign the agreed documents, as the Macedonian version had not been prepared. President Zhelev was not backed by the government nor by parliamentary parties. Could you comment on the relations with Bulgaria?

[Gligorov] The two countries depend on each other. What the Bulgarian side is now insisting on are the remnants of the past. Perhaps this is not the best way to put it, but all Balkan countries must experience the Vietnam syndrome. The problem must be cleared up within the country and be shed as historical waste. Almost all countries once had the ambition to be big. Whether through the idea about "greater Serbia," "greater Albania," "greater Bulgaria." We must start being realistic. The conflict in former Yugoslavia originated from the Kosovo conflict and all its implications. We can also consider the San Stefan Bulgaria that only existed for a year, between the two congresses—the one in San Stefan and the one in Berlin. If we stick to the idea of creating ethnically pure countries, there will never be peace in the Balkans, there will always be war.

[Hodonj] We now focus on the war for "greater Serbia." How do you think it will end?

[Gligorov] How will it end? This idea—and I have already said what I think about such ideas—is inherent in some other Balkan countries as well. Every Balkan country must relinquish such ideas if they want to be part of Europe. I think that is the main problem that does not allow us to become anything but a part of the Balkans.

[Hodonj] I have read in Macedonian newspapers that Macedonia must have access to the sea. Are there talks about the free trade zone in Salonika.... What do you think about that?

[Gligorov] Macedonia, as a country with its present borders, cannot have access to the sea. That would be a territorial pretension and our Constitution says we have none. However, that does not mean that, through friendly cooperation as a result of mutual economic interests, we could not benefit from free trade zones in ports toward which we gravitate. During our talks, President Berisha suggested we get an area to build warehouses in Durres. Why should we not get a place in Salonika or some other port? In Bulgaria, for instance.

[Hodonj] Can you comment on relations between Macedonia and Croatia? Will you visit Croatia?

[Gligorov] Historically speaking, we have long-standing and friendly relations with Croatia. Our destiny is similar in many ways. There are good reasons for close and wholehearted cooperation. These events have hindered not only our relations with Croatia. We are struggling to develop good relations with Slovenia, to reach Hungary, reach Europe. Now we can only use circuitous routes. I think this sea route via Durres has already produced results, but it can be used even better.

We have no political conflicts; our two countries are economically compatible, they complement each other in many ways, and these form realistic foundations for our cooperation. Our fellow-Macedonians—and we want them to be respectable citizens of Croatia—organized themselves to protect their national character and cooperation with their native country, and have now been given a place of worship in Croatia. All this shows that there are no obstacles to our cooperation. Both countries should exchange ambassadors as soon as possible, and it is odd that this was not done sooner. I last met President Tudjman at the session of the UN General Assembly in New York last year. We had a useful and meaningful conversation and we should, naturally, meet again. When and where—that is a matter for agreement.

[Box, p 6]

American Base

[Hodonj] In Serbia, there are rumors that Macedonia will probably lease out the base at Krovilak to the U.S. army. Could you comment on that?

[Gligorov] That is totally untrue. We neither offered the base, nor did the Americans ask us to let them use

Krovilak as their base. I do not think that is necessary, in the present situation. It is not only in the interest of the United States, but also of NATO and the European Union not to allow the war to spread toward the south, for it would then reach the border of a NATO member. And that would add another perspective to the situation in the Balkans.

[Box, p 7]

To Run Away From the War

[Hodonj] People remember you as the man who has long believed one could preserve a kind of inter-governmental Yugo cooperation. What do you think now?

[Gligorov] I do not think so. I was the one who was most persistent in trying to prevent the war and finding a basis for an honest agreement and disintegration, much like that between the Czechs and the Slovaks, or to secure a kind of loose association of sovereign countries that would be members of the UN. When I became convinced that this was not possible, I realized that the only possibility of coexistence in this region was for every republic to have its own independent country, to be responsible for its own development. As I was aware of the consequences of war in this region, war that would inevitably have national, ethnic, and international characteristics, I thought we should not participate in the war. We have been butchered and lost our independence in every war so far, lost the chance for having our own national state. Therefore, in Macedonia we chose to stay out of the war in order to prevent—as much as we could—the war from spreading southward, aware of the danger of the possible spreading of the war in the Balkans to all of Europe.

[Box, p 7]

Serb Aggression and Sanctions

[Hodonj] Can you comment on the implementation and the effect of international sanctions on the "FRY" and the responsibility of the "FRY" for the situation in the occupied areas of Croatia?

[Gligorov] The international community has obviously not found any means to add to the purely political, negotiations, etc., other than economic sanctions. I do not think sanctions will be lifted before key questions on the future of this region are solved, before mutual recognition of former Yugoslav republics as independent countries. That is a complex process and I do not believe that the international community will relinquish the means that may help solve the crisis.

However, what may happen next, how this means will be used, whether to soften or to aggravate the crisis—it all depends upon the pragmatic politics of the international community, but also on increasing awareness in Serbia and other parts of former Yugoslavia that those sanctions have very serious consequences and that, in the long run, they can have disastrous consequences. Every country must take the consequences of sanctions into account.

[Box, p 7]

Croat-Muslim Federation

[Hodonj] Can you comment on the events in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially after the signing of the Washington agreement?

[Gligorov] I think that the forming of the Muslim-Croat federation is a significant step forward. The war has stopped, there are prospects for coexistence and working together. I would not like to predict what temptations may follow, but I think it was a positive act, a step toward ending the war and finding new ways of coexistence on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It would be good if one could find a way to include the other part of Bosnia in the Croat-Muslim federation, for that would prevent possible future conflicts and war—especially with regard to the events in the aftermath of the aggression that has led to the occupation of the greater part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Albanian Deputies To Boycott Assembly

LD0207135794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1045 GMT 2 Jul 94

[Excerpt] Skopje, 2 Jul (TANJUG)—The group of deputies of the Albanian parties—the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] and the National Democratic Party [NDP]—will temporarily stop taking part in the work of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly as of today. This decision has been taken by the PDP and NDP leaderships in the wake of the trial of 10 Albanians and the subsequent sentences passed in late June for their participation in a scandal known as "the Albanian paramilitary." One of those convicted is former PDP Secretary Midhat Emini. [passage omitted]

PDP Comments on Boycott

AU0507153894 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 5 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "PDP Will Not Be Pendant"]

[Text] Following the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] deputy group leaving Parliament, the group's deputy coordinator Ismet Ramadani stated that PDP will negotiate on possibilities of this party remaining within the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] system institutions. He said there were demands by the membership, i.e., the party branches, to get out in the streets and organize meetings. But, Ramadani explained, PDP is aware of the difficult situation Macedonia is in at the moment, pressed from both north and south, and therefore wants to show its

sense of responsibility and desire to make efforts to negotiate on Macedonia's future, before the worst happens.

PDP, as a party, has faced great temptations, Ramadani went on, because it was under constant pressure by groups and individuals, but this party's political moves and its "participation in the system's institutions meant a great deal for the Republic of Macedonia." "We were aware this was the only way to go on in the future, and still think so, but we often conclude there are subjects refusing to show understanding for us." Despite of all, "we are for negotiations, but we will not be only a pendant in Parliament or in the coalition government." Asked on how long will the PDP group be absent from Parliament, he informed that the group will hold a meeting today to find a solution, stressing they also expect good faith gestures by the other side. He refused to make any suppositions on when the PDP group might return to Parliament. He only said they will not participate in the Parliament's work until the others take the situation more seriously.

Census Commission Announces Preliminary Results

AU0607112194 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 6 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Census '94"]

[Text] The census of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was successfully realized. This is an evaluation of the census by the State Census Committee, which still left possibilities for finalizing the census by July 10, for all those who need more time. The Committee held a press conference, stating the census, having in mind present conditions, still gives a satisfactory picture for the largest part of the country. Risto Ivanov, the Committee's President, conditionally divided the municipalities in five groups. The first group includes 23 municipalities in which the census is completely carried out; the second consist of 7 municipalities in which it has been realized up to 50 percent; the third embodies municipalities in which the census has been started but is realized from 20 to 50 percent. The census is not even begun in Debar—this is clear case of boycott and reports from Tetovo vary every day and there is no clear picture on the situation. The Committee decided to have another 12 census stations open in Debar and the president of the local census committee has been replaced. The Debar township warned the citizens the boycott is an act of civil disobedience, but no charges has been brought against any one thus far.

The Committee also formed a working group to prepare its own report on the census situation in Tetovo.

July 4 inclusive, the census operation registered 1,279,314 citizens, 1,268,347 of them having legal residentship, as well as 365,705 households, 398,750 apartments, and 126,425 farms.

Albanians To Request Extended Deadline

AU0607110394 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 6 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Request for Prolonged Census Term"]

[Text] Citing unofficial sources, the Macedonian [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Television informs the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] held its final consultations with the Albanian ministers in the Macedonian Government and is likely to issue an official request for prolonging of the census deadline for five to six days. The television also quotes an official statement on the party resolve not to consider the census as valid unless this request is met. The television comments that the European expert team also seems to go along with the Albanian view. This is confirmed with the latest statement by (Verner Haug) on the necessity to complete the census in order to prevent manipulations with the final figures, national structure, and all other parameters on the social and economic life in Macedonia.

Despite being carried out in accordance with all known and acknowledged international criteria, the census in Macedonia is obviously being quietly boycotted by the Albanian part of the country's population, under instructions by their political representatives in the government. The European experts, who are in daily contacts with the Albanian politicians did not do much to prevent this. This prolonging is just another concession in the series made during this census, mainly in all census centres in western Macedonia. Will this be the last request by the Albanian parties regarding the census, initiated by them in the first place or will there be new demands? And, what will the final results be like, archived by so many pressures? There are dilemmas emerging by themselves, casting shadow on the main purpose of the census—to yield facts for determining the truth, the Macedonian Television comment concludes.

Skopje Police Interrogate Albanian TV Team

AU0207150194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 1 Jul 94

[Text] Our filming group returned from The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] at lunchtime today. The group encountered difficulties there as it was summoned to the Skopje police station. The journalist and the cameraman were interrogated for one hour. They were threatened with the confiscation of their film.

They were also warned that, in the future, they should first present themselves to the Interior Ministry organs of this state if they need to film in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Air Force Receives Russian-Made Helicopters

LD0207185294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1656 GMT 2 Jul 94

[Text] Skopje, 2 Jul (TANJUG)—The first helicopters for the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Air Force have recently arrived from Russia at the military part of Skopje's Petrovec airport, it was learned in Skopje today.

The MI-17 helicopters belong to the category of medium-size helicopters, and their basic purpose is the transport of personnel and equipment, logistical support to units in the field, and medevac runs. These helicopters are not intended for combat operations.

The MI-17 is an updated version of the MI-8 and was introduced in the Soviet Air Force in 1982. The helicopters purchased by Macedonia were manufactured in 1992 and cost $2.7 million each.

The exact number of helicopters delivered from Russia has not been disclosed. The Macedonian Army's general headquarters has probably opted for helicopters—not airplanes—because they are cheaper and because the air space of this republic is too small to allow the unhindered and efficient use of modern aircraft.

Defense Ministry: Straza Peak 'Demilitarized'

AU0507113494 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 5 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Defense Ministry Announcement"]

[Text] In regard to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] territory, the Macedonian Defense Ministry issued a special announcement, saying: "On July 2, 1994, the Yugoslav Army withdrew from the elevation peak 1703, near Cupino Brdo. This created conditions for alleviating of the tension at the Macedonian-Yugoslav border. The withdrawal is the result of successful diplomatic activities by the Republic of Macedonia, the United Nations, CSCE, and the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Headquarters in Macedonia, indicating the significance of the preventive diplomacy aimed to prevent the Yugoslav crisis from spreading into Macedonia. The Macedonia Army troops' professional behavior and engagement also contributed much to the preservation of peace and stability in Macedonia.

Past events at the Macedonian-Yugoslav border and their successful resolving are a solid basis for reaching agreement between the two nations on demarcating the border lines and developing friendly relations."

Meanwhile, according to the agreement between UNPROFOR and Yugoslav Army officials, the peak 1703 will for the time being remain demilitarized, until the border line in this region is officially determined and marked.

Federal

Army Statement on Moving Units Near FYROM

LD0507161894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1416 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Jul (TANJUG)—Following the developments in the area of Cupino Brdo on the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], the information service of the Yugoslav Army's general staff has issued a statement saying that border units which secured the administrative border between the FRY and the FYROM in the area of Cupino Brdo have moved to other positions in the border area, in keeping with the agreement reached, and as a sign of goodwill and lasting determination to resolve border disputes peacefully.

The administrative border between the FRY and the FYROM is not clearly defined due to particular land features in the area of Cupino Brdo, and the data from different municipal land registers is different and contradictory.

The two sides have agreed with the UN Protection Forces to refrain from actions which could increase the risk of incidents and could prejudge final demarcation of the border between the two states. The first step in this direction is the moving of the units of both sides, with simultaneous deployment of the UN units in the area in dispute. The situation on the administrative border between the FRY and the FYROM is peaceful and the reasons for increased tension have been eliminated.

The Yugoslav Army demands that the Macedonian side respect the agreement and refrain from causing violations in this or any other disputed areas along the administrative border. The Yugoslav Army expects the UN units to contribute toward the stabilization of peace in the area by playing an unbiased role, the statement says in conclusion.

Article Views Border Problems With FYROM

Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jun 94 p 18

[Report by Zorica R.S.: "Calculated Cacophony"]

[Text] If countries want to regulate their borders legally, they must set up state commissions with the aim of producing two documents: the Description of the Border and the Atlas of Topographic Maps. This would then be followed by a bilateral agreement and the marking of the border on the ground.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] and Yugoslavia had never defined the border between them. Even in the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia did not agree to work in the joint commissions for determining republican borders.

When a Border Is Not Defined

After the secession of the southernmost republic of the former SFRY, the border needed to be secured. Since the state border was not defined, the only thing left for Yugoslavia to do was to secure those lines that represented the administrative border. This is in fact the border of cadastre communes. The cadastre records of the communes in Serbia stated precisely where the majority of the administrative borders were, but some areas were not included in any documents, neither the Serbian nor Macedonian, nor were they determined by commissions or marked on the ground.

Today, these areas represent the "contentious" part of the border. In other words, there are five ares that the Macedonian and Yugoslav sides view differently.

The west slope of the Sar Planina (the Commune of Gora), represents, in terms of the area, the biggest part of the contentious border—7,607 hectares. The other problematic area are the 2,184 hectares in the Kopiljace region (between the communes of Vitina and Kumanovo). The remaining three regions are small areas of land in the regions of Glabocnice, Prohor Pcinski, and Kriva Palanka.

In July 1992, respecting the administrative borders, Yugoslavia and Macedonia deployed their border guards and neither side objected to this delineation for almost two years. Then, since April of this year, Macedonian diplomats started sending protest notes one after another. They frequently claimed that the Army of Yugoslavia had violated the sovereignty of FYROM by violating its border.

Army of Yugoslavia in Yugoslavia

The most frequently made claims were that our border guards were entering "deep into Macedonian territory." Furthermore, they protested that the army dug trenches, as they said, inside Macedonian territory. According to Macedonian Defense Minister Vlado Popovski, the Straza elevation is on Macedonian territory and the Yugoslav soldiers had taken hold of it. In addition, a Yugoslav Air Force aircraft intercepted a UN helicopter that was allegedly in the Macedonian air space, while the Army of Yugoslavia did not allow the peacekeepers' vehicles to travel on a road inside Macedonia.

A UN press spokeswoman in Skopje stated that approximately a dozen incidents occur on the Yugoslav-Macedonian border each month. If the "incidents" imply written announcements of incidents issued by the Macedonian Government, then this figure is correct. However, these are only reports without any confirmation (despite the checks that had been performed) that something had happened. Objectively speaking, there are hardly any serious incidents. Neither the Yugoslav aircraft nor the Yugoslav soldiers violated the Macedonian border. The truth is that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] on many occasions had used the road that passes by the Kodra Fure mountain peak, a road that is in Serbia. Even though there is another road on the Macedonian side, the one in Yugoslavia suited the Blue Helmets more. UN members were indeed withdrawn hospitality on our roads when the partiality of the organization was revealed.

Macedonia offered to UNPROFOR its views on the border, views that represent a one-sided and unfounded desire. This desire has no legal validity. The one who relies on a Macedonian map can also accept that a Yugoslav aircraft and the Yugoslav soldiers had violated Macedonian space. However, according to international norms, until regulated, this border cannot be earmarked for Macedonian appetites either.

Grumpy Macedonian Minister

Although the UN officials do not think there is an objective danger for FYROM from the north—even Kiro Gligorov had to admit that Yugoslavia is not preparing an aggression on his republic—the minister of Macedonian defense is threatening Yugoslavia with "international factors" and military intervention. It appears that Macedonia is simultaneously demanding that international forces protect its northern part and announcing that the Macedonian Army will take this strategic peak with force if the Yugoslav Army does not withdraw from the Straza elevation.

In addition to the Macedonian media, media of many other countries also reported on the problems on the Macedonian-Yugoslav border. The majority of foreign media, at least for the time being, reject the Macedonian theory that Yugoslavia will impose a military conflict. CNN did try, however, to refresh its program with the announcement of "a possible new war" in the Balkans. In the chronology of events, one must not overlook the fact that FYROM did not have any objections to the administrative borders until U.S. soldiers were posted in its border regions. After persistent demands by Macedonia, UNPROFOR deployed its troops along the border with Yugoslavia and Albania. One-third of these troops are from the United States. Was it because of the U.S. presence that the UNPROFOR commander described certain reasonable activities of the Army of Yugoslavia as the "demonstration of force?"

So, what is Macedonia gaining with the latest cacophony? The diversion of the public's attention from the suspect census? Closing of its own ranks prior to the parliamentary elections? Or more international units in case conflicts break out at home? If Macedonia is a "powder keg," it is certainly not because of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its first problem is the Macedonian Albanians. If, according to the media of that country without a name, the incidents on the border are "part of the Serbian-Greek plan to force Macedonia back into the Yugoslav federation," what kind of choice should the local Albanians make? Who should they hate or be afraid of more—the Macedonians or Serbs? If they opt for the latter, they will have more tame relations with their Macedonian compatriots. In this way, Macedonia will postpone its troubles for some time. After that, they will probably think of new dangers into which to channel the discontent of their citizens.

Simic Outlines Government Stance to UK Envoy

LD0507195294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1907 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, July 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Vice-Premier Zeljko Simic said Tuesday that for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia peace was and remained a measure of all political decisions and the goal to be sought after regardless of the sanctions. Simic made the statement during a meeting with British Belgrade embassy charge d'affaires Ivor Roberts, the Yugoslav Information Ministry said.

Simic noted that a gradual normalisation of relations between Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia might have a decisive impact on the outcome of the overall crisis in territory of the former Yugoslavia and entire Balkan Peninsula.

Speaking about the normalisation of Serbian-Croatian relations, Simic said continuation of the negotiating process and use of political and diplomatic means are the only realistic and for both sides acceptable commitment conducive to easing tensions and securing a peaceful and lasting solution.

Simic informed the British diplomat with Yugoslav Government's stands regarding the situation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and its consistent efforts for ending the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina as soon as possible as well as finding such political solution as would conform to reality and the interests of all sides, the Yugoslav Information Ministry said.

Simic heads the Yugoslav negotiating team for the normalisation of relations with Croatia. Opening of offices in Zagreb and Belgrade was the first step taken in that direction.

Montenegro

Croatian Envoy Arrives in Podgorica for Talks

AU0607065994 Zagreb HINA in English 1739 GMT 5 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Zvonimir Markovic Visits Montenegro"]

[Text] Podgorica, 5 Jul—The head of the Republic of Croatia's office in Belgrade, Zvonimir Markovic, arrived today in Montenegro for a several-day visit. In Montenegro Markovic will meet the highest state officials. Markovic will be received by Montenegrin Foreign Minister, Miodrag Lekic on Wednesday morning, as well as by Premier Milo Djukanovic. Markovic is scheduled for holding a press conference on Wednesday noon.

During the several-day stay to Montenegro Zvonimir Markovic will visit the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Bar and the Diocese of Kotor (at the Adriatic coast) where he will meet the Bar Archbishop, Petar Perkolic, and the Kotor Bishop, Ivo Gugic. Their talks will concentrate on the activities of the Catholic Church and the position of Croats in Montenegro.